Daily Report

East Europe

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Former Monarch Affirms Tirana Massacre

PM0609082690 Paris LE MONDE in French 1 Sep 90 p 7

[Unattributed report: "A Massacre Allegedly Took Place in Tirana at Beginning of July"]

[Text] King Leka I of Albania said in a news conference in Creteil on Thursday [30 August] that around 380 people were killed during a demonstration in Albania on Monday, 2 July. According to the pretender to the throne, who usually lives in exile in South Africa, the secret police in Tirana charged "the wave of refugees besieging the embassies." Almost 80 protestors were apparently executed on the spot, while the others were taken by truck to a location near Dajti Mountain, killed, and thrown into "hastily covered common graves."

The authorities explained to the families of those who had disappeared that they were among the 5,000 Albanians who had fled to the West. The embassies in Tirana, however, never reported these events, which surprises King Leka I, who thinks that agents "controlled by the Sigurimi" [secret police] had "infiltrated" the mass of refugees, including the 543 Albanians who recently arrived in France. "The Albanian authorities made effective arrangements to place the refugees in a difficult position," he said, on the basis of eyewitness reports.

Expressing the view that "after 45 years of pressure on the Albanian people, the regime is in disarray," Leka I launched a message to his compatriots in Albanian: "Wait for the signal to overthrow this regime which has killed so many of our people!"

Cami, Others Speak at Army Youth Aktiv Meeting

AU0509094790 Tirana ZERI I RINISE in Albanian 29 Aug 90 pp 1-2

[ZERI I RINISE correspondent's report: "National Army Youth Aktiv Holds its Proceedings"]

[Excerpts] The national army youth aktiv held its proceedings in one of the halls of the Central House of the People's Army in Tirana on Saturday [26 August].

Secretaries of the youth committees of military, border guard, and internal affairs units attended. Comrade Foto Cami, member of the Albanian Workers Party Central Committee Politburo and secretary to the Central Committee, and Comrade Kico Mustaqi, minister of people's defense, also took part.

The meeting was opened by Lisen Bashkurti, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Albanian Union of Working Youth [AUWY]. Luan Bregasi, secretary to the AUWY Central Committee, presented the report "The Homeland Tomorrow Will Be What Young People Are Today." [passage omitted]

Comrade Luan Bregasi said in his report that young people should be under no illusion that the world is disarming, that the danger of war is receding, and that, as a result, the Army has nothing to do.

Whether we like it or not and whether we admit it or not, it is a fact that the extensive propaganda now being spread throughout the world about reductions in armaments, troops, and military expenditure and the withdrawal of troops from Eastern European countries and other parts of the world has created the idea among our young people—and even some cadres—that the danger of war is receding, the Army has no more work to do, there is no reason to train, and so forth. Consciously or unconsciously, the pressure exerted by the internal enemy also fosters this attitude: "You soldiers can sit back;" "Do not exercise the soldiers;" "Against whom are you preparing yourselves?;" and so forth. It is true that there are efforts in today's world to reduce tensions and trends toward detente and pacifism. Evidence should be produced, however, to explain to young people that this does not mean that there is no more war, that peace now prevails, and we are wasting time in our units. The worst thing is that our comrades have not sharpened their arguments; they talk in generalities and wander around the subject, thus confusing instead of persuading. Propaganda without evidence achieves the opposite end to that which was intended. Our young people must be told frankly that there are genuine efforts to reduce military expenditure. This does not mean that imperialism has changed its nature or has given up expansion, but that it has done this for tactical reasons, because of urgent economic needs, and in order to release financial resources. Is there any more recent example than that of the recent events in the Persian Gulf, where—at the very climax of euphoria over peace and diplomatic dialogue and discussion—the Iraq-Kuwait war broke out? [passage omitted]

Nevertheless, cases of superficial and one-sided understanding are encountered in many youth organizations, which are—in the most extreme cases—sometimes accompanied by individual and group excesses. There are cases of absence without leave, the poor performance of duties, and so forth, which are the result of black-and-white thinking and the interference of local problems in the Army; these are reflected without considering the Army's characteristics and duties. For example, changes in the field of legislation are often taken to be changes in the military regulations.

Similarly, among many young people, the word "democracy" sounds like a concession or liberalism. I will join the ranks if I want to, but not if I do not want to; I will return from leave if I want to, but not if I do not want to; I will carry out the order if I want to, but not if I do not want to. This is not a correct understanding of democracy. Democracy does not presuppose breaches of rules and regulations, but on the contrary implies young people's active participation in their enforcement. An increasing tendency to demand rights has been noticeable during this period, alongside a reluctance to perform duties. This is not democracy. Democracy presupposes that rights stem from the performance of duties. [passage omitted]

Finally, Comrade Foto Cami also spoke. He assessed the proceedings of this army youth aktiv and the progress of the movement of "The Homeland Tomorrow Will Be What Young People Are Today" in accordance with the situations developing in the world and our country and the measures the party has taken for the further democratization of the country's life.

The situations developing in the world and around us, he later stressed, demand that all young people—especially our young people—serving in the Army must be alert and vigilant. This calls for more intensive and substantial work from the youth organizations, work which will touch young people's hearts and minds. The situation in which we are living is an unusual one, and the life and work of the youth organization and every individual young person must be similarly unusual. The main thing in all the youth organization's work is to correctly understand situations and to strengthen the spirit of patriotism as important factors in carrying out duties assigned within the framework of the movement to confront any situation that may arise.

Comrade Foto Cami later stressed that it is necessary to politically assess every event, phenomenon, and situation, putting the interests of the country and the nation in first place. These events and phenomena should be analyzed and discussed, and concrete measures should be proposed to overcome them. The youth organizations must keep these situations at the center of their attention, analyze them carefully, and oppose pacifist illusions which may spread, always reinforcing revolutionary alertness. It is important to strengthen the ties between the youth organization and young people themselves by organizing more activities, discussions, and analytical sessions.

Comrade Foto Cami concluded by expressing confidence that the Army's young people and its organization will be able to honorably carry out every duty the party will entrust to them in order to preserve the homeland's freedom and independence.

Ministry Protests Greek Ambassador's Statement

AU0409194590 Tirana Domestic Service in Albanian 1800 GMT 4 Sep 90

[Text] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania today delivered a protest note to the ambassador of the Greek Republic in Tirana, to be conveyed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Greek Republic.

The note states, among other things, that, according to the Greek media, the Second Pan-Greek Academic Congress on the Problem of Vorioepiros [Northern Epirus, part of Albania] was recently held in the Greek town of Konitsa, in which high-level Greek officials also took part. Speeches were made at this congress in the language of enmity, with threats to the Albanian people and open territorial claims at the expense of our country. The speech of Kanellopoulos, deputy prime minister and minister of justice, draws special attention, with its outright demands for the reconsideration of the geographical map of Europe, involving territorial claims to what is called Vorioepiros.

The note of our country's Foreign Ministry stresses that all this activity has been accompanied by anti-Albanian propaganda and even irresponsible acts in the border zone. Such serious incidents conflict with the Greek Government's expressed desire for good relations between our two countries and its international commitments, the spirit of Balkan cooperation, and positive European processes. The note goes on to underline that the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs expresses its vigorous protest at the aforementioned chauvinist attitudes which disturb the atmosphere of good-neighborliness between our two peoples and countries, and threaten peace and security in our region. The note expresses the desire and confidence that the Greek Government will dissociate itself from these chauvinist statements and attitudes, and will take steps to ensure that such incidents are not repeated in the future.

'Vandalism' After BSP Headquarters Arson Viewed

AU0609092390 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 4 Sep 90 p 1

[Nikolay Stefanov article: "We Are Living With Vandals"]

[Text] Whether we accept it, or not, whether we try to describe it in other terms, or whether, being afraid of the truth, we prefer to close our eyes—we still have to face the facts: Vandals do exist in our country; they are here among us; they are part of our society. We are already living with them in the same country, in the same city, we are facing them eye to eye. They do not even try to hide and do not hesitate to provoke us by more and more frequently disrupting our everyday lives. For several mornings now we have been standing in silence, facing the devastating results of their night orgies.

I tried to look into their eyes during the night in which they set the Sofia headquarters of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] on fire. Not only the fanatical hatred, but also the fear of counteraction dimmed their eyes, while they were throwing the first stones and planks against the windows of the massive building. Later on, when the red tongues of fire which could have burned us all,exploded, their faces shone with a savage glow of triumph.

Last Saturday [1 September], I observed their sudden attack, in Sofia again—this time it happened at the coffee shop of the "Rubin" Restaurant on Lenin Square. For over 20 minutes the peaceful atmosphere of the open air restaurant was disrupted by dozens of young people, who, without being provoked, suddenly and cruelly assaulted people, injuring their mouths and foreheads with their bare fists and with the chairs of the restaurant.

On Sunday, 2 September, I learned that during Friday night they also committed vandalism in the abandoned building of the Bulgarian Journalists Union headquarters, which is situated at a distance of only a few hundred meters from the "Rubin" Restaurant. At the "Copper Factory" cemetery, in the Nadezhda District of downtown Sofia, they did not hesitate to disturb the peace of the dead and to destroy some memorial plates.

We are already living among vandals and it does not actually matter whether they are the product of the seeds of silence sown over the last decades, or whether they reemerged as some newly revived relicts from the Stone Age. It is probably a combination of both phenomena, resulting from the fact that, whenever a society is in transition to the free expression of individual human aspirations, some of its members, prompted by the primordial fear of their own lack of intellectual values and prompted by their inferiority complex, join together on the basis of the herd principle.

It is only paradoxical, at a first glance at least, that instead of herd of cattle, we are facing a pack of wolves. I have observed how physical strength and vulgar rudeness seem to be valued as the most precious "virtues" by these groups. After an initial internal "selection," this youth group, which looks innocent at a first glance, is transformed into a gang ruled by iron discipline, searching for an opportunity to act. Where would they find more favorable conditions for such actions than in a society like ours which is in the process of transition to democracy and where the old structures are falling apart, while the new ones have not yet been established? Let alone the probability that someone might be tempted to exploit the potential of such vandalistic gangs for political goals....

The vandals are here and I am convinced that we cannot protect ourselves against them by forming voluntary, or even organized self-defense groups. I think that we could spare our free citizens the trial of a being newly enrolled in so-called "organized" and "disciplinarian squads." It is my conviction that such responsibilities should be immediately taken over by those institutions which in every democratic state are in charge of guaranteeing the citizens' freedom and inviolability. This should apply to all citizens without exception, and to every individual in particular.

NOVINI Initiates Arson Attack Investigation

AU0509123890 Sofia VECHERNI NOVINI in Bulgarian 4 Sep 90 p 1

[Unattributed editorial: "Truth! Only Truth!"]

[Text] A team of the VECHERNI NOVINI Editorial Board is beginning an independent journalistic investigation of all events, statements, and reports of eyewitnesses, as well as documented facts related to the arson attack against, and devastation [pogrom] of, the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] headquarters in Sofia.

We appeal to all photographers and citizens who have photographed the events in the vicinity of the BSP headquarters on the night of 26-27 August to submit them for payment. We appeal to eyewitnesses to come to the Editorial Board so that we can record their accounts. We appeal to all citizens who have any documents or reports to submit them to the team which is conducting the independent journalistic investigation.

We would like to clearly declare that our investigation aims to assist the official investigation rather than obstruct it. All material that is collected by the Editorial Board will be submitted to the official investigators after being subjected to complete openess on our part.

For details and to establish contact please call telephone numbers 46-73-68, 44-26-24, 44-67-09, and 44-14-66. VECHERNI NOVINI.

Pencho Penev Appointed New Interior Minister

AU0509173090 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1630 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] By decree of the president of the Republic, Pencho Stoyanov Penev is appointed minister of

internal affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria. Until now he served as minister of justice.

By order of the president of Bulgaria, Stoyan Peykov Stoyanov is relieved of the post of first deputy minister of internal affairs at his request.

President Repeals Privileges of Certain Citizens

AU0509152390 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1500 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] BTA has received the following announcement from the Chancellery of the President of the Republic:

By Decree No. 82, issued today under the powers granted to him provided by Article 92, Paragraph 9 of the Bulgarian Constitution, the president of the Republic repealed the illegal acts establishing privileges for certain categories of persons, which run counter to the principles of the equality of citizens before the law proclaimed in Article 35 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

The decree cancels the privileges enjoyed by holders of the title of Active Fighter Against Fascism and Capitalism connected with satisfying their housing needs and installing domestic telephones.

Zhelev Calls for National Unity on Anniversary

AU0509201490 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Address to nation by President Zhelyu Zhelev on the occasion of the 105th anniversary of the union of the Principality of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] Dear compatriots:
Tomorrow we will celebrate the 105th anniversary of the union of the Principality of Bulgaria with Eastern Rumelia. This is a great day in the history of the new Bulgaria. On this day, I would like us to forget about what divides us and leads us into mutual confrontation, and to think about those things which draw us closer together and unite as citizens of this country; to think about our historical past which, albeit in different ways, is constantly present in each one of us and forms part of us.

History is an inseparable part of the life of modern man. For this reason, not infrequently the solutions to many contemporary problems lie hidden in the past we have already lived through, in our own historical experience, whose dimensions in modern life acquire new importance or new meaning.

Accordingly, tomorrow, as we mark a great historical event, let us look back into the past, let us try to divine its meaning, and let us decipher its message in a new way, because the unification is not only a great event in the new Bulgarian history, but also a symbol, a symbol of the national unification of the Bulgarian people.

It is no accident that our forefathers inscribed on the facade of their parliament: Union provides strength. They were the first to understand the profound political meaning of the message. As a political event, the unification was a reaction against the decision of the Congress of Berlin and a proof of the fact that artificial limitation and division of a nation, imposed by foreign interests, cannot be long-lasting, because the unification surprised the world 105 years ago not so much by the challenge it raised to the political will of the great powers as by the independence of the political decision and the firm resolve to assume an immense responsibility. This responsibility was assumed by politicians with no particular experience in managing affairs of state, but by retaining the moral fervor and fighting spirit of the Bulgarian revival they succeeded in their efforts. For this reason, this greatest independent and [word indistinct] action by the Bulgarian people to restore their national unification had then, and still possesses now immense political, cultural, and historical importance.

In political life, determination is not a sufficient condition for success, and the young Bulgarian politicians realized this. They attempted to prepare for the unification by diplomatic means, demonstrating surprising maturity in their assessment of complex diplomatic situation. This maturity displayed itself in a sense of realism, in their energy to defend to the end the cause they had begun, and in their ability to resort to the necessary compromises. The act of unification established the Bulgarian state in European political life as a real fact of life, and the striving and determination of the nation and the state themselves to be the creators of their own fate provided grounds for the great powers to accept the just nationality clause of the Bulgarians over a century ago.

In the eyes of the world, a new image of the country began to be quickly developed, an image in which maturity, endurance, a new sense of self-esteem, sense of responsibility, and feeling of national dignity aroused respect and sympathy. Recognition became inevitable, because before it was achieved at the diplomatic negotiating table, the unification was brilliantly defended on the field of battle by the young Bulgarian Army and thousands of volunteers at Slivnitsa and Dragoman. It was here that the unification was made a fait accompli.

On this occasion, Konstantin Iricek commented: No one can any longer reproach the Bulgarians by saying that they have no state idea, no national self-consciousness, and that their freedom is merely an abstract idea, which they do not know how to value or defend. The unification marked the beginning of a new stage in the existence of Bulgaria as an independent state, a period of ascendancy which from the beginning of the 20th century was to turn the Bulgarian state into a first-rate economic, cultural, and political force in the Balkans.

If it can be said that the new Bulgaria was born in 1878, then in 1885 it learned to walk, and only 20 years later came of age as a state. In this connection I would like to

quote a thought expressed by Zakhari Stoyanov, which is one of my favorites: Grief and bitterness to the unhappy people who wait with smooth unblemished hands, who do not wash their faces with their torn hands.

The unification is especially interesting for us, and not only because of the political message which it bears. It provides a remarkable example. Whereas 105 years ago the builders of the new Bulgaria had to unite the two parts of our disrupted fatherland, the Principality of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, today we, for our part, must unite Bulgaria with democracy, Bulgaria with Europe, Bulgaria with the world. This task is not such a desperately risky venture as the task of 105 years ago, but is no less difficult. This time, we must unite not our land, but our own people; we must unite together on the basis of complete and total democratization of social life. For this reason, let us look back on the unification, let us think about it, let us attempt to read it in different way.

Thank you for your attention.

BSP Supreme Council Announces 9 Sep Rally

AU0609092990 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 5 Sep 90 p 1

[Text] On the occasion of the 46th anniversary of the antifascist victory in our country, the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] invites its members, friends, and supporters, all citizens and guests in our capital to attend a great procession and rally which is scheduled to take place on 9 September 1990 starting at 1000, under the slogan: "For unity against neofascism, for democracy, and civic peace."

The procession will start from 9 September Square, pass along Ruski Avenue and through Liberty Park, and end at the common grave of antifacist fighters. Wreaths and flowers will also be laid at the Unknown Soldier's Monument and at the Soviet Army Monument.

Following the rally, an extensive cultural program awaits you in Liberty Park from 1130 to 1330, and from 1530 to 1739, where four open-air stages have been installed.

A festive 9 September charity concert is expected to take place on the same day starting at 1900 in Hall No. 1 of the People's Palace of Culture. The contributions collected for the concert will be spent on the restoration of the party headquarters building.

The BSP Supreme Council Presidium.

BZNS Announces New Organizational Changes

AU0509210390 Sofia ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME in Bulgarian 4 Sep 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "New Organizational Structure for a New Political Situation"]

[Text] In accordance with the understanding that the organizational structure of all leading organs of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union [BZNS] no longer corresponds to the fundamental changes which have occurred in the political system of our society and in the activities of the BZNS as a modern, authoritative, and independent center party, the BZNS Permanent Board decided yesterday to discontinue the activities of some of its departments. They are to be replaced by the following five major sections reflecting different trends in the party's organizational-political activities::
—The "Union Life" Section;
—The "Union Policy" Section;
—The "Economic and Social Policy" Section;
—The "International Policy" Section;
—The "Financial-Economic Activities" Section;

Officials in charge of the new sections were also appointed. Kostadin Yanchev, secretary of the BZNS Permanent Board, Ivan Glushkov and Asen Khristov, members of the Permanent Board, are in charge of the first three sections, while the other two sections will be provisionally placed under the supervision of Viktor Vulkov, chairman of the BZNS.

Dragomir Shopov, member of the BZNS Permanent Board, who is also editor in chief of the daily ZEMEDELSKO ZNAME, was instructed to concentrate his efforts mainly on editorial work, since these activities are expected to become even more extensive and important under the conditions of the profound democratic changes in our society and the renewal of the BZNS.

It was also decided that Georgi Andreev and Dimitur Kalinov, members of the BZNS Permanent Board, should concentrate their efforts on the activities of agrarian unions in northern Bulgaria, while Ivan Velichkov and Stoyan Bukikov should be in charge of the party organizations situated in the southern part of the country.

Democratic Socialism Movement Discusses Platform

AU0509142690 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 4 Sep 90 p 2

[Vasil Kharalambiev report: "According to 'DEMOS' BSP Must Not Be Bound by Stereotypes"]

[Text] The "DEMOS" Movement for Democratic Socialism considers that a contemporary, modern, European, socialist party cannot be described as social-democratic or a new party. The character of the must be formed in accordance with its attitude toward the basic issues of our time and its internal structures and democratic character.

Many other issues, in addition to the main one—what party do we need—were touched upon in "DEMOS" discussion, which took place on 3 September in Sofia. The organizers tried to lead the discussion out of the abstract-theoretical sphere and direct it toward the practical sphere They pointed out that any formula related

to the change of the party is related to the country's general socioeconomic and political conditions, and its specific situation.

Aleksandur Tomov said that documents drawn up by the various streams could be distributed for discussion at the forthcoming congress, in addition to the general party documents. He pointed out that the existence of various ideological streams and the exchange of opinions are not negative phenomena, and that no hasty and serious assessments should be issued. According to him, while constructing our ideological foundation, we must not stem from canons, but rather combine the best ideas and begin from the ancient philosophers. Tomov stressed that we seek such an image for the party as would attract youth, and from this of view the existence of different opinions is a positive factor.

During the discussion the accusation was rejected that the supporters of the radical change contribute to the threat of a split in the party. Aleksandur Tomov pointed out that the views of the supporters of radical reform are most attractive for youth. "DEMOS" supports such a renewed party as exists within the system of parliamentary democracy and could efficiently resolve its tasks. However, this does not mean that it will turn into an election party by gradually eliminating its basic party organizations.

In reply to a remark that the congress will take place very soon and there is not enough time to study and improve the party documents, Aleksandur Tomov said that there will be no more congresses which will deal exclusively with the adoption of party documents. It is much more important to develop general party discussion and hear the voice of the entire party and, above all, the voice of youth.

Issues related to the internal party structure, the party as the social basis of the working people, and unresolved cadre questions were also discussed. "DEMOS" raised the slogan: "Change Plus Unity."

New 9 Sep 'Defense' Club Formed in Sliven

AU0509130890 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 3 Sep 90 p 1

[Maria Delibaltova report from Sliven; date not given: "Club in Defense of 9 September Cause"]

[Text] Sliven, 2 Sep—A club in defense of the 9 September 1944 cause and of Georgi Dimitrov was established here. Anyone wishing to join the club, regardless of his party affiliation and age, is welcome to participate. The initiators of the club are primarily young people. Their idea is to rally all those who abhor fascism and are willing to prevent, eradicate, and nip the emerging wave of violence and religious superstition in the bud. The club is expected to develop as the center of a broadly expanding antifascist movement in the town of Sliven, which numerous young representatives of the Bulgarian Socialist Party and the Union of Democratic Forces, their supporters, and friends are ready to back. They also request the support of the Grand National Assembly for their initiative.

Ruse Council Appeals to Zhelev Over Pollution

AU0509192490 Sofia BTA in English 1715 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] Sofia, 6 Sep (BTA)—The citizens of Ruse are worried over the continuing atmosphere pollution of this Danube city with chlorine compounds from the chemical combine of the Romanian city of Giurgiu.

The City Council of Ruse calls today on President Zhelyu Zhelev to interfere in the settlement of Ruse's ecological problems. In this address the city council strongly appeals for a meeting between Zhelyu Zhelev and Romanian state leader Ion Iliescu, at which to map up the ways for a final settlement of this ecological issue. The city council notes that atmosphere pollution in Ruse is continuing in spite of the recently reached intergovernmental agreements for termination of all noxious productions in the region.

Appeals for urgent measures to solve the ecological calamity of Ruse are also addressed by this city's Green Party to the Grand National Assembly and by the former prime minister to the ex-Tsar Simeon.

National Security Council on CFE Talks, Iraq

AU0509131090 Sofia BTA in English 1152 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] Sofia, 5 Sep (BTA)—The National Security Council held its first meeting today. It was opened by Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev, president of the Republic.

The council considered the position of the Bulgarian delegation at the Conventional Forces in Europe Talks on the ceilings of the principal types of armaments of the Bulgarian Army.

The participants also discussed information on the situation in the Middle East.

The participants in the meeting voiced concern over the fate of the Bulgarian citizens working in Iraq. Diplomatic and political measures were considered for the amelioration of their condition and for their unobstructed repatriation.

Soviet Media Criticized for 'Biased' Reporting

AU0509123290 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 30 Aug 90 p 3

[Lev Kokushkin article: "One PRAVDA Less"]

[Excerpts] About 10 days ago the Soviet newspaper PRAVDA published a letter from Sofia citizen Khristana Andreeva. The letter accuses official CPSU

circles for disseminating disinformation about Bulgaria, for telling lies and half-truths about the situation in our country.

Andrey Krushinksiy, who was the Sofia PRAVDA correspondent for several years, and is now one of the Soviet party daily's highest ranking officials, answered Mrs. Andreeva. He said that she is not right and that his newspaper's attitude to Bulgaria is not biased. [passage omitted]

In this regard I decided to check what and how PRAVDA has been reporting about Bulgarian from the beginning of 1990 to 19 August, the date on which the Sofia citizen's letter was published.

Over this entire period PRAVDA published about 80 reports, feature stories, interviews, commentaries, and other material on Bulgaria, thanks to its correspondent Leonid Zhmiryev, to TASS, and to the Zhmiryev-Kurshinksiy duo. In all this flood of material only the 55th item mentions the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS], while the name of Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev is only mentioned among some other things. [passage omitted]

The daily DUMA is cited at length, while the SDS is mentioned only on three occasions, and on 3 March precisely—which is Bulgaria's most glorious national day—the Zhmiryev-Krusninksiy duo categorically declares that DEMOKRATSIYA is engaging in "black propaganda." This sounds familiar. In the past we used to read in PRAVDA that people like Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Andrey Sakharov, and Mstislav Rostropovich engaged in similar activities and we also read about other "shady characters," some of whom were recently rehabilitated by Mikhail Gorbachev.

"The SDS representatives are not popular because of their orthodox views and appeals," the PRAVDA journalists inform their readers on 12 May 1990, while their comment following the 17 June elections reads as follows: "Mostly young people voted for the SDS because the methods of street propaganda were more effectively applied toward them."

The comrades from the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP], however, are are described in a totally different manner on the pages of the CPSU press organ: "The BSP leaders are characterized by lofty human virtues and outstanding professional and political qualities. They are close to the masses, and have subjected their personal interests to the country's and the people's interests." In addition to this, the members of Andrey Lukanov's cabinet are described as "people of manly courage."

In his letter of reply to reader Khristina Andreeva, under the headline: "Let Us Not Exaggerate," Krushinksiy mentions that over 150,000 PRAVDA subscribers exist in Bulgaria today. He claims that their number had increased to 159,000 by 7 January 1990. "I do not believe you, therefore I give up my subscription to your newspaper," Khristina Andreeva wrote. As a result of this, there will be one PRAVDA less in our country from now on.

Ambassador Garvalov on Nationals Living in SFRY

AU3108172190 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 30 Aug 90 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Rights for 1.5 Million Bulgarians in Yugoslavia"]

[Text] The issue of the national rights of the 1.5 million Bulgarians who live in Yugoslavia, and the conditions under which they live, was raised in Geneva at the regular meeting of the UN Committee on Eliminating Discrimination. We did not receive a satisfactory answer about our compatriots, Ambassador Ivan Garvalov said at a meeting with Sofia journalists.

He told about the committee's work and about the efforts to eliminate all forms of racial discrimination. It was pointed out that the Yugoslav report has evoked many questions about the rights of the national minorities, including the Bulgarians living in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia and the Socialist Republic of Serbia.

Soviet Troop Withdrawal Still on Schedule

LD3008165190 Prague CTK in English 1543 GMT 30 Aug 90

[Text] Milovice, Central Bohemia, Aug 30 (CTK)—"The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Czechoslovakia continues according to schedule", Czechoslovak Defence Ministry press spokesman Major Marian Bozik told journalists today.

So far 36,742 soldiers have left Czechoslovakia, i.e. just under 50 per cent of all Soviet troops, and also over a half of the overall number of tanks and military hardware. The last train with military equipment is to leave in February next year, Bozik said.

He noted that the Czechoslovak Government has earmarked 80 million crowns for repairs on the buildings vacated by Soviet troops and 70 million for hydrogeological survey and soil improvement.

The spokesman denied reports about the sale of buildings by the Soviet side, which appeared in Czechoslovak newspapers.

In June, preparations for withdrawal began also at the largest Soviet military base in Czechoslovakia at Milovice northeast of Prague, where 11,000 Soviet soldiers were stationed. 21 tanks and 75 soldiers were prepared there to leave today and another four groups are to go in the next two days. The rest of the tank division is to leave by October 15.

Havel Addresses Aspen Institute Conference

AU2908141690 Prague SVOBODNE SLOVO in Czech 27 Aug 90 p 1

[CTK report: "V. Havel Receives Guests"]

[Text] Prague—Inertia in mammoth apparatuses, enterprises, and the bureaucracy, as well as difficulties in replacing our one-sided foreign economic orientation with normal foreign economic relations, are two of the main problems facing the Czechoslovak revolution at the moment. President Vaclav Havel made these comments at Prague Castle yesterday when he received the participants in the Aspen Institute conference, which begins in Prague today. The president said that the aim of Czechoslovak foreign policy is to contribute toward establishing Europe as a friendly community of free nations and states, a community without powerful blocs. As far as the fate of the November revolution is concerned, President Havel said that the battle has not yet been won because powerful vestiges of the totalitarian regime still remain.

Havel Addresses Oslo 'Conference on Hate'

AU3108200190 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 29 Aug 90 p 4

[Excerpt from speech by CSFR President Vaclav Havel at the Oslo "Conference on Hate" on 28 August]

[Text] Ladies and gentlemen, when observing this assembly, it seems to me that there are not many people among us who could contemplate our topic—hate—truly from the "inside" and think of hate as a mental state experienced by themselves—that is, to perform a sort of autopsy. Apparently, we are all anxious observers of this phenomenon and we try to reflect it only from the outside. This is also true of myself; among my bad traits, which are undoubtedly numerous, there is, surprisingly, no place for hate. This is why I ponder about hate as an uninitiated, yet very anxious observer.

When I think about the people who hated, or who hate me personally, I realize that there are certain common characteristics which unite them and which, when summarized and analyzed, can yield a very general explanation of the origin of their hate.

They are not hollow, empty, passive, careless, or apathetic people. Their hate, it seems to me, is always a manifestation of some unfulfilled yearning, of a yearning that cannot be fulfilled, a sort of desperate ambition. They posses a sort of internal and active grandeur which, every now and then, ties them to something, drags them somewhere, and is, so to speak, above them. This is why hate has never occurred to me to be an absence of love or humanitarian feeling, or a simple vacuum in the human soul. On the contrary, hate has a lot in common with love, above all, the element of self-transcendence—that is, this adherence to others, dependency on others, and even a partial yielding of one's personality to others. In the same way, as the one who loves longs for someone to love, the one who hates longs for someone to hate. And, like love, hatred is also, in its final aspect, an expression of craving for the absolute—that is, it is a completely tragic aberration.

People who hate, at least this is how I recognize them, are people with a permanent, indestructible, and, of course, quite inadequate feeling of grievance. It seems that these people would like to be wanted, respected, and loved without limits, and that they are permanently plagued by painful discoveries that others are ungrateful and unforgivably unfair to them, since others do not revere and love them boundlessly as they should, and others—at least it seems to them—even ignore them.

In the subconsciousness of those who hate, there is an aberrant feeling that they are the exclusive owners of the complete truth and, consequently some kind of superhumans or even gods, and that from this point of view they deserve complete recognition by the world, or even its complete submission and loyalty, if not blind obedience. They want to be the center of the world, and they are permanently frustrated and irritated by the fact that the world does not accept and recognize them as such, that the world may go untouched by them and, maybe, even ridicule them.

The one who hates is unable to see the reason for his metaphysical failure in himself and in the complete overestimation of himself. The surrounding world is to

blame for everything. But the culprit is too abstract, indefinite, and untouchable. The culprit has to be personified, since hatred needs—as any other movement of the soul—a specific victim. This is how the one who hates finds a specific culprit. It is a substitute culprit, of course, and can be easily replaced. I have noted that, for the one who hates, hatred is more important than the object of his hate, and that he can switch very quickly between these objects without any impact on his relation to them. It is unbelievable: He does not nurture his hatred against a specific person as such, but against something that this person represents: a collection of obstacles on his way to the absolute—absolute recognition, absolute power, absolute identification with God, with the truth, and with the world order. Therefore, hatred toward a neighbor seems to be a physiologically materialized hate toward the universe which is understood as the cause of his own universal failure.

Another observation made by me seems to be important: The one who hates does not know how to smile, but only how to grimace. He is not capable of being merry, but only of being bitterly sarcastic. He is incapable of real irony, because he is unable to accept irony applied to himself; only he who is able to laugh at himself is capable of laughing authentically. The characteristics of someone who hates are a serious face, a great sensitivity to insults, strong words, a loud voice, and an absolute incapability of looking at himself and observing that he is being ridiculous.

His traits reveal something significant: a complete shortage of such qualities as adequateness, taste, decency, having an overview, capability of doubting and asking, and awareness of one's transiency and the ephemeral nature of everything. The one who hates has never experienced real absurdity—that is, the absurdity of his own existence, a feeling of his own inadequacy, awkwardness, failure, limitation, or guilt.

The common denominator of all this evidently is a tragic, or even metaphysical, lack of sense of proportion: A hating person does not understand how far he can go, what his rights are, the limits of his one existence, and limits of love and recognition that he can expect. He wants to own the world boundlessly—that is, that his recognition by the world is without limits. He does not understand that the right for the miracle of his own existence and recognition must be fought for and deserved by his deeds, yet he thinks of it as of a privilege given to him, once and for all, without limits and obstacles. He simply thinks that he has a universal entry ticket to everywhere—that is, also to heaven. If someone dares to examine his ticket, he is perceived as a villainous enemy. If this is the way of understanding the right to existence and recognition, then one must constantly be at odds with others who do not derive, as expected, an unlimited set of consequences ensuing from such a right.

I have noted that all who hate, blame their neighbors and, through them, the entire world. The driving force for their hate is a feeling that bad people and a bad world deprive them of what belongs to them. They project their own hate onto others. They resemble a spoiled child even in this matter; they do not understand that, from time to time, they have to deserve something and that if they do not automatically have whatever they think of, it does not mean that someone was bad to them.

There is only one sort of hate. There is no difference between individual and group hatred. He who hates an individual is almost always capable of succumbing to group hatred, is capable of spreading such hatred. I would say that group hatred—be it religious, ideological and doctrinal, social, national, or any other—is a sort of funnel which will suck in all those who are inclined to individual hatred. This means that the most appropriate background and human potential for all sorts of group hatred is that group of people capable of hatred toward individuals.

Not only this: Collective hatred that is shared, spread, and strengthened by people capable of hating possesses a kind of magnetic attraction and, therefore, is capable of sucking into the funnel an infinite number of other people who did not seem to have the capability of hating. They are people who are morally small and weak, selfish, of lazy spirit, incapable of independent thinking, and therefore inclined to yield to the suggestive influence of those who hate.

The attractiveness of collective hatred—far more dangerous than hatred between individuals—is rooted in some advantages:

1. Collective hatred rids people of loneliness, desolation, the feeling of being weak, impotent, and the feeling of being ignored, which helps them, of course, face their complex of not being appreciated and their complex of failure. Collective hatred offers them a sort of association, creates a strange brotherhood for them, which is based on a very simple kind of unifying consensus: Membership in this brotherhood does not require anything from them at all; the prerequisites for their acceptance are easily met; no one has to be afraid that he would be refused during the acceptance process—what would be easier than sharing a common object of refusal and accepting a common "ideology of injustice," such injustice for which it is necessary to offer resistance against this object? It is so easy and simple to say that, for example, Jews, Romanies, Germans, Arabs, blacks, Vietnamese, Hungarians, or Czechs are to blame for all the wrongdoings in the world—and, particularly, for the desperate state of each injured soul. It is always possible to find enough Vietnamese, Hungarians, Czechs, Romanies, or Jews, on the behavior of which the idea that they are responsible for everything can be documented.

2. In addition to the basic feeling of not being appreciated, which, so I believe, is hidden in all of us who are capable of hating, the community of those who hate offers another great advantage: They can assure one another about their worthiness, either by competing in

hatred toward the selected group of culprits, or by employing symbols and rituals which strengthen the value of the hating community. An identical garb, uniform, symbol, flag, or a beloved song brings the participants closer, strengthens their identity and proliferates, strengthens and multiplies their value in their own eyes.

3. While individual activity is always risky, since it always rouses the threat of individual responsibility, a communion of hating individuals somehow "legalizes" aggressiveness: Its joint manifestation creates the illusion of its legitimacy, or at least a feeling of a kind of "collective hiding place." Hidden in a group, pack, or crowd, each potential ruffian is more courageous, one stimulating another; all of them together—since they are more numerous—are magnifying their feeling of righteousness.

4. The principle of group hatred makes the life of all of those who hate, or who are incapable of independent thinking, significantly easier, because it offers them a very simple object of hatred, which can be immediately distinguished visually or audibly, and which is the culprit of one's being hard done by; it is a process of the materialization of universal wrongdoing in this world into a specific person whom it is necessary to hate, and this process is made simple by offering the "culprit," who is distinguishable by the color of his skin, name, spoken language, religion, or the place of residence on globe.

Collective hatred has another treacherous advantage: the inconspicuousness with which it is created. There are a number of apparently innocent states of mind, which create imperceivable initial stages of potential hatred, a kind of vast and fertile soil on which the seeds fall and easily germinate.

Today's Central and Eastern Europe is described by some observers as a potential powder keg—that is, an area of growing nationalism, ethnic intolerance and, therefore, various manifestations of collective hatred. This area is sometimes described as a potential source of future European instability and a serious threat to peace. In the background of such pessimistic considerations we can observe, from time to time, a sort of nostalgia for the old golden times of the cold war, when the two halves of Europe were checkmating each other, and when there was peace because of that.

I do not share the pessimism of those observers. Nevertheless, I recognize that the corner of the world from which I come from would seem—if we were not vigilant and if we did not retain common sense—to be fertile soil for the origin and development of collective hatred. It is so, for many reasons that are more or less comprehensible.

Above all, it is necessary to realize that on the territory of Central and Eastern Europe there are many intermingled nations and ethnic minorities, and that it is hard to imagine some ideal borders that would unequivocally separate these nations and ethnic minorities territorially. As a consequence, we have a lot of minorities within minorities, and the borders are, therefore, rather artificial—that is, briefly speaking, an international melting pot. Here nations had few historical opportunities for finding their political independence and their own statehood: For centuries they lived under the roof of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and after a short pause between the wars, they fell, in some manner or other, under the submission of Hitler, or shortly thereafter, of Stalin. What Western European nations had tens and hundreds of years time for, most of the Central European nations had only 20 years between the wars.

They justifiably have a feeling of historical wrongdoing in their collective subconscious. The overblown feeling of wrongdoing, which is a characteristic of hatred, can find favorable conditions for its origin and development

The totalitarian system that ruled in most of these countries for a number of years, was characterized, among other things, by its tendency to tar everything with the same brush, to put everything in the same gear, and to bring everything into the same line, so that for many years this regime was suppressing all differences—or, if you want, uniqueness—of subjugated nations. From the structure of state administration to the red stars on the roof tops, everything was the same—that is, imported from the Soviet Union. No wonder that, at the moment when those nations got rid of the totalitarian system, they saw, all of a sudden, their liberated uniqueness in a new sharp light. Would it be a surprise if this unseen and, therefore, never mentally experienced "uniqueness" would go unnoticed? Freed from the uniforms and masks forced upon us, we are looking into each other's real faces for the first time. There is a certain shock caused by this "uniqueness." And that is where favorable conditions for collective resistance originate, which could even overgrow into collective hatred.

In this area, nations did not have enough time to let their state existence ripen, and also to get used to each other and to politically shape their "uniqueness."

A comparison to a child can be made here again: These nations did not have enough time for maturing in this respect.

After what they have been through, they feel a natural need for speeding up their existence and reaching their recognition and appreciation. They simply want to be known, to be noticed by the rest of the world, they want their "uniqueness" to be recognized. At the same time, still full of internal insecurity about themselves and about how much they will be recognized, they look around themselves with jitters and ask themselves whether the others—all of a sudden, so much different now—are not depriving them of the attention which they deserve.

For long years, the totalitarian systems in this part of Europe oppressed the identity and individuality of the people and tried to make out of them easy-going parts for its machinery. The absence of civic culture, which this system was destroying for such a long time, and the overall demoralizing pressures can also easily allow this kind of careless generalization which always accompanies ethnic intolerance. Respect for human rights

refusing the principle of collective responsibility is always a result of a certain minimum civic culture.

From this very brief and, therefore, necessarily simplified description, it is apparent that in our part of Europe there are favorable conditions for the origin of intolerance, or even hate.

There is one important factor here: After the joy of one's liberation, there is inevitably a phase of disappointment and depression—only now, when we can describe everything truthfully, we can see the horrible heritage of the totalitarian system, and we realize how difficult it will be and how long it will take to repair all the damage.

This state of overall frustration can provoke many people into venting their anger on substitute victims that replace the main, and now already liquidated, culprits. Powerless anger searches for scapegoats.

I repeat that when I am talking about the danger of national hatred in Central and Eastern Europe, I am not talking about it as our future, but as our potential danger.

This danger must be understood in order to face it effectively. This is a task for all of us who lived in the former Soviet bloc.

We must fight energetically against all potential sources of collective hatred, not only principally, but simply because it is in our interests to face the evil.

Indians have a fairy tale about the Bherunda bird. It is a bird with one body and two throats, two heads and, two separate consciousness. Infinite coexistence between them caused the two heads to hate one another, and they decided that they would harm each other. That is why they swallowed stones and poison. The result is obvious. The bird dies in cramps, crying loudly. By Krishna's grace, the bird is reborn in order to eternally remind the people what end every hate takes. It does not consume only the one who is hated, but also—maybe even sooner—the one who hates.

We should remind ourselves of this fairy tale every day, we who are living in newly established European democracies. As soon as one head gives in to the temptation to hate the other one, both will come to the same end as the Bherunda bird did.

The only difference is that there will hardly be some earthly Krishna to save us from this disaster.

38 Albanian Refugees 'Disappear Into Thin Air'

AU3008191290 Prague PRACE in Czech 29 Aug 90 p 2

["(mik)" -signed report: "Albanians Have Disappeared"]

[Text] Prague— The number of Albanian refugees who were flown to Prague at the beginning of July has rapidly decreased. Of the 51 refugees who originally arrived in Prague, the Czechoslovak Red Cross is taking care only of 11; two asked to be allowed to return to Albania for family reasons; and the remaining 38 have gradually "disappeared into thin air" from the dormitory of the "Motorlet" sport club where they were staying. According to information we received from the Czechoslovak Red Cross, no further details on their whereabouts in our territory are available. The remaining 11 Albanians have been taken to a dormitory at Ceska Lipa where they are waiting for the processing of their applications for travel to the United States and the FRG.

Semtex Explosive No Longer Undetectable

AU3008190490 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 29 Aug 90 p 2

[CTK report: "Dogs Trained To Search for Semtex"]

[Text] Lisov—The ability of police dogs to search buildings, vehicles, luggage, and persons for the Semtex explosive, which currently used detectors cannot detect, was demonstrated at the training base of the Regional Administration of the National Security Corps in Lisov near Ceske Budejovice on Tuesday [28 August].

Foreign journalists from Hungary, Poland, Great Britain, and the INTERPRESS, NOVOSTI, and TASS agencies were able to convince themselves that one of the most dangerous explosives made in Czechoslovakia can be detected with the help of dogs.

The training of such a dog takes about three months, and Czechoslovakia is the first country where the attempts to train dogs in this field have been successful.

Slovak Republic Establishes Foreign Ministry

LD0509152990 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1359 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] Prague, Sept 5 (TANJUG)—The Government of the Slovak Republic, without the knowledge of the Federal Government has over night founded a Foreign Ministry headed by famous actor Milan Knazko.

The decision threatens a fresh crisis in relations between the Czech and Slovak Republics which have different views on the character of the country's federal system.

At the same time, ten political parties of Slovakia have rejected the recent tri-partite agreement of the federal prime minister and the two republics on a division of authorities with regard to the political and economic system, and set an ultimatum for Slovakia to become an "independent state."

On the other hand Czech Prime Minister Petr Pithart today said that "a dismantling of the federation" was out of the question, expressing the conviction that the Slovak Government would succeed in stopping separatist tendencies.

Of the ten political parties in Slovakia, which demand the separation of the republic from the Czechoslovak Federation, only four took part in the June general

elections while only two are represented in the Federal, i.e. the republic's Assembly.

Reaction to New Ministry

AU0509103790 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 30 Aug 90 p 8

["(sl)"—signed report: "Facing Fait Accompli"—phrases between slantlines are published in bold face]

[Text] We asked Lubos Dobrovsky, a member of the Expert Commission on Foreign Policy Issues, about his standpoint regarding the establishment of the Ministry for International Relations of the Slovak Republic.

"The adoption of the law establishing the Ministry for International Relations of the Slovak Republic surprised me for two reasons. First, the proposal to constitute such a ministry was not submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in time and, therefore, it could not pass through the proper appraisal procedure.

The second reason for my surprise is the fact that the operation of the Expert Commission on Foreign Policy Issues—which was to act on the basis of the Trencianske Teplice meeting and on the basis of the government decision on the transfer of some jurisdictions of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the republican governments—only held its first informative meeting two days ago. I believe that, under the newly constituted circumstances, further operation of this expert commission is made significantly more difficult—if not impossible—because the competence, the jurisdiction level, and the goals of the newly established office are definitely specified in the just adopted law. I do not see any sense—or better, any advantage—arising from the meeting of the commission except for adopting a critical stand toward this decision. What happened is an obvious example of the fait accompli, which has never to date in modern history led to any positive results."

Violating Laws

Vladimir Mikule, chairman of the CSFR Federal Assembly's Chamber of Nations Constitutional and Legal Affairs Committee provided his comments on the establishment of the Ministry for International Relations of the Slovak Republic: "Thus far, I have no idea of the limits to the sphere of operation of this ministry. Nevertheless, let us begin with the valid Czechoslovak laws. Chapter 7, Section 1, of the Constitutional Law on Czechoslovak Federation (143/88) states: The exclusive domain of the CSFR includes foreign policy, entering into international agreements, representing the CSFR in international relations, and deciding on matters of war and peace. Section 2 of the same chapter states that all issues referred to in Section 1 are dealt with **exclusively** by the state legislative and executive bodies, and courts of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. The constitution of the ministry is in direct contradiction with this chapter. Moreover, I would like to draw attention to Law 194/88, in Articles 31 and 34, in which the jurisdiction of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs is delimited. Article 31 reads: The Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs supervises the assertion of Czechoslovak foreign policy interests in the activities of all federal and **republican** bodies. Furthermore, in Article 33 it is stated: The Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs fulfills, to the extent specified by the government of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the tasks of safeguarding international relations in the affairs which **belong to the exclusive jurisdiction of the republics.** In addition, I would like to draw attention to Chapter 142, Section 1 of the Constitutional Law on the Czechoslovak Federation, which states: Laws of national councils must not contradict the Constitution and Constitutional Laws of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. Among other things, the entire affair points out how we lack a constitutional court which should deal with this."

No Czech Comment

AU0509103290 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 1 Sep 90 pp 1,2

["(MLY)"-signed report: "They Are Making No Comment On Principle"]

[Text] In connection with the appointment of Milan Knazko as Slovak minister of international relations, we asked Dr. Jan Vit, director of the Czech Government Office Press Department and Czech Government spokesman, to give us the Czech Government's opinion. Dr. Jan Vit gave us the following reply:

"We are not commenting on this situation on principle. We assume that the situation arose from a specific Slovak perspective. We have a solution of our own. We are not going to establish a ministry, but will merely expand a department within the Czech Government Office, which has come into existence as a result of the reorganization of the current workplace. We are resolved to deal with this situation within the framework of the existing operation of the whole Office without creating a new institution. We are resolved to fulfill a number of new functions, but only as far as foreign relations are concerned; these will be coordinating or initiating functions. We will, of course, maintain our general loyalty to the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs and we are not developing any active foreign policy of our own. Although we foresee some activity in the face of the aforementioned occurrence, this will be coordinating activity and will be conducted more at the regional level than at the state level; this corresponds approximately to our previous and existing jurisdiction. This absolutely does not involve any interstate activity. This is our point of view, which is a result of how we perceive the situation; in this regard, we have resolved to evaluate the Slovak situation neither positively nor negatively. We perceive their situation to be different.

Slovak Premier Comments on New Bills

LD3008211490 Bratislav Domestic Service in Slovak 1630 GMT 30 Aug 90

[Text] [Announcer] The Government of the Slovak Republic met in Bratislava today. Michal Tvarozek has this report on the proceedings:

[Tvarozek] Today's government session discussed a number of bills. Most of the time was taken up, I would say, by the bill on the status of the Slovak capital, partly because it was due to have been discussed back in June, and also because of the many comments raised on it. The Slovak National Council deputies, who will have the job of passing this bill in the very near future, will no doubt have an awful lot of work to do.

Also interesting was a report on a proposed new hard-currency law which will be valid only until the end of this year, when a definitive law will be passed. In essence, this bill restricts the sale of fixed assets to foreigners. Premier Vladimir Meciar explained that we are losing too much money because we are selling too cheaply.

The government members also heard a progress report on work to deal with the consequences of the breakdown at the Hydrokrak plant. Jan Holcik, the minister of industry, estimates that repairs to the pipework will take between four and six weeks. On Monday a delegation is leaving for the Soviet Union to discuss adherence to the oil supply contracts because the situation is beginning to be very critical.

At the end of the session, Premier Meciar thanked Ladislav Kovac, the minister of education, youth and physical training, for his work and granted his request to be released from his post.

At a press briefing following the government session, Mr. Meciar also replied to an article in today's LIDOVE NOVINY accusing the Slovak Government of going against the Constitution by establishing a Ministry of International Relations:

[Begin Meciar recording] The old Constitution also enshrined the principle that the federation carries out what the republics leave to it. The jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is clearly defined. What we have set up is not a Ministry of Foreign Affairs [ministerstvo zahranicnych veci] but a Ministry of International Relations [ministerstvo medzinarodnych vztahov]. The powers vested in this ministry in no way run counter to the current existence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We do not identify with this view; we do not agree with it, and in general whatever the Slovak Government proposes meets with too negative a reaction and too little understanding in the Czech lands—I do not know the reasons for this—and too much distortion, and of course these groups are beginning to gain the upper hand there, too. We do not deny the right for different views to arise, but it is the duty of everyone in his own republic to explain what is right. So, as for some of the views in LIDOVE NOVINY [words indistinct] I cannot help the people who write them; they must overcome themselves. [end recording]

GERMAN UNIFICATION

Notice to Readers: *In order to provide information concerning German unification in one location for the benefit of our readers, material on that topic from the FRG, GDR, and other media is now being published in the German Unification Attachment to the West Europe DAILY REPORT.*

Stasi HQ Occupied; List of Demands Presented

Political Parties Meet Occupiers

LD0409194290 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1900 GMT 4 Sep 90

[Excerpts] Berlin (ADN)—Leading politicians from the parties represented in the People's Chamber met this evening with the occupiers of the Stasi [State Security Service] Headquarters on Normannenstrasse in East Berlin. The CDU/DA [Christian Democratic Union/ Democratic Awakening] caucus leader, State Secretary Guenther Krause, SPD [Social Democratic Party] leader Wolfgang Thierse, and PDS [Party for Democratic Socialism] Chairman Gregor Gysi took part in a talk with the civil rights campaigners. Krause offered to clarify the future use of Stasi files in the preamble to the Unificiation Treaty. [passage omitted]

Earlier, a second attempt at mediation by People's Chamber President Sabine Bergmann-Pohl (CDU) between the occupiers and the GDR's legislature failed. On behalf of the 21 representatives of citizens movements, who have barricaded themselves in, Ingrid Koeppe (New Forum) said they would hold out for a "sensible clarification" at the People's Chamber session on 6 September. The guarantee made by the president, that the Stasi files would remain on GDR territory and be dealt with according to the law, did not convince the occupiers. [passage omitted]

Occupation Group Issues Statement

LD0509175290 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1550 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The text of the "Open letter to all citizens and all parties and their parliamentary representatives in East and West" is as follows:

Since Tuesday, 4 September, we have been occupying the offices of the Central Archives of the former MfS/ AfNS [Ministry for State Security/Office for National Security] on Berlin's Magdalenenstrasse. We have been active for years in the human rights, evnironmental, and peace movements. For this reason we were constantly watched by members of the MfS. Although none of us has so far seen his file, we are convinced that a file was kept on all of us. There are 6 million victims of these files in the whole of Germany. There are files on 4 million GDR citizens and 2 million federal citizens. That means that data and facts were collected on 6 million people extending to very personal areas. These 6 million files are today the greatest leftover burden of the past 40 years. We are thoroughly conscious of this problem. The content of the files is suitable for blackmailing people from all areas of society, i.e.—politics, academia, and industry—if this material were to fall into the wrong hands. In our opinion all the world's secret sevices are among these. This mountain of information represents an enormous potential for power. The destruction of the files is no solution, as important sources of information which are indispensable for working through our history and future legal processes, would be lost.

On 24 October 1990, the People's Chamber passed a law on the treatment of Stasi files. In spite of all its imperfections, we were in principle in favor of this law. This law did not become part of the Unification Treaty, against the declared will of the People's Chamber. The issue of dealing with the Stasi files should not, however, become degraded to a small appendage to the Unification Treaty, buried somewhere in a thousand pages of paper. In a few days the GDR and FRG will be united. People with 40 years of different experiences will live together in a new Germany. Only if the population can be aware of its past will there be a chance for everyone to construct a truly democratic Germany. For this reason this past should not be locked up in archives. The following questions continue to be unclarified:

—How and in what manner is the right of other secret services to dip into this data regulated?

—Who will guarantee that every citizen will have access to his personal file if he so wishes?

—Who will check the safekeeping of the files; to what end will this occur?

We fear that those bearing political responsibility have forced these issues from their consciousness. Our fears were reinforced in the talks held with the chairmen of the People's Chamber groups on 4 September. We expect from parties that they will exercise pressure on the leaders of the Unification Treaty negotiating teams, and thus represent the interests of the victims of the files, instead of making hasty decisions.

The public appraisal of the files drawn up by the Stasi is too simplistic. There are in fact three categories of files which must be handled in different ways.

1. The decision as to how to treat—that is, either hand over or destroy—the personal dosiers and personal files must be made by the affected persons. The argument that handing over the files would lead to a civil war contradicts previous experience. So far, no exposed Stasi member had come to any serious harm.

2. Source files must be reserved exclusively for the criminal prosecution authorities for legal processing. The greatest attention must otherwise be given to their secure storage.

3. The strategic files must be made accessible for historical research, while taking into account data protection.

4. So-called search aids (card files, etc) must be stored in a safe and protected manner.

The following demands arise for us from the problems portrayed above:

—The law on dealing with Stasi data of 24 October 1990 must become part of the Unification Treaty in its full extent.

—Differentiated treatment of the Stasi files must, going above and beyond this, be anchored in this law. Those responsible for keeping and dealing with the files must be elected by parliament and be subject to parliamentary control. The citizens committees are to be included in this work.

—The dismissal without notice of all former Stasi employees from the Interior Ministry and the Civil Service.

—Former Stasi employees should not be allowed any access to the Stasi files.

—Making public the structures which have hampered the committee disbandment of the MfS/AfNS since 18 March 1990. That means primarily the immediate dismissal of Interior Minister Diestel, who was politically responsible for this.

—Making public the command structures between the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] and the Stasi.

—Dealing with data on the perpetrators of injustice in accordance with the principles of the state based on the rule of law.

—Public trials against the former MfS and all those politically responsible for it for violating human rights, planning internment, spying on people, violating the secrecy of mail and telecommunications, coercion, and intimidation.

—Smashing the Stasi economic mafia, which appropriated the property of 16 million GDR citizens.

—Rehabilitation of all victims of the Stasi, and compensation [for them].

The complete disbandment of the MfS was one of the decisive demands of last fall. It has still not been fulfilled. The last opportunity for solving this demand politically is now!

Our demands should be the basis for further talks with the chairmen of parliamentary groups in East and West. By the unlimited occupation of the offices of the Stasi Central Archives, we strongly wish to call upon all those with political responsibility throughout the whole of Germany and, above all, all those concerned, to think and act.

GDR SPD Supports Occupation

LD0509170590 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1558 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The GDR SPD [Social Democratic Party] supports those occupying the archive rooms of the former MfS/AfNS [Ministry for State Security/Office for National Security] in their aim of pointing out the completely inadequate rules on dealing with the Stasi past in the Unification Treaty, according to party and parliamentary group leader Wolfgang Thierse. In a press statement today, he recalled his proposal for a solution presented yesterday to the leaders of the CDU/DA [Christian Democratic Union/Democratic Awakening], FDP [Free Democratic Party], and PDS [Party for Democratic Socialism] parliamentary groups, in which the relevant law of 24 August 1990 should remain in force until the storage and treatment of the former MfS/AfNS files are regulated by the all-German legislator until 31 December 1995 at the latest. According to such rules, citizens of the GDR would have to retain the right to deal with their past on their own responsibility. Apart from this the files should only be allowed to be inspected and used in accordance with strict data protection rules. "Abuse to political and criminal ends has to be ruled out," Thierse stated. The Unification Treaty, or in any exchange of letters as part of it, must ensure that the intentions of the law passed by the People's Chamber on this would continue to be respected after 3 October.

The period remaining between the introduction on Thursday, and the first reading of the Unification Treaty next week, must be used for consructive talks transcending party political boundaries "in order to formulate this common interest of the GDR population to the Federal Republic." [Passage indistinct] in this context demanded that Interior Minister Diestel resign, as he had hampered the work of the special committee on examining People's Chamber deputies, and left former high-ranking members of the State Security in leading positions. In his opinion the removal of Stasi employees from the state archives and the immediate [passage indistinct] by Stasi officials are equally necessary.

Police Cordon Off Building

LD0509174990 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1638 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—Police equipped with shields, helmets, and nightsticks have been cordoning off the former Stasi [State Security Service] headquarters on East Berlin's Normannenstrasse since early this evening. They are reacting to a demonstration by about 300 people proclaiming their solidarity with those who are occupying the building and demanding that they be given their files. Among the participants are prominent artists such as Wolf Biermann and Katja Ebstein.

One of the occupiers—Rainer Schult of New Forum—gave information about the situation through a loudspeaker. He read a letter to all citizens, parties, and parliamentary representatives in the East and West, calling for the Stasi files to be kept out of the reach of foreign secret services. The task of dismissing all former Stasi members from the Interior Ministry and the civil service still existed.

Schult also announced that Interior Minister Diestel has pressed trespassing charges against the occupiers.

In front of numerous journalists and camera teams from the East and West, Wolf Biermann then asked to be admitted [to speak]. He wanted to speak with the 30 or so occupiers, who are his friends. Negotiations on this are currently in progress with the Interior Ministry. Meanwhile, attempts by individual demonstrators to force their way into the former Stasi complex have so far been unsuccessful.

Deputies Want Stasi Files Retained in GDR

LD0509162690 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1534 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Excerpt] Bonn (ADN)—Deputies from the People's Chamber Legal Committee and the Committee for Constitutional and Administrative Reform met today with the Bundestag Legal Committee in Bonn. The People's Chamber deputies and representatives of the Greens raised the criticism that the work of the special committee of the People's Chamber for revealing the Stasi past, and of former Stasi employees in leading positions, would be stopped. In the deputies' opinion the continuation of this work is of urgent priority. The rules envisaged in the Unification Treaty, particularly on holding the files centrally in Koblenz, are not sufficient for the continuation of this work on the historical, political, and legal reworking of the past.

Representatives of the Greens on the Bundestag Legal Committee also noted that the Unification Treaty ignores the People's Chamber resolution. They announced that the Greens parliamentary group will put forward this People's Chamber resolution as a motion in the Bundestag. [passage omitted]

Stasi Files on FRG Agents Said Destroyed

LD0109093490 Hamburg DPA in German 2301 GMT 31 Aug 90

[Text] Hamburg (DPA)—Immediately after the change in the GDR, the East Berlin espionage service started destroying files. The former head of the foreign intelligence department in the Ministry for State Security, and successor to spy chief Markus Wolf, ex-Colonel General Werner Grossmann, confirmed in an interview for the Hamburg news magazine DER SPIEGEL that the files no longer contained any information about Stasi agents in the FRG. Grossmann said in his first interview that the spies had gradually been deactivated after the change.

The CIA had tried to recruit "top-class" ex-agents of the foreign intelligence department in the Stasi with offers of large sums of money. Similar offers were also made by the FRG Federal Intelligence Service and the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, said Grossmann, who was the last spy chief in the GDR from 1986 until the dissolution of his department. He countered speculation that a top GDR agent had been planted in the midst of the FRG Government for years. There was "no second Guillaume" in Bonn. Grossmann also denied that a Bonn state secretary had worked for his department.

Stasi Reportedly Supported FRG Neo-Nazis

AU0609104790 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 6 Sep 90 p 1

["HLL/REI"-signed report: "Stasi Also Protected Extreme Rightists"]

[Text] Bonn, 5 September—The GDR State Security Ministry not only protected members of the Red Army Faction (RAF), but also extreme right terrorists from the FRG. According to information obtained by FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, at least six members of neo-Nazi organizations were temporarily taken care of by this ministry in the eighties and were then passed on to Arab countries. Two of them, Odfried Hepp and Udo Albrecht, have been assessed by Bonn security experts as particularly dangerous extremists.

FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU obtained the copy of a letter that a former high-ranking staff member of the State Security Ministry submitted to an investigation commission of the East Berlin People's Chamber and the GDR public prosecutors. This letter contains details of Hepp's contacts with Department XXII of the State Security Ministry, which was in charge of international terrorism. According to this informant, former Stasi [State Security Service] Deputy Chief Gerhard Neiber headed this secret operation, which was running under the cover name of "Friedrich" and includes cooperation with other persons from the West German neo-Nazi scene.

Hans-Gerd Langer, spokesman for the FRG Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, confirmed to FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU that such connections existed. He said that the FRG Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution knew about conspiratorial contacts of "several" West German extreme rightists with the former GDR secret service. He added that it is known that Hepp and Albrecht were channeled to the Middle East via East Berlin. According to information obtained from another security agency, there is evidence of at least four other similar cases. They cannot be published yet, however, in the interest of protecting the informants.

United States Cancels Eppelmann Visit

LD0609073590 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0643 GMT 6 Sep 90

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The planned four-day visit to the United States by GDR Disarmament and Defense Minister Rainer Eppelmann has been cancelled by the U.S. on short notice. This was announced to ADN by the ministry on Thursday morning. The visit was intended to begin today, Thursday.

NVA Reportedly Trained Iraqis in Gas Warfare

AU0509172690 Hamburg BILD AM SONNTAG in German 2 Sep 90 pp 4-5

[Bernd Felgendreher report: "Poison Gas—We Were in Iraq"]

[Text] In the Iraqi desert, about 100 km northwest of the capital of Baghdad, elite soldiers of the dictator Saddam Husayn are guarding a secret camp of 20 square meters [number as received]. The facility is secured by several barbed wire obstacles; in front of them, missile batteries are dug into the sand. Here, Husayn's soldiers are being trained to survive a gas war. Nobody from the West has ever entered this training camp in the desert. It has a German name, however, Klein Storkow, because it is an exact copy of the Storkow training camp near Berlin, the training grounds of the "chemical services," as the ABC [atomic, biological, and chemical] defense units of the National People's Army [NVA] in the GDR are euphemistically called.

NVA officers showed Saddam Husayn's troops, which were the first to use poison gas in the war against Iran, how to protect themselves against poison gas attacks. The chief of the secret operation was NVA Major General Karl-Heinz Nagler (62), who until two weeks ago was chief of the "chemical services." Major General Nagler is now retired. Nagler admits to BILD AM SONNTAG: "From 1975 to the conclusion of the operation in 1987, I was in Iraq several times." Playing down the importance, however, he says: "At that point, there were no indications that the Iraqi Army had chemical weapons."

NVA Colonel Rolf Buettner, who has been Nagler's successor since 15 August, also plays down the extremely sensitive training agreement between East Berlin and Baghdad: "We did not supply chemical agents to Iraq. Nor has there been any operational training. The Iraqis were merely trained in using the technical installations of the facility." However, he also makes this revealing statement: "Those who intend to use chemical weapons in an offensive way must first of all learn to defend themselves against such weapons."

Following a preparatory period of five years, the desert construction of "Klein Storkow" began in 1980—the same year that Saddam Husayn's murderous war against Iran began.

The NVA and the then SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] government knew at that time, without any doubt, that Iraq possessed poison gas weapons. Professor Karl-Heinz Lohs (61), GDR government adviser at the Geneva disarmament negotiations, says: "We have taken part in the Geneva negotiations since the early seventies. During the time at issue, the Iraqi use of poison gas weapons was reported and discussed in detail. There was always also a high-ranking NVA officer in the GDR delegation, who would surely have reported to his minister...."

Nonetheless, the two highest-ranking NVA gas officers allegedly did not know about this. Colonel Buettner told BILD AM SONNTAG: "I only learned about it unofficially in the Soviet Union in 1987. Western press organs were not accessible to NVA officers, as you know."

BILD AM SONNTAG asked NVA Colonel Buettner and retired General Nagler: Why was the poison gas project in the desert not discontinued as soon as it was clear that the Iraqis had used gas against Iran?

Buettner: "Our officers were not confronted with this issue. When we were fulfilling this task, at the instruction of our government, we could not have assumed that the Iraqis were preparing a poison gas war against their neighbor countries."

Nagler says today: "If we had known about this, we would have protested, and we would certainly have prevented the implementation of the agreement and the mission...."

BILD AM SONNTAG reporters were the first to visit the poison kitchen in Storkow, one hour's drive southeast of Berlin.

Between pine trees, there are seven hollow concrete columns in which radioactive balls are transported to the top by elevator; from there they contaminate the terrain by nuclear radiation. In exercises, old T-34 tanks and MiG-21 fighters are sprayed with diluted mustard gas. In underground silos there are chemical agents—nerve gas, chemicals which destroy the skin, and so-called psychotoxic agents—comparable to LSD—that are able to intoxicate attacking troops and put them out of action.

Spanish Foreign Minister Arrives for Visit

LD0509140690 Budapest MTI in English 1333 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] Budapest, September 5 (MTI)—Spanish Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez-Ordonez arrived in Budapest on Wednesday on a two-day official visit.

Soon after his arrival—according to his schedule—the head of the Spanish diplomatic corps held talks with Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky, following which he is to hold a press conference.

In the afternoon, Mr Ordonez is to be received by Prime Minister Jozsef Antall in parliament. Later, he will be meeting with Ferenc Madl, minister without portfolio, and Gyorgy Matolcsy, state secretary at the Prime Ministers Office.

Comments on End of Embassy Crisis

LD0509154290 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish 1400 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez-Ordonez, who today started a visit to Hungary, speaking about the now-resolved crisis of the Spanish Embassy in Havana, said that our country kept to its initial position and has not carried out any negotiations with the Cuban Government. According to Fernandez-Ordonez this position was based on two points: first, to keep the people in our embassy, and second, not to hand them over to the Cuban authorities. Now this crisis is over and the foreign minister said that relations with Cuba are at a low ebb, although, he said, this does not mean that now that the problem has been solved they will not return to normal. [sentence as heard]

Addresses Newsmen

LD0509220990 Budapest MTI in English 1941 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] Budapest, September 5 (MTI)—The two-day official visit of Spanish Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez-Ordonez, from September 5-6, is aimed not only at preserving the continuity of bilateral relations, but also at placing them on a qualitatively new footing.

After his talks with Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky, Fernandez-Ordonez told journalists that Spain had long been considered the youngest European democracy, a role which he thinks Hungary can now take over. He spoke appreciatively of Hungary's contribution towards the drive for a single Europe.

Fernandez-Ordonez confirmed Spanish support for Hungary's admission into the West European mergers, and added that at the EC foreign ministers' conference on September 17 he would press for the approval of the "European agreement" to be concluded with Hungary.

As to the Kuwaiti crisis, the foreign ministers were in complete agreement that it should be settled through a process of negotiation. Fernandez-Ordonez, who recently conferred with King Husayn of Jordan, Egyptian President Mubarak, PLO leader 'Arafat and the foreign ministers of several Arab countries, had the impression that Iraq had also become politically isolated in the Arab world. Therefore, he was hopeful of a negotiated settlement of the conflict.

In answer to a question, the Spanish foreign minister pointed out that Italy and Spain had proposed organizing a regional security conference in Palma de Mallorca on September 24, with the participation of other Mediterranean countries. The principal aim of the conference will be to avoid polarization between the western world and the Arab states.

Francisco Fernandez-Ordonez called on Prime Minister Jozsef Antall in the afternoon.

Received by Antall

LD0509221290 Budapest MTI in English 2000 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] Budapest, September 5 (MTI)—Prime Minister Jozsef Antall met Spanish Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez-Ordonez in his parliamentary office on Wednesday.

Ordonez presented an invitation from Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez to visit Spain, which the Hungarian prime minister accepted with thanks.

At the meeting, Fernandez-Ordonez pledged full support for Hungary's early admission to the Council of Europe, and the steps taken by the Hungarian Government towards the European Community. He expressed the conviction that serious talks would begin as early as this month with the aim of preparing an association contract between Hungary and the European Community.

It was commented on at the talks that the countries' bilateral relations showed fair progress, mainly in the economic sphere. Fernandez-Ordonez stressed the Spanish intention to develop cooperation with Hungary on a new and more wide-ranging basis. Accordingly, a Cervantes Institutes is planned to be set up in Budapest to enhance the presence of Spanish culture in Hungary.

1956 Soviet Interference in Hungary Analyzed

AU0509200490 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 4 Sep 90 p 5

[Laszlo Sandor editorial: "Waiting"]

[Text] More than a month has passed since the Hungarian parliament made its request to the USSR Supreme Soviet, and lo and behold, the Soviet parliament has already set up a subcommittee to study the kind of reply that Hungary deserves.

Let us remind our readers: Our parliament asked the highest legislative body of the Soviet state—in friendly

but firm terms—to make the same gesture to the ruthlessly suppressed Hungarian revolution and freedom fight that it made in relation to the Prague Spring of 1968 crushed by Soviet tanks. In other words, the Supreme Council should declare the 1956 intervention in Hungary illegal, and it should condemn the intervention.

The newspaper of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, IZVESTIYA, has now devoted 15 lines to the acknowledgement of our message. The newspaper does not even refer to the most essential point: The Hungarian legislative body does not at all consider this step as symbolic. The paper does not mention that Hungarian legislators expect this gesture to "contribute to the establishment of true friendship", and to the healing of wounds which still hurt Hungary's past.

The reply for which we are waiting is taking its time. It would even have been too late if the answer had happened to arrive yesterday. For the Czechs and the Slovaks, the gesture was made quite naturally, and this contributed to the absence of major anti-Soviet incidents at this year's commemoration in Czechoslovakia of the 1968 interference.

Yet this is not the first time that Hungary is asking for the cleansing of this blood-covered page in our common history, although, in the past, our formulation may not have been so firm. Even the Hungarian Government in power in 1988 received promises from the highest level that documents necessary for a factual analysis would be handed over. Not even this has happened yet; or, in any event, no documents have been handed over to Hungarian state organizations.

This gives us something to think about. Why is it more difficult to admit the crimes of 1956, and why is it more painful to admit that the Soviet interference was directed against the Hungarian people? Renowned Soviet intellectuals have expressed their personal opinions in writing and in speeches several times in central newspapers. They say that both the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact—the act that enabled the Soviet Union to annex Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and which, with Hitler's help, enabled Stalin's troops to march into the "disputed" Polish territory that was suffering under the yoke of fascism—and the "creating of order" in Prague and Bratislava,—a decision directed from Moscow, and made by "the five" (which is a disgrace for our country, too)— were actions comparable to the ones for which the Hungarian revolutionaries in October 1956 were condemned.

The Soviet Government has officially condemned the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, albeit reluctantly. They condemned the Czech events in the most natural way, and that was the result of the friendly negotiations between Vaclav Havel and Mikhail Gorbachev. Sakharov had a heart attack, and that was the price for the declaration by the representatives of the Soviet people that the "relief operation" in Afghanistan, which cost so many lives, was pointless and wrong. The Hungarian 1956, or rather, the Soviet 1956 is surrounded by a wall of silence. Now and again, historians present their opposing points of view. There has been no official reevaluation of the events. It is taking its time.

We can only guess as to the reasons for this delay. In any case, one difference is blatant. Subjectively, it is easier for the present Soviet leadership to dissociate itself from Stalin and Molotov, who signed a pact with Hitler and Ribbentrop. It is easier to throw Brezhnev and Suslov, who stood, armed, in the way of socialism with a human face, onto the trash heap of history than to analyze and reevaluate the politicians who shot Budapest to pieces in 1956, and who dragged the legally elected Hungarian prime minister out of his own country.

We are not dealing with people, however, but with principles. We are not dealing with Khrushchev and Andropov, who acquired some "special" merits in 1956, but with international and human rights.

Nowadays, a responsible politician does not compare, and does not even associate the present Soviet leadership with the despots of the Stalinist and post-Stalinist period. On 20 August 1990, on the occasion of the St. Stephen's Day celebrations, our prime minister compared the Soviet power that invaded Eastern Europe to the Ottoman and Byzantine Empires, but he spoke strictly in the past tense.

Who would not appreciate the rejection of the Brezhnev Doctrine, who would not understand that we can only move into the common European house that Gorbachev dreams of together with a cleansed Soviet Union? Every Hungarian party which thinks in terms of people/nation/Europe has realized, very clearly, that the leadership that decided on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe is totally different from the leadership that stationed them in the area as policing patrols for such a long time, for such an anachronistically long time.

That is precisely why the parliament, elected by the Hungarian people, expects consequent behavior. Indeed, the evaluation that has been delayed for so long, and the self-cleansing associated with this evaluation, lies in the interest of the Soviet and Hungarian people alike. On the other hand, we would tend to blame an exaggerated political shyness on the indecisiveness and inconsequence of the spirit of reform.

There is no doubt, the time for introspection will come, sooner or later, and people will take a public stance about the results of that introspection. Indeed, that is the conclusion to be drawn from historical logic. The time factor, however, is not irrelevant. The later it happens, the more harm it will do to the friendship between our people.

Emergency Plan Drafted for Possible Energy Crisis

LD0509105190 Budapest MTI in English 0937 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] Budapest, September 5, 1990 (MTI-ECONEWS)—The Hungarian Ministry of Industry and Trade has drawn up an emergency plan to be implemented if Soviet energy supplies further decline or are even terminated. The plan contains a schedule of restrictions for major energy consumers, a ministry official told MTI-ECONEWS.

The [words indistinct] first to face restrictions because it is felt that these are likely to suffer the least damage if they receive less energy. These consumers are the following, in this order: power stations, the iron and steel industry, heavy chemical and the bulding materials industry. Energy consumption represents as much as 30 per cent of the production costs of the last three industries.

Households and individual consumers will be the last to be affected should the austerity measures come into force, the ministry official said.

Hungary expects to import 6 million tonnes of oil this year, of which only about 80 per cent will come from the Soviet Union, in spite of the fact that it contracted for the supply of 6.48 million tonnes this year.

If there is a crisis, the reserves of the Hungarian Oil and Gas Trust will be used first. The OKGT has sufficient petrol reserves for 8-9 days, crude oil reserves for 5-7 days, and diesel and heating oil for 14 days, calculated at average daily consumption rates.

As in last year, Hungary will probably import 1.6 million tonnes of oil derivatives this year, and export 1 millon tonnes, down on last year's 1.5 millon tonnes. In the event of a crisis the export of oil derivatives will be halted.

The contracted amount of 6.4 billion cubic metres of Soviet gas will probably arrive in Hungary as scheduled, the ministry official said. The Soviet Union is Hungary's only possible supplier of imported natural gas. Domestic production is 5 billion metres, as compared to 6 billion last year.

The Soviet Union supplies 1,850 mw [megawatts], a third of Hungary's electricity requirement. The loss of Soviet electricity would result in 1,000 to 1,500 hours with electric power a year since Hungary does not have enough reserve generating capacity to compensate for all the missing supply.

According to some estimates, 400-500 mw of electricity could be imported annually from the neighbouring countries using existing links, the ministry official said.

Acting Security, Information Chiefs Appointed

LD0509225690 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1630 GMT 5 Sep 90

["Excerpts" of interview with Minister Without Portfolio Peter Boross by unidentified "Extra" program announcer; place and date not given—live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Our first guest tonight is Minister Without Portfolio Peter Boross. What was the reason for the hurry of the Antall government? Three months ago, when the cabinet was formed, Lajos Nagy, director general of the National Security Office, was confirmed in his post, and now, three months later, he has been just relieved. You have said that the government's or the ministry's confidence in Lajos Nagy has been shaken. What does it mean precisely?

[Boross] If I remember correctly, I did not say that exactly. What I said was that the confidence of public opinion has been shaken. The leaders in charge had to sense this, and a decision had to be made accordingly. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Gabor Demszky, member of the National Security Committee, declared today that they had not known about the planned release of the two heads [Istvan Dercze, head of information office, also relieved of his post].

[Boross] Gabor Demszky is not a member of the National Security Committee, but its chairman. Well, I informed him about this decision earlier, and according to my knowledge, he in turn informed the members of the committee about this. I trust that I am not mistaken. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] So why did you wait until 6 September? Why did you not replace Lajos Nagy when you took office? I think that the government was rather well informed about the work of the National Security Office, in addition to the fact that it would know Lajos Nagy rather well it when confirmed him. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] In my view, claims of graduality are a little dubious in view of the fact that (Sandor Simon) has been appointed as acting head of the National Security Office, and (Kalman Kocsis) has been appointed acting head of the Information Office.

[Boross] Regarding the question as to why it all happened now, the fact is that such a change appears not in itself generally, but is connected to reorganization. For reorganization, all organizations must become known, for which three months are not sufficient. Those organizations in question are rather complex organizations. It seems the clock moves very fast and I feel I cannot finish. [passage omitted]

'Shrinking' Comecon Market Makes Trade Uncertain

LD0509131990 Budapest MTI in English 1147 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] Budapest, September 5, 1990 (MTI-ECONEWS)—Hungarian agricultural exports may be at a disadvantage next year when Hungary switches over to hard-currency settlement with the Comecon [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] countries.

A Hungarian Ministry of Agriculture official disclosed that the shrinking Comecon market has made the future of 400,000 tonnes of various canned foods, 1.5 million hectolitres of wine, and 300,000 tonnes of fresh vegetables, uncertain.

Last year, Hungarian agricultural exports to hard-currency markets amounted to 1.7 billion USD [U.S. dollars], about 30 per cent of the country's total convertible-currency exports.

Hard-currency agricultural exports are to be 2 billion USD this year.

Hungary's farm exports to rouble markets are already feeling the pinch, as sales will probably reach only 700-800 million roubles this year, as compared to 1 billion roubles last.

The Ministry of Agriculture is now trying to get tinned foods, wine and fresh vegetables included in the indicative shopping list Hungary and the Soviet Union are drawing up as a kind of plan for next year's trade.

National Bank President on Economic Situation

AU0509113390 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 1 Sep 90 p 6

[Report on interview with National Bank President Gyorgy Suranyi by Emilia Papp; place and date not given: "Last Year There Was Also Uncertainty—The Sum-Total of Company Deposits Has Grown by 24 Billion—A Debt Exchange Is Possible"]

[Excerpts] Success and failure, shadow and light.... This is a year of contradictions, at least as far as the economy is concerned. Yet our balance of payments is far better than expected, our exports in convertible currency are encouraging, and our imports in hard currency did not get out of hand. In other words, we have every reason to be confident. And yet.... The whole affair does not seem stable, or based on a solid foundation.... Let us remember our accelerating inflation, the increased insolvency of our enterprises, and our growing unemployment.... We asked Gyorgy Suranyi about the reassuring, yet contradictory economic and financial situation.

[Papp] It is true that the current balance of payments looks encouraging, but there are still a lot of uncertainties in our budget. If our budget deficit grows to over 10 billion forints by the end of 1990, this will upset the current balance of payments, for the two are closely connected. Yet it would be time for a surplus, because we can no longer cover our $1.5 billion interest debt.

[Suranyi] The connection is very close, but uncertainties do not automatically imply a deficit. There were uncertainties last year, too, but, at the same time, by the first half of 1989, the budget deficit surpassed the 1990 deficit by 30 billion forints. It was definitely the reduction of the budget deficit that enabled us to register a 4-5 billion forint deficit in the state budget during the first half of this year, compared to 34-35 billion forints this time last year.

[Papp] Yet there is still a contradiction between the success of our foreign financial transactions and the failure of our domestic financial policy. I am thinking of our inflation, and of the insolvency of our enterprises.

[Suranyi] I see no fundamental contradiction. It is more a case of us putting great pressure on the economy, and the population is the first to have to make substantial sacrifices. Nevertheless, this year, the difficult consequences of change have been accompanied by a positive development in our position abroad, and that had not happened for a long time. [passage omitted]

[Papp] Recently, you stated that enterprise queues had not gotten any longer. On what did you base that statement?

[Suranyi] Most of all, I based it on information from several independent sources. First, I would like to say that clearing circles have helped us deal with some of the queues. Second, the sum-total of company deposits has grown by 24 billion forints since last year; this would indicate the same tendency. There cannot be the same shortage of money as before, if the sum-total of company deposits has grown to such an extent.

[Papp] I could imagine companies making their customers stand in line while they make deposits in the bank.

[Suranyi] That can no longer be done so easily, because the law on self-liquidation implies a certain threat. [passage omitted]

[Papp] Naturally, there are many other dangers. We have to do something about the 1,300-billion-forint state debt.

[Suranyi] Debt exchange would be one possibility—as a debtor, the state has to make exchanges with the business sector—and such an alternative is desirable from several points of view. First, it would show that there has been a fundamental change in property in our economy: There has been privatization. Indeed, future proprietors could thus take on a part of the state debt which burdens state property. So, apart from the fact that the new proprietor will probably make more of a profit than the state on the same property, he will also "inherit" the debt with the same time limit. Thus, when the debt becomes due, the financial authorities will be able to decide where the

money should go to. Should they renew the credit to the same person, or do they detect greater imagination in somebody else? As a debtor, it was impossible for the state to do any of these things, because the debt may have become due, the credit still had to be renewed.

[Papp] Regarding the preparation of the government's three-year program, it has been said that liberalization will also apply to the currency market among the population. What is your opinion on that?

[Suranyi] I represent the more conservative school of thought on this issue. It would be preferable to maintain the present "ugly" system for another year or two, rather than endanger the external situation, which has begun to improve. Having said that, I agree with liberalization at all levels where economic restraints can be lifted. Furthermore, even in the most developed countries, it still happens that—among the population—the level of convertibility does not keep up with the level of convertibility allowed in the economic sphere. Even when it is difficult to oversee the situation, that still happens. [passage omitted]

Unemployment Expected To Stay Below 2 Percent

LD0509110590 Budapest MTI in English 1034 GMT 5 Sep 90

[(Text] Budapest, September 5, 1990 (MTI-ECONEWS)—Unemployment in Hungary is now expected to stay below 80,000 (2 per cent of the active population) this year, instead of the earlier figure of 80,000-100,000 previously forecast for the end of the year.

Having said that, it will see a rapid rise later, reaching 8-10 per cent in a few years' time, with about 400,000 people out of work.

Labour Ministry officials told a press conference on Tuesday that the government intends pursuing an active employment policy with the key element aimed at getting employees to adapt to the labour market and at boosting labour mobility.

The main task is to establish a retraining system, and develop labour market services.

Tax allowances and credit preferences will be granted to entrepreneurs to boost workforce demand.

Great hopes are being pinned on the operations of the 'E' (Existence) bank, which, with its starting capital of 8 billion forints, will offer loans to the unemployed to support them in launching enterprises.

Defense Ministry Budget To Increase Next Year

LD0509133590 Budapest MTI in English 1246 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] Budapest, September 5, 1990 (MTI-ECONEWS)—Plans project that the Hungarian Ministry of Defence will need at least 7 billion forints next year, ministry officials told a press conference in Budapest today.

This year's budget is about 40 billion forints, but it will have to be raised considerably because of inflation and the switch-over from rouble to dollar accounting, both of which are likely to push up purchase costs considerably.

Another reason for the increase in the army's budget is that if Hungary leaves the Warsaw Pact next year it will have to re-organise the army on a national basis. The deployment of army units may also be changed with some units moving from western to eastern regions of the country. A new mobilization and preparedness plan may also have to be developed.

The salaries of professional soldiers will also have to be raised considerably as these rose by only 8 per cent last year, while inflation was 17 per cent. Regular soldiers received a 16 per cent rise this year, while inflation is now nearing 30 per cent. Wages account for over 25 per cent of all army expenditure.

Despite a significant rise in the army budget, only 10 per cent of the 77 billion forints will be spent on development. A widescale development of the army's technical facilities has therefore been put off until 1992.

Defense Minister Comments on 'Insecurity' in Army

LD0509143590 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1000 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] A sense of insecurity among the professional staff of the Hungarian Army, can indeed be considered justified, said [Defense] Minister Lajos Fur at his news conference today. The minister gave three reasons for this. First, the change of system, in which it has not become fully clear what consequences this will have in the army, whether there will be a big clearout. In connection with this, Lajos Fur underlined that no one needs to fear a cleansing, taken in the political sense. The new defense leadership unambiguously counts on and builds on every decent, honest soldier, committed to the cause of the nation, with high professional knowledge, and genuine moral bearing.

Second, the minister mentioned the program for the reduction in military forces, in the framework of which the size of the Army—currently at 126,000—will be reduced to 90,000 by the end of 1992. This means a roughly 30 percent reduction in numbers which will affect mainly conscripts and civilian staff. The introduction of 12 months military service, which is in progress at the moment, is a part of this process.

Third, the minister spoke about the financial conditions of the professional staff, in which there are great extremes. One example: The average income of a lieutenant working as a commanding officer is 10,700 forints and, naturally, he cannot get any supplementary income alongside this.

Writes Letter to Army Representatives

LD0509155190 Budapest MTI in English 1417 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] Budapest, September 5 (MTI)—Lajos Fur, minister of defence, wrote a letter to the body representing the professional staff of the Hungarian Army. The press were briefed on the contents of the letter on Friday, which Mr Fur said had revolved around the soon-to-be published new Hungarian military doctrine and security policy.

The letter is also aimed at dissolving the uncertainty still experienced by some members of the professional staff. Mr Fur said there would not be a major clean-up in the Hungarian Army. The letter also stressed that the new military leadership wished to rely on every honest and nationally committed soldier who had a high professional knowledge and genuine moral strength. The 12-month compulsory service time for conscripts would require a more disciplined and orderly life from the soldier, coupled with a more considered and competent approach from commanding officers.

The minister also said that soldiers should be given a wage rise as soon as possible, as 10 per cent now lived under the minimum wage, and the salaries of the majority were only around 10,000 forints. Professional staff and civilians had received an 8 per cent rise last year, and 16 per cent this year, which is well below the rate of inflation. (Soldiers are not allowed to take second jobs.)

Brigadier General Lajos Kondor, secretary of the ministry Cabinet Office, said that the most pressing task in the near future would be lay the amry's activity on national foundations. This required a radically new system of training and education. The officers' code and the new service rules were soon to be published, and the creation of bodies for the defence of democratic interests.

It was also said that while the military budget was at about 40,000 million forints for this year, next year, the ministry would need at least 77,000 million forints. In addition to inflation, considerable expenses were incurred in the process of restructuring the army, moreover, from 1991, the necessary components and technology would only be available for dollars. Currently there are only 7-8,000 million forints earmarked for the latter, although several times as much would be needed.

Finally it was said that the rehabilitation of the soldiers illegally deprived of their rank during the past decades had already been started.

First 100 Days of Antall Government Analyzed

SZDSZ Chairman Interviewed

AU3108190390 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 30 Aug 90 pp 1,7

[Report on interview with SZDSZ Chairman Janos Kis by Lajos Poganyi; place and date not given: "The Justitia Plan Is Not Legal"]

[Excerpts] [Poganyi] If I misunderstand your words, please promise me that you will not ask for corrections tomorrow, issue an angry MTI communique about this interview or call me a brainless good-for-nothing, or a cultural ignoramus with no national sentiments.

[Kis] If your question refers to a change in my behavior toward the press, then my answer is that I have no reason to change. I, therefore, will not do anything like that in future, either.

[Poganyi] Let us turn to more serious matters, get to the heart of things, or, to be more exact, let us start with the end of the first 100 days of the Antall government. What is your opinion on the daintily named Justitia Plan initiated by parliamentary representatives of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] and supported on many points by the government (what a surprise!)?

[Kis] It is an electoral campaign ploy, nothing else.

[Poganyi] What evidence can you give of that?

[Kis] When the coalition government presented its amnesty bill to Parliament, the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] vociferously protested, but the government still showed leniency toward all those against whom it now wants to start procedures. The government should inform public opinion that, in these cases, a public prosecutor's investigation or a court case is no longer possible. Following the MDF news conference at the beginning of the week, many SZDSZ representatives went to see Imre Konya, the chairman of the MDF parliamentary faction, asking him about his bill for the Justitia Plan. They all received the answer that there was no written bill. In other words, the Justitia package was only good in stirring up sentiments and further destabilizing the political situation.

Who Are the Good-for-Nothings?

[Poganyi] Meanwhile, public opinion is being divided, of course. Some people are saying that it was about time, while others feel even more insecure.

[Kis] I agree with that. Only with strictly legal procedures can we calm people who should not be worried—according to the law—and only thus can we reassure people who rightly expect social justice. The Justitia Plan is, quite simply, not legal. The examining committees that will be appointed cannot replace professional prosecuting attorneys and judges. [passage omitted]

[Poganyi] In such an overly tense political climate, perhaps we could still try to discuss objectively how the SZDSZ views the first 100 days of government. To repeat the words of the political analyst Attila Agh, the largest party in government—namely the MDF—promised us a rosy future. So, let us start with the economy, something that is on everyone's mind.

[Kis] The specialists and political leaders of the SZDSZ have put together their assessment of the first 100 days, and we will be publishing it soon. It is entitled "The Days of Tolerance Are Over." In our assessment, we show that the government has had little substantial success in dealing with the crisis. [passage omitted]

[Poganyi] There is also the Smallholders' Party [FKgP], which believes that the land reform should take us back to 1947 conditions. This may just be a mistake on my behalf, but people sometimes begin to feel that the FKgP is turning into a heavy load for the Antall government, like a necessary evil.

[Kis] The entire government is responsible for all the damage the smallholders' actions may cause to the nation. Nowadays, the catastrophe pending over our heads is no longer that the FKgP's land reform may come true in the near future, but that the government does not clearly distance itself from the FKgP's promises and threats. As a result, villages are overwhelmed by general insecurity and fear. Consequently, there are many places where farmers are neither sowing nor reaping. It is our duty to present concrete proposals for an intelligent and fair privatization of agriculture.

Brothers-in-Law, Friends

[Poganyi] We cannot talk about the first 100 days without mentioning the government's foreign policy statements, which have caused many reactions. I am thinking of Jozsef Antall wanting to be the—spiritual—prime minister of 15 million Hungarians, and of him comparing the Soviet Union to the Byzantine and Turkish Ottoman empires.

[Kis] Relations between Hungary and her neighbor states became tense because the national and national minority arguments which emerged after World War I were simply repressed after the Soviet occupation. Now that Soviet troops are withdrawing from the countries of our region, conflicts are surfacing again. In that respect, the government is not responsible for the deterioration of the situation. Nevertheless, any responsible Hungarian government should avoid ambiguous statements, because they can make even our potential allies turn against us. We have to be aware of the fact that, in our neighboring countries, people in general —not only nationalist elements—are seriously worried that we will one day make territorial claims. That fear is the trump card of nationalists in our neighboring countries. Let us not play into their hands. [passage omitted]

Press Office Issues Statement

AU0309151890 Budapest MTI in English 1626 GMT 31 Aug 90

[Text] Budapest, 31 Aug (MTI)—A short review of the first hundred days of government office was forwarded to MTI on Friday by the Prime Minister's Press Office. The document makes the following points:

The free elections in Hungary marked a change not so much in the government as in the system. Our historical task is to turn a suppressive state that caused general degeneration into a motherland that will see to the welfare of its citizens. Despite the unprecedented difficulties we face, it seems promising that our endeavours coincide with a national awakening, as well as similar processes at work in neighbouring countries and the whole world.

The coalition government set itself a triple task for the first period. It wanted to transform the organizational and operational order of government control, lay international relations on new foundations, mitigate the economic crisis, and encourage enterprise.

To facilitate the procedure of governing the country, the coalition parties, in co-operation with the opposition, amended the Constitution so that only a two-thirds majority would be needed on issues which would have a role in guaranteeing democracy.

The National Assembly elected the president of the Republic of Hungary.

The government's structure had been transformed: Some ministries and chief authorities, including the National Planning Office, former symbols of the ancien regime, had been wound up. The control of ministries had been put on a new footing through the appointment of a minister, a political state secretary and an administrative state secretary, as well as deputy state secretaries.

The Ministry of the Interior had grown out of the former ministry of public safety turned administrative office.

The direct supervision of security services had been removed from the authority of the prime minister, and a profound reorganization launched.

The transformation of the Army had already begun, with the numbers cut and compulsory service time reduced. The post of commissar, or political official, had been abolished.

The government had succeeded in making arrangements for holding genuinely democratic local elections on September 30, which would mark the end of the structural changes in the political system. At the moment, the country has 132 public officials in posts ranking higher than that of a deputy state secretary. Thirty-eight of them also held a high office in the former government and 94 are completely new.

The government is also concerned about the spectre of unemployment. A social network is being set up, minimum wages have been determined, and resources are being [word indistinct].

In connection with the new foreign political bearings, the review says:

When establishing its new foreign policy principles, the government had to consider contradictory points of view. On the one hand, it had to take into the account the need to restore the country's independence and sovereignty, and improve its country's future: These considerations could only be realised by the cancellation of one-sided links, and the creation of new ones with Western Europe and the Common Market. On the other hand, it was anxious not to jeopardise the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary or the negotiations aimed at setting up a new European security system.

At the Moscow session of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Body, the government unambiguously revealed the Hungarian intention of leaving the military organization, stressing that this decision was not directed against WP countries. He also expressed our long-term political and economic interest in maintaining links with the Soviet Union.

The new Hungarian Government set relations with leading West European powers and governments on a different footing. This endeavour was assisted by the fact that the parties in the government coalition are members of the same international party federations as most West European government parties. Naturally, common ideologies and political views will open up new channels for Hungary in, say, economic cooperation, or that of security.

In the course of his Brussels talks, the prime minister handed over a memorandum to the current EEC president, opening up the realistic possibility of signing a bilateral contract which would make the Republic of Hungary an associate member of the European Community in early 1992. This contract and the contracts to be signed, as a result of Hungary's endorsement of a letter of intent issued by EFTA, will create favourable conditions for Hungary's admission to the European Economic Network.

The Hungarian prime minister was the first to pay an official visit to the NATO Headquarters. Hungary was also the first Eastern European state to announce plans to open a Bureau attached to NATO for diplomatic communication.

The Hungarian Government enforced the sanctions against Iraq ordered by the Security Council within 48 hours. The fact that ten countries have cancelled the visa requirements for Hungarian tourists during the past few months indicates that West European countries are willing to receive Hungarian travellers.

The government has made a special effort to steadily improve relations with neighbouring countries. In the framework of a cooperative quintet involving Austria, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia Slovenia, Croatia and Hungary a few specific achievements have already been reached in joint programmes of infrastructural development and environmental protection.

As one of the corner stones of the government's foreign policy, the question of national minorities has been taken up at every available opportunity. The government has used all the international diplomatic means at its disposal to promote the rights of the Hungarian minorities living in neighbouring countries. At the same time, a separate state secretariat has been set up to secure a guarantee of these rights and further improve the situation of the minorities concerned.

In sum, we can state that the country has taken decisive steps towards becoming an equal partner in the community of European democracies. Needless to say, further major initiatives in this direction are needed in the remainder of the year too.

In connection with the immediate government package aimed at controlling the economic crisis, the review stresses that the first challenge faced by the government was its ability to fend off insolvency, as the elections had seen the withdrawal of some 800 million dollars in foreign deposits from Hungary. However, the government succeeded in regaining trust shaken by the political risks involved in the change of system. Thus, funds required to preserve the country's solvency are available for this year. Short-term deposits worth several hundred million dollars were brought back into the country. In the course of the past three months, Hungarian citizens have tripled their currency deposits in Hungarian banks, so that they now amount to 650 million dollars.

The drop in trade with the CMEA [CEMA] and the economic embargo imposed on Iraq, however, pose grave difficulties to the national economy.

The economic package set the ball rolling for a market economy based on private ownership to be established. The government has submitted the law on "preprivatization" to Parliament. A bill on overall privatization is in the pipeline. On the basis of the guidelines issued on ownership reform and privatization, new laws and speedy, large-scale privatization will start in the autumn.

During the autumn, a new investment law will be drafted for the all-out regulation of foreign capital investment.

As poverty is the bitterest inheritance and greatest risk of the new government, it will make an effort to prevent massive impoverishment with a new welfare programme.

In September, the government will go public with a full-scale report (white paper), providing an authentic analysis of the state of the economy, as well as three-year government policy.

Mazowiecki Said Topping Public Opinion Poll

LD0509171390 Warsaw PAP in English 1539 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] Warsaw, Sep. 5—Public opinion polls carried out by the CBOS [Public Opinion Research Main Center] in the period between last April and last July were designed to investigate the links between declared political attitudes and opinions held on the changes which are taking place in this country.

Each of the surveys showed that about 70 percent of those polled opted for the centre, while leftist attitudes were declared by some 10 percent and rightist by about 20 percent.

Positive assessment of the ongong processes in Poland was declared most often by respondents of the rightist orientation. The economic reforms implemented by vice-Premier Leszek Balcerowicz were supported by about 38 percent of rightist respondents, 23 percent of persons calling themselves leftists, and 21 percent of the centrists.

People declaring rightist orientation were clearly more often in favor of the activities of the Parliament, government, church, and Solidarity Trade Union than persons on the left and centre. The left more frequently praises the Army, OPZZ [National Trade Union Confederation] trade unions, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Of three leading political figures Wojciech Jaruzelski enjoys the recognition of 48.5 percent of the leftists, 41.2 percent of the centrists, and 34 percent of the right. Lech Walesa: 71.4 percent of the right, 60.5 percent of the centre, and only 54.4 of the left. Tadeusz Mazowiecki got the best rating from all the groups of respondents. 82.6 percent of the rightists positively assessed his work, 74.8 percent did so in the centre, and 78.8 percent among the leftists.

National Solidarity Commission Meeting 'Stormy'

LD0509213490 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1700 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Report on National Solidarity Commission meeting on 5 September; place not given—recorded passages within quotation marks]

[Text] Today's meeting of the National Solidarity Commission was very stormy and interesting. Today's plenary session of the National Solidarity Commission was devoted to, among other things, debate on the draft laws on works collective agreements and the return of property lost by the union and social organizations during the martial law period. A lot of time was spent on the current social and political situation in Poland, the state of Solidarity, and the union's future. Here are excerpts from the debate on this subject.

Jan Rulewski speaking:

"What alarms me most, frankly, is the dismantling of the Solidarity social and trade union movement. There are alarming voices from within the union, including yours, Lech [Walesa], as seen in the recent interview I read, in which you said the Solidarity banners have to be put away.

"Why should this be the case? Poland is in a transition period, and practically the only stabilizing factor in Poland is the Solidarity trade union. People still rely on it, despite various opinions about it. They want their poblems solved; there is no other force. Imagine what would happen if we split; we would make a political Lebanon of Poland.

"I ask: Who is disturbed by this great Polish experience, which is not just a trade union but the sum of human relationships, sometimes in the shape of me quareling with Lech Walesa, but his is a very good bond, because in this way we have people giving other people a chance to chose? [sentence as heard]

"A change from this stabilizer to a partial, new citizens committee in the shape of the Center Accord or ROAD [Citizens Movement-Democratic Action] is dangerous for Poland, without any way out."

Andrzej Slowik:
"We have no arguments here to defend the Soldiarity government. Should this government continue to be called the Solidarity government or not? We will sink to the bottom together with this government if such an opinion persists about this team, which does not give us the chance or arguments to defend ourselves against the accusations of the work forces. There is no single enterprise that can be pointed to as an example of where a link has occurred between work and wages, where for better work one gets paid better, which would be an incentive for other enterprise commissions or local residents. All groupings are quoting both the union and the church. There is terrific confusion.

"I read today about a poll held in Lodz. If you were to compare this to a poll held by GAZETA WYBORCZA, you would think we were living in two completely different worlds.

"This is how it is. There are two worlds: the world of TV and newspapers and the real one, the world for the works commissions where they struggle against the old nomenklature supported by people from Solidarity. Nothing has changed. The propaganda has assumed the face of the worst period of the Gierek era, and those involved in the alcohol scandal continue to be hidden, which is read as an attempt to cover up the whole affair and the whole matter during election time for political gain rather than to sort out the most important issue—namely, the disintegration of the economy. [sentence as heard]

"The same is also happening in light industry, particularly the customs duty, and so on and so on. Clearly, the time for political games has ended, because we are dealing with a partner who lacks credibility, who does

not realize our expectations, who is acting contrary to the intentions and declarations adopted earlier, and who supports itself with statistics. We live as paupers, all equal, according to the communist model. This evaluation (?is contradictory)."

Maciej Jankowski:
"We also cannot allow ourselves to be demoted to the role of trade union, a traditional role, concerned only with wages or, let us say, health and safety conditions. The trade union must exist in a political form as changes occur, and it must be authentically political. That is why it is high time we stated precisely how we, as a trade union, will enter the elections and [word indistinct] candidates sent by whom."

Lech Walesa:
"Your slogan today is pluralism, or perhaps in other words, the market economy. If that is so, then how can we imagine a market economy within a Solidarity monopoly?

"If we have a market economy, then some people are better, some are wiser, some are owners, some are workers, and so forth. We will not create a market economy at a time when we are allowing a monopoly to exist.

"It is worth our while, however, to clean up the situation, and we can do this only through free elections. Then it will [word indistinct] be clear how much who (?took on), how he (?took it on) and what he is answerable for, as much responsibility as participation. Then we will have a clean situation.

"But, this is what now hampers us, this is what does not let us live. Please understand, this is not Walesa or whoever pushing for (?the next) position. That is not what is at stake. It is untying a knot which, at the moment, is hampering us. We will not do anything differently.

"Second, we will not be a different union, such as unions are in other countries, where they have really passed the test. We will be similar. We will not be such a movement, such a (?stick) as Jasiu [words indistinct] hanging over the government at that time. That is the past. We are aiming today for governments similar to those in Italy, France and the United States. We will be no other, if normal laws stay in force here."

More on Solidarity Meeting

LD0609034890 Warsaw PAP in English 2110 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] Gdansk, Sept, 5—The National Commissin of Solidarity held a meeting in Gdansk today, discussing the current situation in the country, the parliamentary draft law on returning assets taken away from the trade unions and social organizations after the introduction of martial law. Solidarity leader Lech Walesa attended a part of the meeting.

Walesa provoked a discussion on the condition, role and future of Solidarity. He stated that one should not prolong the abnormal situation in the country which should be redressed by free elections and the return of Solidarity to trade union positions. Walesa expects Solidarity, as a movement bearing the responsibility for the reforms, will be in trouble up to the elections and must be ready to shoulder responsibility for not fully meeting trade union commitments. "Only free elections will allow us to live and act in defence of people," said Walesa.

The discussion once again brought to light the differencs in concepts of Solidarity's operation, strictly trade unionist or enriched with political activity. Most participants favoured the trade unionist trend, even a radical one, arguing that growing political divisions harm the union, its prestige and effectiveness.

The participants also worried about the union's unsatisfactory activity. They stressed the sharp outflow of experienced activists to the state administration and local government, the lower "impetus" of trade unionists and the populism of local leaders.

Walesa agreed that many discussants were right and recalled that not much would change in Solidarity's position in society before the parliamentary elections. "If you want to topple a government, you should have another one ready. I see us as sitting on a powder barrel with the fuse burning. Today we could come together only through strike. Every other road calls for concrete solutions while the situation is difficult. We proved that the system can be reformed but we did not promise that this would not hurt. The government is ours but only in 35 percent. The only way out is setting order through elections. Only then will we be able to be a trade union like anywhere in the world," Walesa said.

The National Commission acquainted itself with the draft law on the return of assets taken away from trade unions after martial law. The bill envisages the return of assets and funds or compensation for destroyed assets in real value. A special commission would handle these matters.

The commission voted to take away the Solidarity logo from the GAZETA WYBORCZA daily. Following the vote, press spokeswoman of the national commission Barbara Malak resigned.

Discussion on the trade union bill on collective labour contracts was postponed till the next meeting of the commission.

GAZETA WYBORCZA Loses Solidarity Logo

LD0509213890 Warsaw Television Service in Polish 1730 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] A minute ago we received confirmation from PAP of the REUTERS dispatch about the National Commission taking away the Solidarity logo from GAZETA

WYBORCZA. In view of this, says PAP, the National Commission's press spokeswoman, Barbara Malak, has resigned. It is not GAZETA WYBORCZA I am concerned about, since it will manage even without this logo, but the principle and method, she said. The logo has been treated as an instrument of censorship, directed against the press and other mass media. I had to decide whether I could accept mny work as spokeswoman in a situation where it came to the use of censorship. We have found out from GAZETA WYBORCZA that a statement from the [editorial] team will be published tomorrow.

GAZETA WYBORCZA on Logo Loss

LD0609093190 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 0500 GMT 6 Sep 90

[Text] Today's edition of GAZETA WYBORCZA appears without the Solidarity logo. Let us remind you that during Wednesday's meeting of the NSZZ [Independent Self-Governing Trade Union] Solidarity National Commission, 26 people voted in favor of withdrawing the logo from the newspaper, 21 voted against, and 12 abstained. The union's National Commission justified its resolution on withdrawing the logo by the tendentiousness of articles published in GAZETA WYBORCZA, by the fact that the paper was not Solidarity's information organ but that of a private company, and by the absence of agreement in the National Executive Commission, as also the National Commission, for this newspaper to use the Solidarity logo.

In today's statement, the GAZETA WYBORCZA editorial team reminds [us] that the daily was created by Solidarity personnel from numerous underground publications one and a half years ago. At that time, it never occured to anyone to question the newspapers's right to use the Solidarity symbol, a sign which the editorial team identifies with. We are not convinced, states the newspaper team's statement, that the National Commission has the right to the exclusive use of our common symbol. Out of respect for the Union and its authorities, however, we will not argue over this.

Solidarity's Borowczak Apologizes for TV Incident

LD0509192790 Warsaw Television Service in Polish 1730 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] Today's GAZETA WYBORCZA quotes extracts from a letter written by Jerzy Borowczak, a member of the solidarity founding Commission in the Gdansk shipyard, to Prime Minister Mazowiecki. The television incident that occurred 30 August during a meeting between the prime minister, representatives of the government, and shipyard workers in the Safety and Hygiene Hall should not have occurred.

And further: In apologizing to the prime minister, I also ask him to accept my assurance that this incident was not a question of ill-will but just a matter of inexperience. Let us remind you that the shipyard's representative demanded that the reels on which the meeting was taped should stay in the television centre in Gdansk, thereby making it impossible for us to present a broader report on that day. The following day, Polish television rebroadcast the meeting in full.

Addition to Walesa Gdansk Rally Speech

AU0509183090

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish on 1-2 September on page 3 carries the 1,000-word speech by Solidarity Chairman Lech Walesa at the Gdansk shipyard rally on 31 August to mark the 10th anniversary of the creation of Solidarity. Receipt of the RZECZPOSPOLITA version allows the following additions to be made to the Warsaw Radio version published in the 4 September East Europe DAILY REPORT, page 31:

Column two, paragraph two, penultimate sentence reads: We watched with fear, knowing that without joy and faith in our own strength, we would not be able to rouse the people to make the effort. (supplying indistinct passage)

Page 32, column two, first paragraph, last sentence reads: Just as when, day by day, we learned how to win without destroying, how to win without causing devastation, so today we are learning day by day to build a rule-of-law state, and the economic principles which suit a contemporary world and society on the brink of the 21st century. (supplying indistinct words)

Litynski on Presidential, Parliament Elections

AU0509084290 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 30 Aug 90 p 4

[Interview with Jan Litynski, cofounder of Citizens Movement-Democratic Action, by Pawel Lawinski and Piotr Pacewicz; place and date not given: "Let Us Stop Throwing People for a Loop"]

[Text] [GAZETA WYBORCZA] You have called yourselves Democratic Action. Would reaction—a belated one at that—not have been more appropriate?

[Litynski] The emergence of Citizens Movement-Democratic Action [ROAD] really was a reaction—to the emergence of a split in "Solidarity." It would be better, however, if all of "Solidarity" were to go into the next election together with the citizens movement. A crisis is not a time for splits, but for uniting efforts around fundamental goals. Things have turned out differently.

That ROAD was a reaction is nothing to be ashamed of. In politics, one has to be able to respond to new developments. Thank God I am not a Marxist, and that I do not believe that it is possible to predict everything.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] The Center Accord and Lech Walesa are advancing two definitions of the split: the

center right (they) and the (crypto) left (you), as well as the "accelerators" (they) and the "procrastinators" (you).

[Litynski] A lot has already been said about the absurdity of this division into left and right. If one considers the philosophy of the government, which ROAD supports, there is a lot that can be said about it, but it cannot be called left wing.

There are no left-wing or right-wing answers to today's questions; there are only pragmatic answers, and thus, by the very nature of things, the answers are centrist ones (in this sense, the name Center is apt).

What we and the Center really differ on is how we see the emergence from communism. The Center Accord proceeds from the assumption that it is possible to accomplish this by revolutionary means. We think that it can only be accomplished through the law, by evolutionary means, although we realize that evolutionary methods do have their faults.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Is this split sufficiently clear?

[Litynski] Yes, there are differences in our style of pursuing politics, in responsibility, in our attitude toward the construction of democracy. In our opinion, it cannot be created from above, but has to evolve out of concrete public activities.

I would not lament the fact that this division does not conform to any ideological pattern. Whatever government emerges, it will have to think along both social democratic and liberal lines.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Sometimes, statements made by ROAD representatives create an image of Walesa as a political giant surrounded by diminutive politicians from the Center Accord.

[Litynski] I have treated the Center Accord seriously from the outset, regardless of the critical observations that I have to make about it. It is the first large force to emerge from "Solidarity," although it does not include "Solidarity" leaders. Of course, without Walesa, the Center Accord would be much weaker.

On the other hand, if we are thinking about an effective foreign policy, or obtaining Western aid, then these things cannot be achieved without people who are members of the present government and without ROAD. In other words, the Center Accord is not in a position to form a government that would have international credibility entirely by itself. The acceleration slogan itself has already shaken the West's belief in the stability of Poland.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Lech come back: Does that opinion, which was voiced by Deputy Malachowski, still prevail among activists of the Krakow alliance, including ROAD?

[Litynski] I think that Walesa made an enormous mistake by remaining outside Parliament and counting on being an arbiter in political disputes. It was surely also a situation that he found difficult to come to terms with. A Lech Walesa confined to the role of a trade union leader, which—as one can observe—does not especially interest him, is dangerous for the country.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] So, what should Walesa do?

[Litynski] A man with his enormous political muscle should assume responsibility. He could have become the leader of a political club, or the Sejm or Senate marshal. A year ago, many people saw him as a potential prime minister. Perhaps he could assume that office now.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] The Center accepts that Mazowiecki should remain prime minister so as not to be a rival for the presidency. Both sides have proposed the slogan: Our president, your prime minister. Is a Walesa prime ministership not just a political trick to stop him along the road to the Belweder Palace?

[Litynski] Tadeusz Mazowiecki would be an excellent president. Walesa, on the other hand, would get the best people into his government. It would be a "Solidarity" government, but, at the same time, it would not be enmeshed in temporary alliances, even if it were the government of a future parliamentary coalition. It could be an efficient government, because Walesa has shown that he can maintain control over a situation without interfering in details.

When Walesa feels that he has responsibility resting on him, he performs great things. When he is freed of responsibility, he does silly things. A Walesa presidency would be a classic example of the absence of responsibility: He would be able to level accusations at everyone, delay things, recall people; and he himself would not be accountable for anything.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] The Center Accord maintains that a President Walesa would, for example, speed up privatization...?

[Litynski] Margaret Thatcher made her first privatization moves after having been in government for three years. In our case, the first moves were made in under a year. There can be no great speeding up, because of the enormous complexity of the problem. If one is not aware of that, then one can, in one breath, talk about speeding privatization and curbing unemployment.

The easy option is to wreck things, to carry out a revolution, and clear the ground completely. It is difficult, however, to start building on that ground afterward. When one takes over a ministry, one can, of course, throw out everyone who once belonged to the party, as well as those people who, according to informants, had links to the party. The only question is how will the ministry carry out its work following that kind of purge?

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] So, you accept the government's personnel policy then?

[Litynski] The charge that can be leveled at the government is that so far the prosecution service has not investigated any real crimes committed by the former ruling elite—that is, crimes such as embezzlement or the plain theft of public funds.

The government, however, is to some extent hemmed in by its pseudo-coalition character and by the composition of the Parliament. The Center Accord has attacked the government and by doing so has paralyzed it even more.

Mazowiecki made such cautious changes to his cabinet, precisely because he was afraid of how the Sejm would react, and because he lacks political support in it.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Could Mazowiecki not propose a ministerial portfolio to the Center Accord?

[Litynski] There have been no serious negotiations so far. The Center was formed and then launched into its criticism of the government. If they were to initiate a serious, substantive discussion about the government's program, then that might become a possibility, but their response has been demagogic.

The Center Accord started out with a bitter attack on the government's economic program and created the illusion that there was an easy way of effecting an improvement, but now it has "come down to earth" and given its support to Balcerowicz.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] The Center Accord's attacks on the government have a programmatic character. Is ROAD's defense of the government not of a programmatic kind as well?

[Litynski] I see no reason for defending the government at any price. We are defending something else at any price: The government's program, which—despite all its faults, and they should be criticized—provides Poland with an opportunity, and we cannot allow the program to fail.

The government requires support in order to be able to respond flexibly, to be less restricted; in order to be able to change a minister without fearing that one of the parties that has happened to find itself in Parliament will say no.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] ROAD is proposing that general presidential elections be held this fall. Yet, that must mean destabilization—and that is something that Jaroslaw Kaczynski is right about.

[Litynski] I expect a proper presidential campaign to be short and relatively peaceful. At any rate, it will be less destabilizing than the campaign that Lech Walesa has been waging for some time.

The election of a president by the National Assembly—that is what the Center is proposing—would be ridiculous. The president would not possess sufficient legitimacy and, in a sense, the campaign would not end there. What is more, many members of the National Assembly, because they lack a political power base, would not vote for the "better" candidate, but for the "winning" candidate. The National Assembly would seek to apple-polish the prospective victor in the hope that that would ensure its survival.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Who would be the victor?

[Litynski] Senator Kaczynski—judging by his statements—is confident that pressure could be exerted on Parliament, and Walesa would be elected. I think that it would be dangerous to use Walesa in this way.

I think that Walesa would be defeated if the president were to be elected by the National Assembly.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Can the original scenario—spring parliamentary elections followed by presidential elections—no longer be sustained?

[Litynski] No one is in a position to state that the elections will definitely take place in November or in December. After all, perhaps some agreement will be reached if the parties to the conflict conclude that another solution would be more advantageous to Poland.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Will President Walesa be at all able to cooperate with Prime Minister Mazowiecki?

[Litynski] Perhaps not. The current situation, however, is even worse. Assuming there is another strike. Walesa will go along to it and will lend his support to more just demands (and it has to be borne in mind that there is a whole multitude of just demands in Poland now, so many that they cannot all be accommodated within the budget). One of these times the government will have to submit its resignation.

Walesa behaved like a president last year when he designated a prime minister, but he began to knock him very quickly—at first with allusions and then in an open manner. Becoming president might have a restraining influence on him.

What matters more than all these calculations, however, is something different: People have to be given an opportunity to make a choice. Every day people hear Walesa repeating on television: "I do not want to, but I will have to."

We have to stop throwing people for a loop. If they choose the option that Walesa is proposing, then let us have Walesa as president.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] What if Walesa is defeated? Will he not turn into a political time bomb? Would that not be the worst scenario?

[Litynski] I do not think so. That bomb is already ticking away. If he were to lose, then the man of the moment would become a politician who lost an election and can

then start preparing for the next elections. There would be a greater chance of achieving political normality in Poland.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] So, does that mean the best scenario according to ROAD would see President Mazowiecki offering the prime ministership to Walesa?

[Litynski] I think that we are going too far now. I have just drawn attention to the positive aspects of that kind of solution.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] We are indulging in speculation without mentioning presidential powers.

[Litynski] The president's current powers—dissolving Parliament when it cannot perform its functions, representing the country abroad, being commander in chief of the military—make it possible to talk about the preservation of parliamentary democracy. If the president does not abuse his powers, then he can coexist well with Parliament.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Without issuing the decrees that have the force of law that Walesa has been talking about so much?

[Litynski] The decrees would be damaging to democracy. Decrees mean laws that are implemented without the agreement of the representatives of society and, above all, without the agreement of the trade unions. It is also a poor law that is promulgated hurriedly and without parliamentary control.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] Could ROAD propose negotiations with the "other side?"

[Litynski] Talks cause people to tone down their ways. There could be some kind of preelection agreement or some kind of nonaggression pact. After all, the differences between us are not so great that we would be unable to see that there are things that necessarily unite us.

However, when, for example, I read something like Jaroslaw Kaczynski's latest interview for ZYCIE WARSZAWY, doubts begin to assail me: It is the same invective yet again. In private talks, there is none of this nonsense about calling on us to raise the red flag.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] What can ROAD tell the ordinary man, who feels disappointment on a personal level, because things were meant to get better, but they have not.

[Litynski] What we have to say is that things are difficult, that they will be difficult, but if people themselves do not assume responsibility for defending democracy and the economic reform program where they work, where they live, and in the entire state, then we will all be losers. Let us appeal to that perceptive civil society that is organizing itself and, at the same time, is aware of the conditions under which we live.

A telling example is the GDR, whose per capita national income is four times that of Poland and which has a powerful uncle—the FRG. Now that change in the direction of real capitalism has been "accelerated," it turns out that the whole of the GDR is fit for the scrap heap. In other words, if we were to have an "acceleration," then we would have a GDR without West German marks.

[GAZETA WYBORCZA] The Center Accord says: We have to speed things up, and then there will be an improvement. Does that not sound attractive?

[Litynski] If the Poles choose the path that the Center Accord is proposing, then that is their choice. That is the price that one pays for democracy. I think that such a choice would be harmful for Poland, but it is not for us to instruct society to make a particular choice; we can only propose a particular choice.

Kaczynski on Current Political System, Mass Media

LD0409225890 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1700 GMT 4 Sep 90

[Report on Senator Jaroslaw Kaczynski's meeting with journalists by Andrzej Jelenski]

[Text] The meeting was organized on the initiative of the Association of Polish Journalists [SDP] at television headquarters in Warsaw. Senator Jaroslaw Kaczynski, leader of the Center Accord and editor in chief of TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC, met radio and television journalists. In answer to questions, he presented the Center Accord's program; the political group's stance regarding support for Lech Walesa's candidacy for president of the republic; and the issue of speeding up presidential and legislative elections. He also emphasized that the political system currently in force, created at the roundtable, brought Poland more harm than good, and, therefore, should cease to operate as soon as possible. Senator Kaczynski also spoke of differences in outlook between the Center Accord, ROAD [Citizens Movement-Democratic Action] and the Krakow group, regarding Poland's political landscape.

One of the questions concerned an assessment of the mass media. This is what he said:

[Begin Kaczynski recording] I am not in a position to assess the mass media—television in particular. I look at it as a representative of one of the political forces taking shape in Poland today, as someone who would like the mass media to express political pluralism within the scope of its remit.

From this point of view, the situation within the mass media today is most certainly not good. We are dealing with a state of deep disequilibrium, which is to the advantage of one of the parties to the political conflict. It is an advantage which causes considerable confusion in public awareness; an advantage which arouses a feeling

of repulsion in relation precisely to the operation and existence of the mass media, including television, among a section of society which identifies with the other party, with what one might call our or my party. This in turn often leads to unfair assessments. I hear many extreme assessments; assessments which attribute to television what many people at this moment generally attribute to our public reality—that is, the absence of change.

Television is to stay the same as it was under the communists. Well, even from my limited, minimal experience in this sphere, I can state that this is, of course, untrue, that our social and particularly our political life has changed. It is the effect of disequilibrium, however, which leads to such assessments and they form a certain, objective element of our reality. I think that there is no other way of changing this situation, and therefore, of changing the assessment of the mass media, including television, of a considerable section of public opinion, except by restoring this equilibrium. [end recording]

RSW Liquidation 'Basic Principles' Outlined

AU0509120090 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 30 Aug 90 p 3

[Interview with Jerzy Drygalski, chairman of the Liquidation Commission of the RSW Publishing Conglomerate, by Janina Parandowska; place and date not given: "The Disappearing Giant"]

[Text] [Parandowska] The process of winding up the Workers Publishing Cooperative [RSW] is now about to implement its first specific property changes. In the light of your experience, has the process of liquidating the RSW been mainly an economic or a political undertaking?

[Drygalski] This incredibly complicated operation includes managerial aspects (the commission has managed the concern), as well as economic and political functions.

[Parandowska] The political effects are the most visible ones to date.

[Drygalski] All three aspects are equally important and one should not separate them. It is absolutely true that there have been and will be more political changes to the profile of the Polish press. Its most important aspect is the process of breaking up the central steering mechanism which is being done at the Sejm's insistence. The monopoly and the control mechanism will be broken up.

[Parandowska] You mentioned the Sejm, but the Sejm has some reservations. Recently, Deputy Zych, chairman of the Sejm Justice Commission severely criticized your commission on the "Wiadomosci" television program. Journalist associations and certain editorial staffs have reservations, too.

[Drygalski] We have the support of the Sejm, for example, in the Sejm's Culture Commission. I am familiar with what Zych said, but I do not know whether he speaks for his whole commission. We also have the support of independent groupings and it is not true to say that the workings of my commission only attract criticism. I think, however, that the criticism mainly stems from the ignorance of my commission's tasks and the complexity of the operation to change the RSW. I can refute each and every accusation. Deputy Zych believes that the commission is breaking the law by not transferring property to the workers cooperatives. The law clearly states that the commission can, but does not have to, transfer RSW property to cooperatives. It can do so if it is satisfied that there are guarantees that publishing will continue and when the financial performance of a particular publication is good and has sufficient resources to carry on. Are we to throw good money after bad by transferring struggling publications to weak workers cooperatives that have no hope of success?

There is another aspect to this matter. The law was intended to be a weapon against the nomenklatura. In the meantime, it has paved the way for the transfer of property into their hands. We are aware how the editorial teams were formed and the management elected. And another question—namely, is it correct to transfer property into the hands of nomenklatura teams? The Citizens Committees, other independent grouping and "Solidarity" are against the transfer of RSW property into the hands of workers cooperatives (out of 160 applications, objections have been lodged against 90). Thus, the decision whether to transfer to a cooperative cannot be automatic. Many aspects have to be evaluated.

[Parandowska] The Association of Polish Journalists [SDP] has protested against the way people are being dismissed and the refusal to make severance payments in group dismissal cases.

[Drygalski] The SDP and the Association of Journalists of the Polish Republic assume that we are liquidating the concern and thus each employee should be dismissed. The RSW Liquidation Commission maintains that it is transforming the RSW and most of the units will continue to function, but as different organizations and under separate legal regulations. Thus, the law on group dismissals does not apply.

[Parandowska] But you are working in accordance with the provisions of the law on the liquidation of the RSW, not its transformation.

[Drygalski] We take the opposite view and believe that legal argument is on our side. Of course, the journalist associations can have different views. I would just like to indicate that a literal interpretation of the liquidation process and the payment to some 100,000 RSW employees would have far-reaching effects. We have estimated that we would have to pay some 150 to 180 billion zlotys to do this. Where is the commission to get that sort of money?

[Parandowska] The RSW as a whole generates a profit, and the sale of separate units will also bring in a lot of money.

[Drygalski] But if we do this, then we will reduce the number of units capable of generating turnover, units that could be given to new organizations. What is better for the Polish press; to transfer property to new organizations or to hand over money to the workers? Without a doubt the former. I am counting on cooperation with our journalists associations. I would like them to begin cooperating in the creation of a new media order in Poland and not just make pay claims. Many problems need to be solved—namely, how to control foreign capital, organize the market, and protect the independence of the press. The law does not oblige the commission to organize the market; we do it out of public duty. We could simply parcel out the RSW and let market forces do the rest. In such a situation, only one question would remain: What would happen to the Polish press?

[Parandowska] The commission has produced proposals for some transfers. I know that you do not want to go into details before the Council of Ministers has had its say.

[Drygalski] These are proposals, which, according to the law, the government must first approve. I think this will happen at the beginning of September. Our proposals concern almost the whole of the RSW—namely, publishing, distribution, and individual titles.

[Parandowska] Have any titles been transferred to the workers?

[Drygalski] Some have, and these are quite important.

[Parandowska] If you cannot go into details, perhaps you can tell us about the principles behind the commission's decisions?

[Drygalski] Five basic principles were applied. First, to support financially strong publications and groups. Only titles that are financially strong will be able to invest in, market, and develop the product and be in a strong position in negotiations with foreign capital. Our efforts to achieve this have already had good results in Gdansk, Silesia, and Greater Poland.

[Parandowska] Who is involved in these companies?

[Drygalski] These are complicated structures of private and state investors, local government, voivodes, "Solidarity," and Citizens Committees in various configurations. Privatization is the second principle. We want RSW transformation to assist the privatization process.

[Parandowska] You want to privatize papers?

[Drygalski] Printing and distribution divisions mainly, but also papers. We want to do it sensibly and link privatization with handing property to the workers. This will help them to identify with their enterprise. We do not want to be dogmatic, there are proposals to transfer printing shops to their worker cooperatives and two such printing shops are well suited for this.

[Parandowska] You will transfer printing shops for nothing?

[Drygalski] No. This will be a lease arrangement. The crew will have to repay by installments. Parts of the printing division will be changed into state companies and the shares will be sold to home and foreign investors. I also want privatization here to be tied to modernization through foreign capital. We are making similar proposals for the distribution division, "Ruch." I hope that a private "Ruch" will be a showcase for the whole process. The present International Book and Press Club network will be changed into a modern network of trade and cultural centers. We have also received very good offers from foreign capital to change the kiosk network into a network that is comparable to the West.

[Parandowska] One of the most worrying aspects is the fear that foreign capital will buy out everything.

[Drygalski] This is our third principle. We did not initially want to go into this area, because it is outside our powers. But Western partners continually approach us and wait for our decisions. Individual RSW units are not prepared for such talks. The critical element is to prevent them monopolizing certain sections of our press. We are opposed to a one-time sale. We favor a gradual admission of foreign capital to the press market. We must protect our influential central dailies and the important regional papers. We are more relaxed about the sporting, youth, and women's press. We are talking with some 30 important foreign firms like Hersant, Maxwell, Murdoch, Mercure, Kodak, and Philip Morris. Our fourth principle has a public character, for example, the protection of buildings, resort complexes, and medical centers. We want to keep this sector of RSW infrastructure for the journalists, printers, and publications. Under this category comes the protection of important but financially weak titles and educational, cultural, environmental titles (TATERNIK, PROBLEMY). We are seeking sponsors for these. We have also signed preliminary and temporary agreements to transfer such titles to RES PUBLICA and BANKOWOSC I ZARZADZANIE.

[Parandowska] Do you think that press independence will survive the liquidation process?

[Drygalski] This is our fifth principle and it gives us a very tough problem. Given the present stage of Poland's democratic process, I think that our press ought to support certain political options. We have to seek a wise solution and ensure that part of our press expresses the policies of political groups and part remains independent.

[Parandowska] Is the commission under strong political pressure?

[Drygalski] To my surprise, no. Only the Polish Socialist Party has made a claim.

[Parandowska] Does the Center Accord want EXPRESS WIECZORNY?

[Drygalski] This is a very recent move. Others who have also expressed interest are the Christian-National Union, the Labor Party, and the Mazowsze and Gdansk Regions. These are offers based on a good grasp of the legislation. But we have found ourselves under strong pressure from local authorities and other self-governing bodies. Sometimes, this pressure is very strong. Local authorities often ignore the law and demand a free transfer, but we have happily resisted them by suggesting negotiation or share participation.

[Parandowska] When will the RSW breakup begin?

[Drygalski] When the Council of Ministers approves our proposals. I hope the breakup can begin around the middle of September or October. The RSW will then begin to disappear.

Sejm Speaker Kozakiewicz Describes Sejm Debates

LD0509133390 Warsaw PAP in English 1112 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 5—Following debates of the Lower House (Sejm) next week, the Sejm will meet once again on Sept. 20 and probably on Sept. 21 to discuss draft amendments to the constitution, regarding the procedure of presidential elections, and two drafts on the parliamentary election law. One of them was presented in July and the other will be filed with the Sejm in the coming days.

"This will create a starting-point to discuss the future of the president and the Parliament," Sejm speaker Mikolaj Kozakiewicz told PAP. "It is not clear yet at the moment whether this will end in adopting a resolution by the Sejm or sending the drafts to a Sejm committee. I personally come out for a resolution, not one specifying precisely hours and days in the timetable but one showing the intensions as to the approximate time of individual events."

The Sejm is facing an unprecedented situation. On the one hand, it is convinced that despite all its imperfections it has done much in reforming the Polish economy and politics, that is it seems to have well fulfilled its obligations and to have initiated the process of transition from one economic-social system to another," he went on.

"On the other, as the situation develops in the country, it is necessary for the Sejm to determine the end of its own term. This is a fairly exceptional and uneasy situation. It is not certain at all whether the discussion will be free of such voices as" 'Why do we have to dissolve the parliament when we fulfill legislative functions and ensure proper support to the government'," Kozakiewicz stated.

"I am of the opinion that in a specific socio-politial reality such thinking would be erroneous, one of the reasons for this being that the internal structure of the Sejm does not correspond to the organization of society at the moment. Let us remember that there are 38 percent of deputies representing the former Communist Party who divided themselves into four groups," Kozakiewicz continued.

"Changes have also taken place within the Citizens' Parliamentary Club (OKP). Two clearly political factions, the centre agreement and the Citizens' Movement-Democratic Action, have emerged from this body already, and the third group, maybe more centreleft than centreright-oriented, is being formed. The Citizens' Parliamentary Club has stopped being a homogenous group of deputies who represented a homogenous programme and wanted to realize identical aims."

"Now voting is held according not to clubs or orientations or policies but according to decisions made by individual deputies."

"What is also an essential issue is the fact that free elections were staged in all the neighbouring countries whereas we are in the paradox situation: Poland is the most advanced country on the road to reforms but the Sejm was not elected fully democratically," Kozakiewicz went on to say.

"Thus, it seems to me that a decision on the dissolution of the parliament is inevitable. The Sejm should pluck up courage to do this, and I hope it will do it, after the debate."

"As for presidency, it was fairly clearly stated in a letter sent to me by the president. The letter included a sort of a statement to the effect that the president puts himself at the disposal (of the parliament-ed.), fulfills functions serving society, and when this society does not need him anymore, he will be ready to go. In my view the Sejm will also present its opinion as to the length of the presidential term," Kozakiewicz said.

New Sejm Deputies Club Formation Reported

AU0409091290 Warsaw ZOLNIERZ RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ in Polish 31 Aug-2 Sep 90 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Colonel Zbigniew Puzewicz, chairman of the newly formed Military Deputies Club, by Janusz Grochowski; place and date not given: "We Are Not Creating Another Lobby"]

[Text] [Grochowski] I assume, although I do not know, that the formation of a Military Deputies Club is a result of the debate in the Sejm on the need for soldiers to be apolitical.

[Puzewicz] The possible introduction of an amendment to the military service law of career soldiers, forbidding them to join political parties or associations, undoubtedly influenced our decision to organize a separate club, but the issue goes deeper than that.

[Grochowski] Could you not have joined the Non-Aligned Club?

[Puzewicz] Even this club, though formally independent, has its distinct political profile and when the moment comes, it will support this or that political option. Our membership in any other club might imply that we support such stands. We want to avoid it. As a Military Deputies Club we shall not take positions on political matters.

[Grochowski] Are the military deputies about to stop participating in parliamentary political life?

[Puzewicz] As a club, yes. Our rules provide that club discipline will not apply to voting in the Sejm or the National Assembly, and every deputy can vote as he likes.

[Grochowski] What will you discuss at club meetings? It is common knowledge that positions are hammered out at such meetings.

[Puzewicz] I am convinced that as a club we will speak out on economic matters. Most of our members are familiar with these issues, and it would be a shame not to use their experience. We want to concentrate on defense and Armed Forces issues, and despite the fact that certain processes, like restructuring and humanization, are already being implemented, many matters remain. What is more important is to coordinate all these processes. To do this one must create a new image for the Armed Forces, and we want to help. We realize that for a handful of people it will be difficult and we are counting on other opinions and suggestions from the Armed Forces and those people for whom Polish defense and sovereignty is important. I believe this will widen specific issues and lead to different approaches from the ones put forward by the ministry, though they may be in accordance with what the Army expects.

[Grochowski] A Sejm debate on defense is long overdue.

[Puzewicz] We want to see one. But it has to be well prepared, because the Army is too delicate an institution for it to be treated badly. We have to define the kind of army Poland needs and what we can afford. Being realistic and assuming no new political developments, such a debate is two or three months away.

[Grochowski] Will the Military Deputies Club be duplicating the work of the Sejm National Defense Commission?

[Puzewicz] The commission's task is to evaluate legislation, oversee its implementation, and review the defense ministry's expenditure. Our club wants to concentrate on legislation and suggest specific solutions.

[Grochowski] Do you want to create a military lobby in the Sejm? Will you be pressuring the government or the Sejm?

[Puzewicz] We do not want to be accused of forming a lobby. This is not our aim. Nor can I answer yes or no to your second question. Our lobbying will be multilateral. Putting it another way, we will support all initiatives that strengthen Polish sovereignty.

[Grochowski] According to your rules, only career soldiers can join. Have all deputies who are career soldiers joined?

[Puzewicz] At present, only seven have. Colonel Czeslaw Kosinski is on holiday and I have not spoken to him.

[Grochowski] Till now, you have all sat on the Sejm's left-wing benches. Where do you see yourselves sitting now?

[Puzewicz] This Sejm has seen so many political color changes and nobody bothered to change their seats. I think we shall stay where we are until the end of this Sejm.

[Grochowski] Do you think any club members will sit on different Sejm commissions?

[Puzewicz] We have not discussed it, but we would like to be in those areas that are of interest to us.

[Grochowski] Many interesting things are happening in the Sejm. Military deputies have many duties linked to their service. Are you afraid that attendance at club meetings will drop?

[Puzewicz] No. Compared to others, our discipline is good.

[Grochowski] The Sejm will soon be fixing its political calendar. What will the club's position be?

[Puzewicz] We have not discussed it, and I doubt whether we need to take any position. This would be a contradiction of what I said before. I can only speak for myself. We are on the threshold of great changes. Sejm deputies are faced by a mass of drafts which need their attention, and they must oversee those that have already been adopted. Premature elections would brake this process. Sejm elections ought to take place after the new Constitution is adopted.

[Grochowski] Sometime between May and June 1991?

[Puzewicz] Yes, but if we have to have presidential elections, then naturally these have to be general.

Soviet Troops To Withdraw From Torun

LD0509214890 Warsaw PAP in English 2006 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] Torun, Sept. 5—The headquarters of the local garrison of the Soviet Army informed the provincial governor of Torun about dates and ways of withdrawing Soviet units stationing in the region. The evacuation of an Air Force unit of the logistic character, already started, is to be completed by the end of this year. A date

for the pull-out of a pontoon battalion depends on results of inter-governmental talks. The unit is certain to participate in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the GDR. It is, for instance, to mount a pontoon bridge over the Vistula River so that the pull-out operation does not disturb road traffic. The land vacated by the Soviet troops is to be assigned for housing construction.

GDR Customs Turn Back Polish Travelers

LD0509124590 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 0400 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] Poles traveling to West Berlin are already able to feel the results of the stricter controls introduced without warning by the GDR on 1 September. Seventy-five Polish citizens have been turned back at the border. The Poles can still travel to West Berlin, however, but only as genuine tourists. One of the Poles who was turned back at the border had over 260 cartons of cigarettes and 400 prerecorded cassettes confiscated by customs officers.

Growth of Belorussian Nationalism Viewed

PM2908111790 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 14 Jul 90 p 14

[Jerzy Tomaszewski article: "Ethic Minorities: Belorussians"]

[Text] One of the lesser-known facts of our 1989 elections was the coming to light of the independent lists of Belorussian parliamentary candidates. True, none of the independent Belorussian candidates managed to collect enough votes to obtain a parliamentary seat. This was because of the relatively small number of Belorussians living in Poland and also the spread of their votes. Some voted for the candidates proposed by the Solidarity lists, some for the so-called coalition lists, and a considerable proportion of the Belorussian community never went to vote at all: They preferred not to vote for Polish lists, since they refused to believe that the Belorussian list could have any chance of getting through.

Nevertheless, it is sufficient to count the votes which were cast to be aware that a new element appeared on Poland's political map in 1989: the Belorussian national movement. It is regrettable that this phenomenon was barely noted by Polish press, except for the publications appearing in the Bialystok region (a worthy exception was Marek Ziolkowski's article in TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC No. 17).

It is worth our while to try to study this phenomenon, even if only cursorily. One of the political currents followed by some Belorussians is fashioned by circles grouped around the Belorussian Social and Cultural Society [BTSK] and also activists of the former Polish United Workers Party [PZPR]. This trend favors preservation of the distinct Belorussian culture in Poland, but at the same time promotes close cooperation (one of its activists, Jan Zieniuk, even speaks of integration) with parallel Polish circles. This is in keeping with the traditional direction of the BTSK activity to date. The organization publishes its own weekly publication NIWA [The Field] and represents the Belorussian minority before the state authorities, aiming to protect the former's interests in dealing with the latter.

For a long time now the BTSK's activity and aims have encountered increasing opposition of a kind, especially among the younger generation. Perhaps the word "opposition" is not fully appropriate, since representatives of those circles have published their views in NIWA itself and have frequently been active within BTSK cells. It would, therefore, better fit the definition of internal opposition. By spring 1989, however, this internal opposition organized itself into a distinct, separate group with its own candidates and a separate program. This eventually developed into the Hramada Belorussian Social Committee. The name "Hramada" points to links with the tradition of Belorussian left-wing organizations dating back to the beginning of the 20th century and the interwar period. Hramada's activists include the well-known writer Sokrat Janowicz and a younger-generation historian, Eugeniusz Mironowicz. The Committee published a draft action program. This deserves close attention, since its fundamental tenets converge with other political programs which propose to forge and establish a democratic political system in Poland. The committee proposes a system of free and proportional elections to parliament and a reform of self-government structures in Poland.

At the same time Hramada believes that the activity of minority organizations should come under the Sejm's competence (at present it is within the power of the Internal Affairs Ministry); that the use of the Belorussian language in public life in the territories inhabited by Belorussian communities should be regulated by appropriate legislative decisions; and that a large number of economic questions specific to the region—a region which over the years has unquestionably suffered considerable neglect—should be put in order. It also places the question of sorting out the problems of education and access to cultural values among the issues of fundamental significance for the Belorussian minority.

It should be stressed that the BTSK and Hramada are not the only centers of political life at the disposal of Belorussian communities in Poland. There is also the Belorussian Students Union, established some time earlier, whose activists maintain contacts with both of these groups. Apart from all these, there are the Belorussian Orthodox Church organizations, which strive for the introduction of the native Belorussian language to the liturgy. All these groups and organizations complement and cooperate with one another in many respects. It would appear that we are witnessing only an initial stage in the emergence of a Belorussian political movement in Poland. In the future, new groups with more clearly formulated programs should eventually emerge from the groups and organizations which are currently active in

the area. These new groups will cooperate with ideologically parallel Polish organizations and with similar groups representing other ethnic minorities.

It is to be expected that this development will be assisted by a statutory regulation of the situation of ethnic minorities in Poland. In late October 1989, NIWA published a draft project of such an act. This contained a number of noteworthy ideas, though it would require redrafting with a view to a considerably greater precision of legal formulation. It should be noted that, surprisingly, the proposed act does not stipulate the principle of cultural autonomy originally proposed by BTSK Chairman Aleksander Barszczewski.

Debates conducted in Belorussian press and on the occasion of various public meetings indicate that Belorussian activists place special importance on the question of preserving the Belorussian language from extinction. A variety of proposals and recommendations have been put forward with this end in view. These refer most often to education, printing facilities, and the introduction of Belorussian into public life and religious services in the areas inhabited by the Belorussian minority.

These questions are a cause for concern also for Belorussian activists in the Soviet Union, where the range of the Belorussian language had been gradually reduced, even to the extent of eliminating it from school education. It was not until last year that a change for the better has been observed, but the question of preserving the native culture through the language remains the most important issue under discussion among Belorussian intellectuals in the Belorussian Republic. Small wonder that the process of transformations in Poland and the views of Polish citizens of Belorussian extraction attract great interest there.

Two further questions deserve to be examined in this connection. While preserving their ties with their compatriots in the USSR, Belorussian activists in Poland stress their loyalty to the Polish Republic, whose citizens they remain. They look to the Polish Parliament to solve their Belorussian problems. On the other hand, through their action for development of Belorussian educational network and the establishment of Belorussian as the official state language, Belorussian activists in the USSR demand statutory guarantees for a free development of education, culture, and language for all ethnic minorities in Belorussia. This last issue is particularly important, since the Belorussian Republic is home to a relatively numerous Polish minority. The stipulations quoted above were published in the periodical REANIMOVA Z NAD NIEMANU (No.2, 1989), which listed Poles as the principal minority in Belorussia.

P.S. A new organization, the Bialystok Democratic Assembly, was recently set up in Bialystok, while the Belorussian Electoral Committees put up their own candidates in the local self-government elections.

Vargas Leads Chilean Delegation Visit

LD0509113490 Warsaw PAP in English 1059 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 5—A political-economic mission of Chile with Vice-Foreign Minister Edmundo Vargas arrived here today for a three-day visit.

The delegation is to hold talks with Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski, minister of state Piotr Nowina-Konopka, Sejm Speaker Mikolaj Kozakiewicz and Senate Vice-Speaker Zofia Kuratowska.

Minister Vargas is also to deliver a lecture in the Polish Institute of International Relations PISM on the Chilean foreign policy and give a press conference.

Upon arriving in Warsaw, the Chilean guest told PAP: "I came here to make up for the lost time. Our relations were broken for 16 years, and we would like to intensify them now after their resumption."

Swedish Reportage on Mazowiecki Visit to Sweden

WA059191190

For Swedish reportage on the visit to Sweden by Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki to attend an environmental conference on the Baltic Sea, including reports on his talks with Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson, please see the Nordic Countries section of the 5 September West Europe DAILY REPORT and subsequent issues.

Iliescu, Nastase Pay Official Visit to Yugoslavia

Iliescu Statement Prior to Departure

AU0209201990 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1900 GMT 2 Sep 90

[Text] Romania's president, Mr. Ion Iliescu, will pay an official visit of friendship to Yugoslavia on 3-5 September 1990, at the invitation of the SFRY Presidium. On the day before his departure, Mr. Ion Iliescu told our radio: This is the first visit in my capacity as president of the country. I believe that it is not accidental, and it is even significant, that I pay this visit to Yugoslavia, a neighborly and friendly country to which we are connected by traditions of common history and joint struggle for national assertion and independence, a country with which we have never had conflicts throughout [our common] history. On the contrary, we have always shared elements of mutual solidarity in the joint struggle, and a base for advantageous and sincere cooperation, based on mutual understanding.

I responded, therefore, with pleasure to the invitation extended to me by President Jovic to pay a visit to his country and in this way to inaugurate personal contacts with the leaders of other countries, certainly starting with our neighbors. My program includes meetings and talks at the level of the two presidents—that is, with President Jovic, a meeting with the Prime Minister Ante Markovic. During this meeting, we will talk mostly about economic relations between our countries—including a visit and meeting with President Tudjman in Croatia on the last day of my visit, and a meeting in Belgrade with Serbian President Milosevic, said President Ion Iliescu.

Arrival in Belgrade 3 Sep

AU0309133990 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1308 GMT 3 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 3/9/1990—President Ion Iliescu arrived in Belgrade on September 3 in the morning for an official visit to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, upon an invitation extended by President Borisan Jovic.

Welcoming the guest at the airport in Belgrade were the president of the presidium of the SFR of Yugoslavia, Borisav Jovic, Aleksandar Bakocevic, member of the Presidium of the Serbian SR, Budimir Loncar, federal secretary for foreign affairs, other officials.

Also present were Ionel Stanculescu, Romania's ambassador in Yugoslavia, and Boro Denkov, Yugoslavia's ambassador to Romania.

"We welcome President Iliescu's visit, which we appreciate highly, as this is his first visit after the changes occurred in Romania and after his election as President of Romania," Mr. Pavle Jevremovic, adviser for foreign policy matters to the president of the Presidium of the SFR of Yugoslavia, told a "ROMPRES" writer a few hours after the Romanian president's arrival in Belgrade.

Explaining the reason behind the interest taken in the visit, the collocutor said: "No matter how we look at the relations between the two countries from the angle of the remote or nearer past they have already been fine, even in the most difficult historical moments."

Iliescu Meets Jovic, Lays Wreath

AU0309210490 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1921 GMT 3 Sep 90

[Text] Belgrade (ROMPRES) 3/9/1990—Monday afternoon official talks began at the Federation Palace between Romania's president, Mr. Ion Iliescu, and the president of the SFRY collective Presidency, Borisav Jovic. The talks are attended for Romania by Messrs. Adrian Nastase, minister of foreign affairs; Mihai Zisu, minister of raw materials and industry; Napoleon Pop, head of the Foreign Trade Department; Ion Mircea Pascu, adviser to the president; Ionel Stanculescu, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Romania to Belgrade, and other officials.

For Yugoslavia they are attended by Budimir Loncar, federal secretary for foreign affairs; Stevan Santo, federal secretary for energy and industry; Boro Denkov, Yugoslavia's ambassador to Romania; Dusan Rodic, deputy federal secretary for foreign affairs; Pavle Jevremovic, adviser to the SFRY president in foreign policy matters; Slobodan Marinkovic, chief of the presidential office, other officials.

At the beginning of the talks President Jovic addressed the guest pointing out the relations of close friendship and collaboration between the two countries, which resisted to all trials over the time, as the friendship between the two countries became traditional, and deeply rooted in history.

In the evening Romania's president was guest to a dinner party offered in his honour by the president of the SFRY collective presidency, Borisav Jovic.

In the afternoon, President Ion Iliescu laid a floral wreath at the Avala grave of the unknown hero.

After keeping a minute's silence to the memory of the heroes that died in defence of their homeland, Mr. Ion Iliescu wrote in the remembrance book: "High homage to those who gave their lives to defend and assert the independence and being of the Yugoslav peoples."

Iliescu: Romania 'Unitary' State

AU0309210690 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1937 GMT 3 Sep 90

["President Iliescu's Visit to Yugoslavia—Romania's President Toast"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 3/9/1990—We are determined to work in line with the aspirations and will of our two peoples for the promotion of our traditional relations of good neighbourliness and broad cooperation, for

the benefit of the two countries, said Romania's president, Ion Iliescu, in his toast at the official dinner given on Monday evening by his Yugoslav counterpart, Borisav Jovic.

Mr. Iliescu showed that after the revolution of December 22, 1989, Romania had left the totalitarian regime and its ideology behind, having committed, with all its forces, to the building of a free and democratic society, set on respect for and guarantee of human rights.

We started, he said, from the reality that Romania was a unitary national state and from recognition of the existence of a number of national minorities in the territory of our country. A recognition that implies both the definition of the rights of national minorities, through legislative acts, according to international rules and the practice of democratic countries, and the realization of those rights concomitantly with the general democratization of the Romanian society.

The market economy imposed and imposes on us a number of reconsiderations and reforms, the Parliament and government being involved in working out and instituting their specific economic and financial levers.

We encountered and we still face multifarious problems in our activity.

The housing shortage, the population's insufficient supply with foodstuffs and manufactures, the employment shortage, the extremely difficult working conditions in some branches or enterprises, the existence of segments of the population whose incomes cannot buy a decent living, a still unsatisfactory medical assistance and the lack of means for social protection are all stringent issues of concern to us for the resolution of which we work with full energy.

Against this background, we were also confronted with a number of serious political events which our people had to overcome avoiding anarchy and street dictate.

Undoubtedly, the internal political process to which we are committed will not lack elements of confrontation. However, we hope they will show in the form of loyal and civilized political debate, in the context of competence and constructive dialogue, the aim pursued being that of modelling the structures of the state of law of a democratic society, set on justice and social balance.

The talks we started today and will continue are centered on the intensification of the collaboration between Romania and Yugoslavia, on raising it up to the requisites of the period of changes we traverse together.

We wish our country to unreservedly join in the general effort for the building of the reality which I would like to call "new Europe." At a time when the whole political, economic and military structure of the continent is being revamped the way and stand on which we will get integrated into it will make all the difference. That is why we think that a realistic and viable structure of the future system of security and cooperation in Europe should necessarily imply the active participation of all states signatory to the Helsinki Final Act.

The dynamic changes that have occurred and keep occurring in the central and Eastern parts of the continent, Germany's reunification, the dramatic changes in the balance of forces require a deepening of the interstate political dialogue, wide opening to the world, giving up voluntarism and the old practices of strength and dictate, of making groups and alliances with opposed interests.

Against the background of the current changes in the world, the crisis in the Gulf has emerged and it goes on with most negative effects on international peace and security.

Romania thinks that no reason can justify the recourse to force against an independent and sovereign state.

The UN Charter and the unanimously acknowledged principles of international law ban the use of force as a means to settle interstate disputes. Therefore, we advocate the cessation of any action that might lead to heightened tension in the Gulf, the undelayed withdrawal of the Iraqi military forces from Kuwait and moderation and responsibility on the part of all states, those directly involved in the Gulf crisis first of all.

As for the Balkans, we think action has to be taken for the strengthening of mutual confidence. Some actions with positive effects on the process of multilateral collaboration among the countries in the region did occur. It is important that the various projects and ideas of cooperation should be materialized, which would provide conditions for the growth of the bilateral and multilateral collaboration in the area as part and parcel of an active contribution to the development of multilateral European collaboration and security, President Iliescu concluded.

Iliescu: Jovic Talks 'Most Fruitful'

AU0309214090 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1900 GMT 3 Sep 90

[Statement by President Ion Iliescu following his talks with SFRY President Borisav Jovic in Belgrade on 3 September—recorded]

[Text] As expected, the Yugoslav hosts welcomed us with great warmth and open hearts. Today's program and especially the talks I conducted with President Jovic and with representatives of the Yugoslav leadership were most fruitful. They stressed our common interest in strengthening and developing bilateral relations and this is also a way to approach closely related problems. We are confronted, to a great extent, with similar problems as far as the transition of our economies to the market economy is concerned, a field in which Yugoslavia has greater experience than we do. The way of approaching these problems and the way action is taken, however, constitutes the basis of our mutual interest and exchange of experience which is beneficial for both sides.

At the same time, from a political viewpoint, there is broad understanding. In fact, there exists a rich tradition of candid cooperation, mutual interest, and mutual respect between our countries. The destiny of our countries in both more distant and closer history has brought our peoples closer and developed their feelings of friendship, solidarity, and mutual understanding. All this constitutes a sound basis for understanding and for developing our bilateral relations.

We also have a platform of joint action in the international area and of active cooperation in the political area under new conditions. We jointly stressed the new framework within which bilateral relations are developing without any red tape or artificial elements and are based on a frank and open approach to all problems. This will facilitate cooperation at the level of bilateral relations and common action in international activity.

Within this framework we also stressed our common interest in all-European processes and our common preparation for the Conference for European Security and Cooperation at the end of the current year, as well as our common interest in developing cooperation in the Balkans. The Balkan area is the area in which our two countries are located. It is an area with special peculiarities, as far as developing European relations are concerned. The approach—at a regional level—to numerous problems regarding bilateral and multilateral relations among the countries in this area is an important component of developing all-European relations.

We have expressed our common interest in supporting all those initiatives aimed at developing relations in this area and at strengthening security and cooperation among the states in our area as a basic and important component of the all-European process.

Iliescu, SFRY's Markovic Talk

AU0409164090 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1500 GMT 4 Sep 90

[Text] To begin with, we will report on Mr. Ion Iliescu's visit to Yugoslavia. The identity or closeness of Romania's and Yugoslavia's positions on approaching the most important international issues, and on the need to develop Balkan cooperation within the general process in Europe and throughout the world, were noted during talks conducted today in Belgrade between President Ion Iliescu and Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic.

In a short statement to the press, President Iliescu expressed great satisfaction with the exchange of views made with the Yugoslav prime minister. He said that these talks and his visit to Yugoslavia have opened up a new era in relations between the two neighboring and friendly countries. He stressed that the experience gained by Yugoslavia up to now in developing the market economy and in the democratization process of society is valuable to Romania since these are the objectives for which Romania aims following the December events and the May elections this year. During the two and half hours talks, President Iliescu and Prime Minister Markovic paid special attention to promoting economic cooperation under the new conditions created in the two countries.

According to a statement made by Prime Minister Markovic, the talks were particularly open, rich in content, and friendly. The sides stressed that the changes in both countries offer new opportunities for cooperation which will reflect the requirements and realistic possibilities of the two economies. In conclusion, the two sides emphasized that it is imperatively necessary to make better use of the insufficiently utilized potential of the Romanian iron and steel industry and petrochemistry, and of areas for long-term economic cooperation between the two countries such as in the iron and steel industry, nonferrous metallurgy, energy, agriculture, petrochemistry, and cooperation within the framework of small border traffic. Both sides noted that, despite their common interests and economic cooperation accords, no legal mechanisms have existed so far to give material shape to these accords. The relevant ministries are to examine this problem and to create the necessary mechanism to permit better economic cooperation.

More on Talks With Markovic

AU0409183690 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1800 GMT 4 Sep 90

["Statements-Interviews: President Ion Iliescu's Press Statement After his Interview With Premier Ante Markovic"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Belgrade (ROMPRES) 4/9/1990—It has been in continuation of the talk begun yesterday with President Jovic. What we could jointly notice is that it is not only the Romanian Government that is in a difficult position but also the Yugoslav one, because the economic problems are quite complicated. Both countries have taken decisive steps toward democratizing political and economic life, promoting the democratization process in general and passing to a market economy. In Yugoslavia, the transition to a market economy was adopted several years ago, therefore, from this point of view greater experience has been acquired, people have been trained for that effect and started to think otherwise. We have been going through such a process for a shorter time and inertia is quite big. I think we shall find the due force to surmount the difficulties of an alert rhythm we must impose on our transition to a market economy as Yugoslavia's and other countries' experience shows. As a matter of fact the market economy exists. It is an objective fact. To contest or ignore it does not mean it does not exist. Its laws have indirectly stricken us and led to the effects we know in our economic life.

Likewise, the character of talks has taken on two aspects: On the one hand, the mutually advantageous exchange of experience—and I think we have to attentively study Yugoslavia's experience in this respect, because it is interesting to us—and, on the other hand, the new context in which bilateral relations have found a useful

platform for both countries. We reviewed new forms of mutual collaboration and forms of cooperation in production. In economic activities we shall find a broader framework for assertion on a new basis, on a mutual interest basis.

Iliescu, Serbia's Milosevic Meet

AU0409191290 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1805 GMT 4 Sep 90

[Text] Belgrade (ROMPRES) 4/9/1990—Tuesday President Ion Iliescu conducted talks with the president of the Serbian Socialist Republic Presidium, Slobodan Milosevic.

Questions were approached specific to the collaboration between Romania and that republic as part of the Romanian-Yugoslav relations.

Romania's president, Mr. Ion Iliescu, pointed to the contribution of the cities of Bucharest and Belgrade to the expansion of mutual collaboration in the aggregate of the Romanian-Yugoslav ties during a ceremony when he received the Golden Plaquette of Belgrade. In his address, the vice-president of the Belgrade City Assembly, Milorad Andjelic, mentioned that actions were taken in the Yugoslav capital devoted to the collaboration and understanding in the Balkans that are part of the broader process of European reintegration.

During his Yugoslav visit Tuesday morning President Ion Iliescu planted a tree in the Friendship Park lying at the confluence of the Sava with the Danube.

Iliescu, Milosevic View Economic Ties

AU0509144190 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1308 GMT 5 Sep 90

["President Iliescu's Visit to Yugoslavia—Talks with Slobodan Milosevic"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 5/9/1990—The capitalization of the energy-giving potential of the Danube and the initiation of cooperative ventures of Danubian countries in various areas were the themes approached during the talks in Belgrade between President Ion Iliescu of Romania and the president of the Presidium of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic. Special attention was paid to the situation of the Serbian minority in Romania.

Both sides were shown to be interested in the further development of economic cooperation and it was pointed out that 55 per cent of the exchanges between Romania and Yugoslavia were accounted for by Serbia. Emphasis was placed on the need to pass on to superior forms of cooperation—cooperation in and specialization of production—and conclude long-term agreements.

Nastase Meets SFRY's Loncar

AU0409201690 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1900 GMT 4 Sep 90

[Text] Belgrade (ROMPRES) 4/9/1990—Yugoslavia and Romania have identical points of view on the need for the granting of compensations to the countries that have to suffer from the economic blockade imposed on Iraq. Belgrade and Bucharest reacted identically to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait by condemning Baghdad and fully backing the resolutions of the Security Council presided over in August by Romania.

Such statements were made Tuesday during a two-hour talk between Budimir Loncar, Yugoslav federal secretary for foreign affairs, and his Romanian guest, Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase.

In an open, working atmosphere, multifarious questions were approached with emphasis the relations in the Balkans, more particularly on the preparations for the second regional meeting of diplomatic heads due in Tirana in late October.

Loncar and Nastase considered the term—the end of October—as apt to offer the Balkan countries the opportunity to come to the November CSCE meeting in Paris with their own modern programmes and opinions on European integration.

Questions were also approached in relation to certain new initiatives which would mark the institutionalization of Balkan collaboration. Romania proposes that the Balkan countries should develop their own activities in spheres also dealt with by the CSCE and concretize the accords within the CSCE on a regional level, respectively the Balkan one.

To this end, Bucharest suggests that a regional forum be set up which should dwell on specific matters—the economy, collaboration in defence or in reference to the status of ethnic minorities.

In connection with the minorities' question, a standard code should be established which would ensure minimal rights and duties that may not be below the level agreed upon at the CSCE.

The two ministers also looked into other forms of regional collaboration, especially in the Danube area. Romania expressed its wish to take part, as observer, in the pentagonal session (Italy, Austria, Czech and Slovak Federation, Hungary and Yugoslavia).

All this, Loncar and Nastase assessed, attests to the new spirit that characterizes the collaboration in Europe not only within the CSCE. Yugoslavia and Romania want to be as active as possible within such an evolution.

Loncar and Nastase also discussed about the need to further improve human rights in the Balkans, more particularly the freedom of communication and travel. They stressed the need to cancel the visas between Balkan countries. Till such an objective was to be

attained, it was necessary to adopt a proclamation favouring the cancellation of visas.

Loncar informed the guest about the activities taken within non-alignment and the efforts made to adapt the movement to the current processes in the world. The talk focused in that respect on the activity of Yugoslavia that is chairing the movement as well as on the measures which were taken or are under way for a peaceful settlement of the gulf crisis.

Iliescu To Visit Zagreb 5 Sep

AU0409201490 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1945 GMT 4 Sep 90

[Text] Belgrade, ROMPRES 4/9/1990—The official talks between Romania's President Ion Iliescu and Borisav Jovic, president of the Presidium of the SFR of Yugoslavia, came to an end in Belgrade, on September 4 in the evening. The dialogue was comprehensive, covering both aspects of the Romanian-Yugoslav collaboration, with stress on their consolidation, and matters of international relations. The two parties stressed their interest in the all-European processes and in the expansion of the Balkan collaboration.

Ion Iliescu is expected to arrive in Zagreb on September 5.

Iliescu Meets Croatian Officials

AU0509161990 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1430 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] Belgrade ROMPRES, 5/9/1990—The first part of Romanian President Ion Iliescu's official visit to Yugoslavia, paid at the invitation of the Presidium of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, came to an end on September 5.

In Zagreb, the next stage of the visit, Romania's president is to have talks with Franjo Tudjman, president of the Presidium of the Republic of Croatia.

Before leaving, President Ion Iliescu held a news conference at the residence on Dedinje Hill, for the Yugoslav journalists and foreign press correspondents accredited in Belgrade. Ion Iliescu summed up on the occasion the meetings and talks with the top Yugoslav officials, expressing satisfaction at the results of the first official visit to the neighbour country.

President Ion Iliescu invited the president of the Collective Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to pay a visit to Romania. The invitation was accepted. Its date is to be established subsequently.

At the airport in Zagreb President Iliescu was welcomed by Ivica Percan, vice-president of the Assembly of the Republic, Foreign Minister Zdravko Mrsic, Defense Minister Marin Spegelj, by the Zagreb City Mayor Boris Buzancic and by other officials.

Iliescu, Tudjman Talk in Zagreb

AU0509184690 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1746 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 5/9/1990—Romania's President Ion Iliescu, now on a three-day visit to Yugoslavia, went on September 5 to Zagreb. Talks were held between Romania's president and Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, in the presence of their advisers. Issues were approached concerning bilateral cooperation and the development of political, social and economic relations.

Presidents Iliescu and Tudjman exchanged views concerning the experience of Romania and the Republic of Croatia in the transition to the multiparty democratic system. That was another opportunity to draw the conclusion that several processes and problems discussed had been similarly handled.

Iliescu News Conference in Belgrade

AU0509162090 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1515 GMT 5 Sep 90

["President Ion Iliescu's News Conference"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 5/9/1990—The course toward democracy the Romanian people has chosen is irreversible and it is own decisive option, said Ion Iliescu, Romania's president, in his statement at the news conference held at the Federation Palace in Belgrade, on September 5 in the morning.

President Iliescu summed up the results of the visit, of the talks conducted with President Borislav Jovic and Prime Minister Ante Markovic.

He highlighted the major questions approached during the talks and expressed satisfaction about the existence of a similar way of approach by the two parties and of similar preoccupations, pointing out that the traditional fine relations, the climate of understanding that prevailed between the two countries along the years showed also during the talks that were sincere and informal.

The common problems of Romania and Yugoslavia on an internal plane were in the centre of the two heads of state's talks, as well as the development of the bilateral relations, the establishment of joint actions in the context of international life, including the situation in the Gulf, the starting of contacts pursuing a wider framework of cooperation among the Balkan countries.

President Ion Iliescu also made a brief presentation of the political and economic situation in his country after the December 1989 events, of the decisive and irreversible course toward democracy, of the priority issues the Romanian Government has to cope with in order to speed up the process of transition to the market economy.

Likewise, Ion Iliescu made a point of saying that: "I have heard it was alleged in the press that we criticized the United States for boycotting us economically. Our talks were not meant to judge the United States policy. In the talk with Senator Dole in Bucharest we voiced our surprise at United States Administration's reserves, meaning that the American banks are really reserved in giving us long-term credits. We cannot allow ourselves to judge the policy of other states, of other governments. No doubt, we expressed in this respect our wish that all states, especially the economically powerful countries should show more understanding for the present situation of Romania and we expected warmer, more humane feelings of solidarity toward the Romanian people's efforts for overcoming the present difficulties."

Iliescu Summarizes SFRY Visit

AU0509212390 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1900 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Statement by President Ion Iliescu to Liviu Duma of Romanian Radio and Television aboard the plane returning from Yugoslavia on 5 September]

[Text] As I said to my Yugoslav partners on my arrival in Yugoslavia, to begin with, I would like to emphasize that my first official visit has taken me to Yugoslavia, a neighboring and friendly country. This has special significance, given the fact that Romania and Yugoslavia maintain traditional relations with deep historical roots. We have never had and do not have conflicts. There is a lasting foundation for mutual friendship and solidarity and for mutual interest in developing relations of good-neighborliness and cooperation in all areas.

In the context of changes occurring in our societies today, both in Romania and Yugoslavia, we and our Yugoslav partners noted that new and favorable prospects are opening for the Romanian-Yugoslav relations and bilateral cooperation to expand and diversify at all levels.

I would also like point to the new spirit in which our talks were held—namely a relaxed, sincere, and open climate, without any kind of formalism or bombastic words and assessments—that is, a frank, friendly, and realistic way of tackling all problems and pointing out common points and [words indistinct].

We briefed each other on the progress of the processes for the development and democratization of the political life in our two countries, which have clearly opted for this path, and in the processes taking place in our economies to promote development on the basis of laws specific to the market economy—a field in which Yugoslavia has accumulated some experience, while we are just at the beginning of the road. We noted that this creates a new and favorable framework for ensuring that the economic relations between our countries should develop on new and healthy grounds, in the spirit of mutual interests—that is, our exchanges, production sharing, and economic activity should proceed on the basis of criteria of efficiency, quality, promptness, correctness, and respect for mutual interests, which is only natural for good economic relations.

In view of the fact that all bilateral economic accords between us and Yugoslavia expire this year, we discussed ways and means for laying the foundation of the legal and legislative framework for the future development of these relations. To this end, the Joint Romanian-Yugoslav Economic Cooperation Commission will meet this fall. As for now, after concrete discussions between the relevant ministers, we decided that that meeting should also be attended by the economic agents—that is, by representatives of the main economic units which maintain relations with Yugoslav partners, because the commission will also work out guidelines for a long-term agreement concerning our economic relations; of course, that agreement will only establish the overall legal and legislative framework for stimulating these ties, while concrete issues will be resolved through direct ties between the economic agents. This means that we are now establishing a new framework, in which the initiative and responsibility are the direct domain of producing units engaged in these economic relations.

On this occasion, we also agreed to identify other fields, ways, and forms to expand cooperation in all areas, not only the economic one, but also science, culture, education, relations between nongovernmental bodies, human relations, border activities and small-scale traffic, tourism, and so forth.

Likewise, both sides emphasized their interest in which our countries approach and resolve the problem of national minorities, by taking into account that the problem of ethnic relations and national minorities is of particular importance in our countries, especially in the border area. As a matter of fact, this problem is specific to the Balkans, in general, and to this part of Europe. The Yugoslav side noted with satisfaction the way in which we tackled the problem of national minorities in Romania, including the granting of parliamentary representation to delegates of representative organizations of the minorities; as a matter of fact, the Romanian delegation on this visit also included the representative of the Democratic Union of Serbs [of Romania], something which was noted with particular satisfaction in Yugoslavia.

We emphasized that we want to free ourselves of all kinds of complexes—not only with regard to the democratic and frank approach to the problem of national minorities in Romania, but also with regard to the way in which we approach the problem of Romanians living outside the country's borders. We discussed ways and means to develop and facilitate contacts and relations with the Romanians in Yugoslavia, particularly those in Vojvodina and the Timok Valley and to meet halfway and help all these Yugoslav citizens of Romanian descent to have easier contacts, without any kind of barriers, with the original homeland.

We also noted that we have similar views and a very close understanding of international events, particularly in Europe. We expressed our interests in preparing the next conference on security and cooperation in Europe.

In the framework of the ongoing overall European process, we agreed on the need to stimulate initiatives in the area we live in—that is, in the Balkans—by taking into account the good existing traditions in this respect—in the bilateral and multilateral cooperation among Balkan countries—as a part and parcel of the all-European process. We had a first exchange of ideas on this matter, which we intend to continue with other countries in Balkans, in order to work out a whole series of initiatives and actions, which can be an integral part of the process of detente in Europe, of rapprochement and elimination of barriers among European countries, and of building security on our continent.

In this respect, we discussed certain ideas concerning various formulas for organizing and initiating all kinds of contacts and of bilateral and comprehensive actions. We even took up the idea of a forum of cooperation, understanding, and security in the Balkans, as a component part—as I said—of the processes taking place in Europe. I emphasized here a number of ideas discussed during this meeting, which I have also stressed in the toast I made on the first evening of the visit, which I think was broadcast in our country.

As I have already said, I noted with great satisfaction that we have very close views on international developments, on the problems of international security, and on the need to ensure the active participation of all states in the overall process of defending international peace and security. In this respect, both of us expressed concern over various elements of tension, particularly in the Gulf, and we noted that both our countries were affected by the measures imposed by the situation in the Gulf. We pointed out the economic effects we have to bear following the (?interruption) in oil deliveries—Iraq and Kuwait were among the main oil suppliers for our petro-chemical industry; the largest part of these deliveries were made as repayment for Iraq's debts to our country, which amount to (?1.7) billion dollars. But other activities were also affected; we were supposed to deliver all sorts of equipment to Iraq—there are many enterprises involved. Hence, we are dealing here with various negative economic effects, which come at a time of hardships for our economy.

Although we are an economy without foreign debts, I can say that the repayment of these debts was made, in recent years, at the expense of great sacrifices for the development of our economic life and for the living standard of our country's people. I would even say that we would rather have had debts and a healthier economy, than the current situation. The rich countries have many debts. The riches country in the world, the United States, has the largest foreign debts. We would also like to be in such a situation, but we cannot really afford it.

I can confirm, therefore, that the press interpretations of my statements—as I heard of them—are wrong. On the one hand, I expressed sadness at a certain lack of understanding from a number of financial circles, states, and international press in connection with the difficulties we meet in obtaining credits from some international banks. Here, I would like to make a digression and say that Yugoslavia is currently receiving a one billion dollar credit from the IMF. That is why, on the one hand, I expressed sadness at the reticence and reservations shown toward us—something which I discussed, as is well known, with the delegation of U.S. senators led by Senator Dole, who has recently visited our country. We hope that reason and realism will triumph in the end and that the world we become convinced that the current and fully legitimate leadership of Romania is taking decisive steps along the road of democratization and openness to the world. In this respect, we hope to encounter a more correct attitude of human solidarity with the efforts made by the Romanian people to renew the Romanian society.

In conclusion, I would like to say that our discussions proceeded in an open climate of mutual understanding, with our Yugoslav guests, both in Belgrade and Zagreb, in the Croatian Republic, having expressed satisfaction at this visit. They highly valued the spirit in which these discussions were conducted and the common desire to develop our ties.

As has already been announced, we invited President Jovic to visit Romania as soon as possible.

Iliescu Returns From SFRY Visit

AU0509184990 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1741 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 5/9/1990—President Ion Iliescu returned to Bucharest Wednesday evening after paying a three-day visit to Yugoslavia upon the invitation of President Borislav Jovic.

Mr. Iliescu was welcomed at the airport by high Romanian officials as well as by representatives of the Yugoslav Embassy in Bucharest.

* Iliescu Regime Continues Communist Policies

90BA0287D Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 17 Aug 90 pp 1, 3

[George Em. Prut article: "The Iliescu Regime"]

[Text] The situation in which we, Romanians find ourselves is paradoxical. There has been a revolution, one of the bloodiest, most disturbing, and most replete with question marks and exclamation marks in the second half of this century; nevertheless, almost eight months since then, we perceive the social reality around us as belonging to the old social system. Something dramatic has occurred in Romania's history in the past months and this something has to do with the complete resignation of the power from the ideals of the revolution. This

is so obvious that the question whether the political system has changed in Romania is not even relevant anymore. The answer is, beyond a doubt, that we continue to live amid the texture of the elements of the old Communist system.

Evidently, the ideals of the December Revolution essentially followed the guidelines of a manifest and active anticommunism, which has remained on the barricades ever since. Consequently, Romania could have logically been expected to share in the great European efforts to eliminate totalitarianism. In fact, that had actually been the impression in December 1989, during the days of the revolution, when we thought we were, as indeed we were, leading the revolutionary wave sweeping the East. In the end, however, everything turned out to have been an illusion with profoundly tragic consequences for the fate of an entire struggling and innocent nation fallen prey to the cynical manipulations of a group of dissident Communists, whose aspirations do not rise above building a comprehensively developed socialism with a human face. The fruits of the revolution made possible by the sacrifice and heroism of thousands of young people, were soon grabbed by a team of neocommunists obsessed with power, whose leader showed already in December that he cared more for power than for national interests. One proof of that is the present situation, when Romania is dying for lack of moral, economic, and political support, Ion Iliescu's men are clinging to power at any cost and any sacrifice from their compatriots, even though they are responsible for the impossible situation of the country.

Why is it that we can already talk of an Iliescu regime? The answer is easy. If we examine the structures of this regime we see that they do not differ much from the previous ones. Mere cadre rotations here and there, while for the rest the nomenklatura is in position with its entire convoy of mentalities, habits, and inertia. The damage done to the country is enormous; the Sapinta case had to happen for us to realize how badly we fare as a society from the viewpoint of the distribution of power at a local level. Social leadership is still discharged by brute force and the bodies of reprisal have been developed and diversified by the current regime more than ever before (in view of the preoccupation with defending the regime against social protest and keeping it in place in spite of popular discontent, training at the Police Academy and similar institutions focuses on fighting crowds).

Are we once again the victims of a democracy enforced by troops, or a timocracy, as Plato said? Developments to date undeniably confirm that this is what has been happening between 28-29 January and 13-15 June. As for the forms of ownership of the Iliescu regime, they are the same as before and are feeding, so to say, the supporters of this new aggressive power. That is why individual initiative, privatization, and free association are not well received by the present regime. Any private entrepreneur—and we have not even gone beyond the level of street stands selling sandwiches and coffee—can tell you what difficulties he is encountering. The laws issued in this area, like in others, defy the social and economic reality and serve to severely repress and sanction. The state—another arm of power—is run as a typical police or totalitarian state.

In its turn, the economy, in a state of galloping collapse, suffers of centralism, lack of initiative, obsolete procedures, lack of competitiveness, and absence of coordination between financial resources, sources of raw materials, and marketing. We have fallen so low that we don't have even the most elementary commodities. The current regime has been so incompetent and lacking in any patriotic spirit, that it was not able to even maintain the level inherited from the old dictatorship. Not to mention agriculture, where matters have been exceedingly complicated by the issue of absurd laws, decreed against the will of the peasants. This is why as of this fall we will experience even greater food shortages because the fall agricultural production is consierably smaller, due to the disarray and disorder reigning in agriculture. Ion Iliescu's regime has also managed to produce great imbalances in the financial arena, too, where it fanned inflation by raising salaries without corresponding outputs of labor and production, and granting unearned money privileges to certain favored professions which thus became its Praetorian Guards (like the miners). A grave and aggravating situation is also prevailing in the social arena, where we see conflicts among social classes, ethnic conflicts, and social delinquency.

In foreign matters, the prestige of the Iliescu regime is below any criticism; the current president and government have practically lost all their audience in the world, even in the Third World. This is causing enormous damage to the Romanian people and to their democratic development.

The situation is pretty bad regarding political pluralism, too. The political opposition has been subjected to continuous violent attacks by the neocommunist authorities and the Iliescu regime. In the wake of these actions without precedent in the civilized world, Romania had fraudulent elections which served to perpetuate a communist-type socioeconomic system, something that happened nowhere but in Mongolia, in the heart of Asia, and not even there to such an extent. Thus, in Romania there are political detainees of the Iliescu regime, people are persecuted, the securitate is in action, and the police and gendarmerie, armed as for war, attack peaceful demonstrators in cities or peasants barricaded in their villages. In Iliescu's Romania any democratic behavior is a risky personal and private business, subject to the same arbitrariness as under the former regime. This is because nothing has yet been done to separate the powers in the state; the president blatantly violates the executive power, the legislative branch is nothing but a rubber stamp ballot machine which votes by hand raising, while the judicial (including and particularly the prosecutor's office) are completely subordinated to the political power: See the arrests made after 13-15 June, when those seized were the innocent, rather than those (or he) who

summoned and brought the miners to Bucharest—the miners and securitate members who vandalized the city and thousands of citizens.

The inventory of a regime that continues the bankrupt situation inherited from the former dictatorship does not stop here. The Iliescu regime has on its record actions, deeds, and initiatives profoundly damaging to the Romanian people for which it will have to account. The inconsistency of its actions, forcible initiatives, frame-ups, people arrested or missing, unjustifiable shortages (from food to medicine to household items), endless corruption, perpetuation of situations which create social tensions, and the economy bogged down in every sector demonstrate incompetence, lack of civic spirit, little interest for one's fellowmen and compatriots, and stubborn clinging to a power that is nevertheless melting away day by day. The Iliescu regime is nothing but the same handful of people who a few months ago were plotting, as historically outdated then as they are now. Communism was collapsing around them while they were dreaming of neocommunism. In other words, the same face, different makeup.

Their complete political failure abroad as well as at home reveals them as people not in touch with reality and as adventurers greedy for political power. That and nothing more.

* Speculations on Iliescu's Real Allegiance

90BA0287C Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian 10 Aug 90 pp 1, 4

[Doina Diaconu article: "On Whose Side Is President Iliescu?"]

[Text] Present Romanian society suffers from a festering sore. In spite of some superficial signs of improvement, an explosive tension is smouldering deep down. We are not completely free of anxiety, either, because on some inner frequency our awareness is registering the signals of deep turmoil. The December events, like the ransacking of the offices of the provisional government, the tragic ethnic confrontations in Tirgu Mures, or the dramatic events of 13-15 June in Bucharest are as many persistent obsessions whose enigmatic nature contribute to stirring up an irrational proliferation of suppositions and scenarios. The number one political personality of the country, continuously and bitterly disputed from the very beginning, is still assigned the leading role in all the speculative scripts. Thus, former Communist leader Iliescu was involved in the conspiracy against the Ceausescu regime—naturally, in order to seize the power, is the ambitious conclusion. The present president was a colleague and friend of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, hence he was the latter's man in Romania where he staged an antirevolutionary terrorist reprisal with the aid of the KGB in order to justify his own ascent to power and the condemnation of the old leaders. He is weaving a Machiavelian plan to restore communism, albeit with a human face, and planning a version of perestroyka for the economy; he wants to establish an "original democracy" to eliminate party pluralism; he falsified the elections and summoned the miners to damage and discredit the opposition; with the same purpose in mind, he incited attacks on the government and had several state institutions set on fire. These are a few of the articles of accusation. Let us examine them more carefully without prejudice or flights of imagination.

To begin with, a Communist past, even among the leadership at a certain point, although rather long ago, does not necessarily indicate an intellectual or moral insufficiency, in contrast to the former double-headed (but no brain) authority that showed all the symptoms of such a deficiency. There have been many Communists—approximately four millions—by virtue of the policy of identification of the party with the masses, and more than a few reputable intellectuals occupied leadership positions. Like some of them, the Communist Iliescu clearly stated his view—true, earlier than they did—which did not exactly win him the goodwill of the sovereign. If as a black sheep of the regime he conspired against it, as some people hint, that was an act of courage and a merit, rather than a reason for indictment. It seems at the least absurd to criticize someone for anything like that.

His friendship with the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev has been publicly denied, although a relationship with that distinguished statesman would do honor to anyone, if for no other reason than because of the high prestige he enjoys everywhere. On the other hand, if the USSR had been involved, as some of the Western press claims, in the Eastern revolutions, regardless of the reasons for that, that does not a priori preclude the initiation of a democratic process. Let's suppose that the dissident Iliescu had not been a stranger to KGB maneuvers designed to destabilize and overthrow the dictatorship in Romania. Given the conditions of a regime of terror, based on stringent control of the population, an internal subversive movement would not have had many chances of success. But, when the vital interests of the nation, whose very life was threatened, demanded it, such a compromise could have been a solution. Not the only one, but perhaps the most appropriate. For example, under the Turks, rulers who loved their country took advantage of the sultan's favor to ascend to the throne, in order to later serve the interests of the nation through their policies. More than a few of them came into open confrontation with the Ottoman Empire: Dimitrie Cantemir was both a relevant and dramatic case in point.

If the December Revolution broke out, as some say, at a signal from outside, then the signal was completely obliterated by the huge internal popular revolt that it triggered. Mr. Iliescu occupied the seat that became vacant but it could have been someone else, perhaps an impostor, or an adventurer, or a charlatan. Who can tell, because revolutions are not selective; on the contrary, history seems to verify the fact that in such conditions of social upheaval, the morally defective fauna often tends

to float to the top. Even supposing that Ceausescu story about foreign agents was not a tall tale, equally true should be their both Eastern and Western origins. So the West was not completely innocent, either. What its game was, the Western press does not tell us, preserving a legitimate discretion.

Accusations of a frame-up, genocide, and incitement to violence are an aberration; they cancel each other out because, at least if we accept the idea of wanting to preserve power, it would be absurd for rulers to destabilize their own situation. As for restoring communism, too much ink has been wasted on that and currently not even the honest opposition believes that such a thing could be possible. The countless declarations made by the president, systematically and never refuted, testify that the old ideology and the social system it generated have been irreversibly repudiated. Even assuming that he did not from the beginning sense the historical proportions of the phenomenon, it seems clear that the current president grasped them quickly and unreservedly adopted them. The 20 May elections brought presidential candidate Ion Iliescu a crushing victory, foreseen and anticipated long before election day. He won the sympathy and trust of the voters massively. Not lastly because he felt the pulse of their wishes and respected them.

Thus, between East and West, partisan and general interests, neocommunism and democracy, perestroyka and a market economy, on which side is President Iliescu? I think he is on the side of history and of the true reality that demands the modernization and progress of Romanian society above anything else, above and beyond any prefabricated ideologies and formulas. All the rest is human action, subject to the judgment and erosion of time.

* Dangers of Internal Enemies Assessed

90BA0287A Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 19 Aug 90 p 1

[Silviu Dragomir article: "The Country's Enemies Are Inside, Not Out"]

[Text] By a general consensus of the governmental mass media, it is being said at every opportunity and at various levels either that Europe views us with suspicion and even hostility, or that the Hungarians want to seize a hunk of our Romanian hearth. In short, everyone is against us, and they are all our declared enemies. Here and there we also find bellicose declarations (made by irresponsible people) presented as official (or officious) statements. The solution proposed (or merely suggested) is extremely simple. We must abandon all opposition and rally closely around the party, the one that became the NSF [National Salvation Front], to be able to overcome these difficulties.

Which in fact do not exist.

Not a word is said about the reasons that prompt Westerners to look with skepticism at what is happening in our country. There is no attempt to really analyze what is happening. The populace must not know! The populace must have "peace." In other words, it must be kept away from the truth; it must be content to believe the soothing lies dished up prepackaged by the authorities. And to have peace, it needs to be kept busy with other things. For example, with procuring food (Ceausescu did know a thing or two!), with suspense on the job (do we become profitable or do we go out of business, do we centralize or decentralize, etc.), or with outside plots by national enemies, some of whom want "to buy us up," while others want to "tear Transylvania away from us." That is why we hear, "We will not sell our country," and "We will die fighting to defend Transylvania." The governmental press, the official news agency, the radio and television, persuasively supported by that vipers' nest with its only too familiar means of spreading rumors, are brainwashing us with this kind of slogans.

The purpose is to mislead.

The true enemies of the country are not outside but inside it. After seizing power by specific communist means (lies, secret maneuvers, attacks on opponents, electoral fraud, distortion of electoral results, and even political assassinates), the governing party now has only one purpose: to stay in power! This purpose takes priority over anything else! This purpose ensures that the nomenklatura can stay or come back in power as an expression of purely parasitic authority and blind repression designed to hide the crimes of the securitate and to postpone sine diae its punishment for the inhuman and antisocial treatment in which it had (and continues to have) a hand, and to maintain the political and economic bog to which the same communists brought us.

The real enemies of the country are those who make sure that this nation remains completely ignorant of the true problems that keep us distant from the civilized world and sabotage the press's access to broad circles. By using the darkest levers and employing for this purpose the most experienced cadres of specialists in behind-the-scenes maneuvers, the government party makes sure that the press does not reach the readership that may otherwise weigh what it has learned (God forbid!) and judge for itself. Newspapers do not make it to the provinces. On the other hand, a bland television pumps us full of platitudes at the same intellectual level as the capabilities of its expressly selected staff. The tacit instruction is to keep the country quiet. The newspapers are only good for recycling. And the fault for this situation has been laid on the few newspaper thieves or the lazy kiosk keepers who prefer to keep them under the counter and return them, rather than sell them. No one must think that the government has ordered secret maneuvers to ensure that the press does not reach those who wait for it, to find out who ignores them, who is lying to them, who makes promises and does not keep them, in one word, who is their real enemy.

The real enemies of the country do not necessarily have to be on the outside; they can be right here when they, because of incompetence, deliberately continue to undermine the economy which has already been weakened by their former party comrades, thus keeping us in the same poverty to which they also contributed in the first place. Through obscure maneuvers they take out loans from only they know whom, at interest rates that only they know, and in situations that only they approve, with which they buy goods only they know about. The only condition is that we should not really need them. Such undiscussed and undisputed transactions will delay by many years our recovery from the economic crisis in which their former party plunged us. The procedure is the same. As are the actions designed to sabotage the national economy. Not long ago, a former Japanese prime minister was tried and sentenced for irregular transactions in purchasing airplanes from a certain firm. So, since some are in favor of copying the Japanese "model" anyway...

The real enemies of the country are those who deliberately hide the truth, regardless of whether it concerns the events of December 1989, 12 January, 28-29 February, 18 March in Tirgu Mures, 12-15 June, or other, more minor ones. So, the safest way to bury the respective problems is to set up investigation commissions. A commission was established to investigate the "mysterious" crash, immediately after the revolution, of an airplane which was carrying a foreign reporter who had in his possession video tapes that could have clarified many events better left obscure. So nothing was found out. Actually something was found out. Namely that anyone who knew anything about the respective events have been under permanent death threats. A commission was set up to investigate the events in Tirgu Mures. Nothing. A commission was set up to investigate the 13-15 June events. It is now August, but nothing has transpired. Or rather, something has: more death threats. Are not these the enemies? Why are we searching for our enemies across the border?

The country's enemies are here. They eat at us like a cancer, of which we can only rid ourself by surgery. That is the only solution...

* Paper Cites Bad Image of Country Abroad

90BA0287E Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 19 Aug 90 pp 1, 3

[Eugen Mihaescu article: "What Good Does a Passport Do Us?"]

[Text] The noose is getting tighter. An increasing number of countries refuse to let us in as visitors. Countries that were always our friends and had sympathy for us, now take stringent measures against Romanian citizens. This is not only an unjust attitude, but also a serious gesture that directly illustrates the position of these countries, states, and peoples toward us, toward our wish to see them and know them, and at the same time toward our desire, after so many years of living in a prison-country—as Romania was under the last Communist dictator—to set foot in Europe. Our money, for which some of us worked long and hard, is viewed by many of our fellow Europeans as worthless paper. They simply do not know or do not want to know our currency. Or they give us a pittance for it. As if our labor were no labor and our life no life.

The current Iliescu regime has put us in such a situation that we are shown the door just about everywhere in Europe. We are shamed. We are pained. We are troubled. We are irritated. Why do they do this to us? Had we been better housekeepers and had we elected a leadership capable of representing us and protecting our national dignity in every circumstance, we would be the ones to be sought after, here in our country. Few Europeans have an equally pleasant and rich country. Nevertheless, we are the ones who have to knock on closed doors everywhere in Europe, going through sullen and unfriendly customs. Ion Iliescu's regime has elaborated on the evil inherited from its predecessor. In other words, it spoiled everything that had not yet been spoilt. And now we are alone again. Alone and lonely, like people living in a reservation. Sad, very sad. And all the more depressing since on this occasion we managed, especially thanks to our more colorful representatives and some less so, to win a new "reputation" in Europe and maybe even farther.

The last door to close was that of gentle Czechoslovakia (or rather, of Czechia and Slovakia). The question we ask ourselves is: Why did the Czechs forbid us their country? Could the troubles of 200-300 Romanians perturb so badly the life of a modern and civilized state like Czechia and Slovakia? We cannot believe that, so there must be something else involved. Something much more profound. This irks us all the more since in 1968 millions of Romanians would have given their lives for the Czechs and Slovaks. Could Czechoslovakia's life be disrupted even by 100,000 needy Romanians who came there? Let us be serious! And let us remember that in the fall of 1939 tens of thousands of Polish refugees were taken in by Romania, and later came others, too, whatever the government or the political orientation was. For years on end in the past decades, hundreds of thousands and millions of Czechs and Slovaks came to our beaches and shared our water, our sun, and even our (good or bad) beer. Did anyone lower the border barrier in their face? On the contrary; we slept in tents so that they should be more comfortable, because that is how we were taught from childhood on, to treat guests decently, whoever they may be.

These words were prompted by bitterness. It may be argued that Romanians steal. Some of our compatriots perhaps do; starved as they are and uneducated they may be committing such antisocial acts against which there are laws and policemen everywhere. So what is the problem? Let us not forget the notorious British hooligans who start fights and kill, but still...

We think that the blame rests with the government and primarily with Ion Iliescu's regime, which has allowed things to come to this. Let us consider what most of us buy when they go abroad: small things, from chocolates to blue jeans or cosmetics. Well, these kinds of small things could have been brought into the country immediately after the revolution and the market could have been flooded with them. That would have been possible because the country's financial situation (including its hard currency reserves) was good, better than in any other Eastern country. Then, the travel system could have been organized so as to save us embarrassment. There are measures and there are still possibilities, although the situation has deteriorated; the government, and especially the foreign minister should resolutely intervene. The national dignity and the country's prestige are not a joke, they must be protected. There are diplomatic measures that can be used to rectify the situation, measures and countermeasures that can teach others to stop treating Romanian citizens like the pariahs of Europe. Each Romanian citizen who goes abroad must be aware that a passport is to be protected, as is his personal dignity, and that he is entitled to be respected by the hosts. Except that the respect does not depend only on the individual but also on his government's reputation in that country.

So the question remains: What good does a passport do us?

* Cornea, Ratiu on Need To Unify Opposition

90P20109A Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 21 Aug 90 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Doina Cornea and Ion Ratiu by Doina Basca; place and date not given: "The Need To Unify the Opposition—Doina Cornea and Ion Ratiu on the Policy of Truth"; first two paragraphs are DREPTATEA introduction]

[Text] At this time, official international reports consider the situation in Romania to be unstable. Within the country, more and more people are experiencing a feeling of frustration and fear in the face of the gulf which is being opened between words and deeds and in the face of the escalation of the arbitrary.

Everybody is talking about democracy which means that, in principle, they are in agreement with the five basic elements which define democracy—the rule of law, the separation of powers in the state, freedom of expression, a multiparty system, and respect for human rights. But if you express opinions contrary to the government you are automatically considered to be a traitor and you suffer all the consequences resulting from this, from deprivation of freedom to slander by means of the mass media.

[Basca] How do you think we can get out of this impasse?

[Cornea] Democracy has its own structures and laws which are valid throughout the world. The premises for establishing democracy have just been created in Eastern Europe. In Romania, the current leaders and government are in favor of an "original" appplication which which does not correspond to the norms of real democracy, and which has obviously created tensions and dissatisfaction.

I believe that the first thing which must be done is to unite the ranks of all those who want to include Romania in those European democracies dominated by the five principles which you mentioned.

The opposition, that is, the parties, the intellectuals, the young people whom we are seeing once again on the streets of Bucharest, Timisoara, and Cluj, is not traitorous as is being insinuated. The opposition is fighting to make Romania a law-governed state based on justice, truth, and respect for human rights. The current leaders have reintroduced terror instead of giving evidence that they are on the path of democratization. We all know what happened in mid-June and I will not say any more. Thus they were able to reinstate the arbitrary in Romania.

It is not the opposition which is the obstructing factor; the government itself is the obstruction because of the lack of understanding which it shows for democracy.

[Basca] Mr. Ion Ratiu, on 13 July, one month after the Bucharest massacres, Mr. Iliescu gave a speech, broadcast by all the mass media, in which he, for good reason, ignored the big demonstration which was going on in Bucharest, on that very day, at that very hour.

[Ratiu] Mr. Iliescu expressed himself very clearly on 13 July; he stated that we do not need lessons in democracy but we need understanding and assistance from the West because there is an authentic desire (on the part of this government) to move toward democracy.

The words are beautiful but the deeds are not.

Therefore it is normal that the West should insist on the application of the points defined in the statement of the European Economic Community so that the former communist states will be entitled to economic aid.

Therefore, it is clear that the failure to respect these points has resulted in the isolation of Romania. By its actions, the government has created this situation.

Efforts have been made and will still be made to make us responsible for this ostracizing.

But the real story is that, if it wants to achieve a situation which benefits the Romanian people, the government must respect human rights and must introduce an authentic multiparty system which gives all parties the opportunity to express themselves legitimately—not by the destruction of headquarters like our central headquarters in Bucharest—and gives them access to independent media of the press, radio, and TV.

As for the opposition, we have the obligation to devote ourself at the present time to the creation of a favorable

climate in which our aspirations toward democracy would be properly expressed and properly coagulated so that the world will realize that we are united for this purpose.

But this has not happened yet.

[Basca] In this sense, Mrs. Doina Cornea, you are one of the principal members of the Group for Social Dialog and you know the members of this group very well. This group calls itself independent but it includes people who have important positions in the government and who have belonged to the Front. Obviously, I am referring to Andrei Plesu.

Do you believe that a group which advertises, first of all, its capacity for dialog, and second, a possible political value would be able to contribute to the achievement of cohesion?

In addition: How do you think it is possible for their civic movement to be of assistance to political figures at the present time?

[Cornea] You are asking me a very difficult question.

It is a rather heterogeneous group in which there is a discussion as to whether the government and the politicians are things to be manipulated or factors which devaluate the world of ideas. In my opinion, a person, living in a social milieu, should, whether he wants to or not, take political stands, which does not mean, absolutely, that he must join a party. If it is necessary, if the country requires it, you must support it and this is a type of politics. But not that of a professional.

But I believe that there is a politics of truth. Only in the name of the truth are we obliged to respond to the demands which society makes. Now when the situation in the country is so tense and disturbed and so many injustices are occurring, the intellectual cannot remain uninvolved. When young people are killed and beaten on the streets, when so many people have been arrested, not on the basis of a warrant, not as a result of an investigation, but simply by people who did not have this distinction [of an intellectual], then every intellectual should take a stand. Isolated, this stand has a weak echo. But if, in the name of truth and justice, the intellectual joins up with the parties which are qualified to carry on a political struggle, the echo becomes much stronger.

[Basca] But the intellectuals have been totally involved in the Revolution; we saw them on the streets. Is this attitude of nonparticipation and of independence the result of "inducement"?

Did they desire, perhaps, to keep the intellectuals outside the political arena?

[Cornea] I believe that this was the first aim of the Front which preexisted and had a preestablished tactic—to isolate the intellectuals. Throughout the world and for all time, as Mircea Eliade said: "The intellectual was the number one enemy of all totalitarian regimes." I believe that you are right. It would seem that the idea that politics is dirty and that the struggle of parties cannot be noble has been implanted. And then they have oriented themselves toward a form of civil war based on the model of Charter 77 or Solidarity, which, ultimately, also has a political finality.

But we have had a tradition of democratic parties which has been preserved. Perhaps it would be simpler for the intellectuals to use these structures which have already been formed.

[Ratiu] I am delighted to hear Doina Cornea speak this way. It is absolutely necessary that we realize the value of a culture and of the way in which a nation can assert itself through culture but we must also realize that certain historical moments do not permit us to have a very clear political attitude.

In our case, when a radical shift in political trends occurred in the world, communism became marginalized. It is important that those who want something other than communism come forth and offer their support. It is utopian to expect fantastic results by means of culture alone. Therefore I am pleading for what Doina Cornea supports—namely that we must find a platform with which, together, we will become involved politically.

[Cornea] I believe that these two concepts, politics and culture, are linked by truth. Under Ceausescu, all good culture played politics. For example, Octavian Paler's novels.

We must continue to arouse people's awareness. During recent months there has been manipulation on a massive scale. This is what was responsible, not the man on the street. When Westerners tell us that Romanians voted freely for communism, I explain to them that the voter simply believed that he was voting for democracy. He was constantly disinformed.

[Ratiu] The Front tried to create a democratic facade. At the beginning, when you were at the head of the list it was even credible. But it was rapidly seen that the inspiration for this government is and remains communist.

Our party has proven to be steadfast, loyal, fair, and consistent in regard to democratic values in its entire political activity.

Recently, in Parliament, we have voted against measures which we considered to be an imposition of executive power over legislative power.

[Basca] Do you believe that this is the time for a joint action or at least a joint field of action on the part of the parties and the opposition in general?

[Cornea] I am clearly in favor of this idea. I cannot imagine that the parties which unified Greater Romania would not give their support when the Romania which they raised up is on the threshhold of collapse.

[Ratiu] At the present time we need a sense of responsibility and that self-sacrifice which the difficult moments of history demand.

* Minister on Future Role of Foreign Trade

90BA0289B Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 15 Aug 90 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Commerce and Tourism Minister Constantin Fota by Ion Untaru; place and date not given]

[Text] [Untaru] What is the situation in Romanian foreign trade seven months after the Revolution? I am referring to volume, structure, and geographical orientation.

[Fota] In the first semester of this year, at the end of which I came to this ministry, foreign trade was marked by the decline in production and the reconsideration of the ratio between export and import volumes practiced in previous years.

Exports totaled 1,393 million rubles and $1,742.8 million and imports totaled 2,203.3 million rubles and $2,436.0 million, which caused a deficit of 805.3 million rubles and $693.2 million.

The hard currency deficit was incurred especially because of the considerable increase in the volume of imports compared to the same period of 1989 (157.2 percent), designed to provide the economy with raw materials and spare parts for the production, and to offer more and more diversified consumer goods to the people. In the first six months of this year, imports of foodstuffs and other commodities, paid for in convertible currency, came to $689,100,000 as compared to only $3,300,000 in the first semester of 1989.

At the same time, exports in these six months were 60 percent in clearing rubles and 56 percent in hard currency of the 1989 exports for the same period, because of both the fact that the production planned for export was not fulfilled and the fact that various products that used to be mostly exported were kept for domestic use (like fertilizer, soda products, chemical fibers, and agricultural produce).

Much of the exports in clearing rubles consists of machinery, equipment, and means of transportation, while hard currency exports continue to be dominated by fuel and metals. Compared with the same period of 1989, exports of industrial consumer goods dropped, and foodstuffs were not exported anymore.

Among imports, a large share was made up of fuel and mineral raw materials. We want to particularly highlight the considerable increase in imported foodstuffs and industrial consumer articles (from 3.3 percent in the first six months of 1989 to 16.3 percent this year) as well as livestock fodder.

The geographical picture of Romania's exports and imports in hard currency is the following: Western Europe—62.3 percent of exports and 30.2 percent imports; Africa and the Middle East—17.9 percent exports and 41.5 percent imports; United States—3.0 and 4.2 percent exports and 4.2 percent imports.

Foreign trade activities did not improve in the first 20 days of July. Thus, export incomes in convertible currencies came to $151 million, while payments for imports came to $243 million. For the future we are striving to achieve an equilibrium between revenues and payments, whereby the emphasis will be put on increasing exports.

[Untaru] What role did CEMA play in Romania's foreign trade?

[Fota] There was a quantitative and a qualitative aspect to CEMA's impact on Romania's foreign trade. Quantitatively, over 55 percent of Romania's trade was with the countries members of the organization and was based on a predominantly administrative mechanism. Qualitatively, however, we had a certain relation of mutual dependence, so to speak, with certain supply and sale markets, something that is contributing to our present problems, when the CEMA member states are moving toward exchanges based on commercial criteria and convertible currencies.

[Untaru] What do you think will be the future of CEMA, in view of the fact that the USSR intends to replace its clearing accounts with the East European partners with accounts in convertible currencies?

[Fota] In view of the fact that almost all the CEMA member states are switching to a market economy and shifting their economic relations on the basis of the principles of international trade, including the use of world market prices and payments in convertible currencies in their mutual trade, CEMA will change its nature fundamentally and will become an organization based on new principles, which are expected to contribute to developing the cooperation among the members states through new forms and methods, particularly exchanges of information and mutual consultations, in accordance with the rules of the market economy as practiced in international trade.

The new organization will be open, both in the sense that additional countries will be able to participate in it, while the member states will be able to unrestrictedly participate in other international organizations, including integrated ones.

Another new trait of the organization will be that it will no longer be empowered to issue recommendations that in the past constituted obligatory decisions for member countries. The organization will serve as a forum for exchanges of views and mutual consultations and for agreements among interested countries, which will concern the respective countries alone, rather than the entire organization.

We believe that the restructuring of the mechanism of mutual economic cooperation must agree with the processes currently underway in those countries. In accordance with the decisions made by the council meeting held in Sofia in the first half of this year, it seems reasonable that the transition to world market prices and accounts in freely convertible currency should be implemented gradually, through bilateral agreements.

During the transition period, when all the CEMA member states will be struggling to make payments in convertible currencies, we can consider maintaining some accounts in transferable rubles, multilateral or bilateral clearing, and bilateral clearing in freely convertible or national currencies in addition to payments in convertible currency, whereby annual residues can be covered by goods deliveries and barter trade.

Along this line, our government has decided to approve the establishment in our country of a commercial public company, Bartimpex S.A., whose activities will focus on coordinating and carrying out barter transactions with CEMA member states.

[Untaru] Many Romanian entrepreneurs would like to carry out foreign trade activities. What influence will the privatization have on our international exchanges?

[Fota] One of our immediate objectives is to set in motion a foreign trade mechanism based on the principles of a market economy. Thus, after extensive consultations with experienced foreign experts, we outlined new duties for the Ministry of Commerce and Tourism in the area of foreign trade, too, which will become the venue for establishing new regulations and implementing specific economic levers such as: a licensing system—possibly contingency licenses—effective custom tariffs, a new system of hard currency allocations, possibly temporary and retroactive subventions, etc. At the same time, we will eliminate the foreign trade monopoly, in the sense that not only special organization will be allowed to engage in foreign trade operations but any state or private economic agent that has the conditions required for carrying out such activities autonomously and without any interference (competitive products, supply sources, trained personnel, etc.). Thus, the foreign trade domain will feature manufacturing units that will directly engage in export and import, special Romanian or mixed foreign trade associations, and private firms.

Private foreign trade firms are becoming increasingly prominent amid this diverse spectrum; we are pleased about this development and are doing everything we can to support them.

According to Decree-Law No. 54/1990, by 17 July 1990 over 2,300 private entrepreneurs were authorized to carry out foreign trade or auxiliary activities. These private foreign trade firms are engaged in a large variety of operations: commodities import-export, shipping, consulting, marketing, leasing, operations in free ports and zones, international tourism, etc.

The influence of privatization on our international commercial exchanges can only be positive. I am saying this because private firms can export to foreign partners products manufactured by small industries, artisan workshops, or small entrepreneurs in a large variety and in small quantities, according to orders and customer specifications, something that is less attractive for specialized foreign trade enterprises which normally handle large volumes. Similarly, private firms can cooperate with a larger number of foreign firms and can bring in a diversified range of foodstuffs, consumer and industrial goods, materials, parts, subassemblies, etc.

Thus, the privatization of foreign trade will create favorable conditions for diversifying Romania's foreign economic relations from both the viewpoint of the number of partners in a given geographical area or country and from the viewpoint of the range of products imported and exported.

Similarly, privatization will contribute to increasing the mobility and adaptability of production to foreign market requirements and to enhancing creative inventions and innovations, thus implicitely improving product quality to achieve competitiveness.

In fact, we hope to promote automation and privatization processes in both foreign trade and tourism and in domestic trade, thus channeling all activities toward a market economy.

Members of Helsinki Federation Arrested in Kosovo

AU0509123990 Vienna ORF Teletext in German 1215 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] Four human rights activists of the International Helsinki Federation, consisting of two Austrians, one Dutch national, and one Dane, have been arrested in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo.

According to statements by a member of the federation, they were interrogated and consequently taken to a hotel, which they were not permitted to leave. Their papers were confiscated. All members of the delegation were declared persona non grata for three years and have to leave Yugoslavia within 24 hours. They visited Kosovo to examine the human rights situation in connection with a general strike.

Ordered To Leave; Strike Viewed

AU0509165290 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] The general strike of ethnic Albanians held the day before yesterday is still the main topic of all Kosovo talks. Two Kosovo trade unions—one legal and another illegal—voiced their views on the issue today. Here is a report from Pristina by Milivoje Mihajlovic:

[Mihajlovic] The Kosovo agency of the Serbian Trade Unions Conference assessed at its meeting today that the strike had shown that the influence of separatists had resulted in the negative homogenization of the Albanians. The announcement issued from this session says that because of their dirty political aims, the separatists are more and more frequently misusing their fellow-nationals and make them oppose the laws of Serbia and Yugoslavia. It was pointed out that new strikes to be organized by separatists had been announced, but, it was said, their only consequence will be more Albanians left without jobs.

It was stressed that respective state organs had been asked to take measures against the well-known leaders of the Albanian separatist movement.

On the other side, representatives of the so-called Union of the Independent Trade Unions of Kosovo, which had in fact organized the general strike, held a news conference and assessed the strike as a complete success. The aim of the strike, they said, was to warn Serbia that it cannot have any success in Kosovo through repression, but also to warn Yugoslavia that it should react to Serbia's policy.

The organizers claimed that the nature of the strike was economic and social, and, they said, it was political inasmuch as the measures taken against the Albanian workers were political. It was said that the strikers demanded that dismissed Albanians—according to the independent trade union leaders, there are more than 15,000 of them—should be given back their jobs. The independent trade union demands that all replaced Albanian officials should be reinstituted in their former posts.

It is interesting that the leadership of the independent trade unions claimed that everything was functioning in Kosovo during the general strike, not because of the efforts made by the state organs, but above all because of those made by the teams of Albanians whom the strike organizers prepared in advance.

We have learned that the organs of order today detained members of a delegation of the Helsinki Human Rights Federation who are visiting Kosovo, Kristine von Kol, Marend Koen, and Manon Peig [names as heard]. We have learned that they had been handed the decision demanding that they leave Yugoslavia and forbidding them to visit our country during the next three years.

Serbs Deny Making Arrests

LD0509212690 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1851 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] Belgrade, 5 Sep (TANJUG)—The government of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia today denied reports that three members of the Vienna-based International Helsinki Federation were arrested in Prizren, in the troubled Kosovo Province, yesterday.

The report was brought by the ASSOCIATED PRESS (AP) yesterday.

The AP information says that the three were given a 24-hour limit to leave Yugoslavia and that their passports were branded "persona non grata".

According to information available to the Serbian Government, the AP report is untrue, a statement issued today says.

The Helsinki group was on on unofficial visit to Kosovo and [words indistinct] by provincial Justice Secretary Djorde Aksic, at its own request.

"This latest misinformation is another element of the special war waged against Serbia and Yugoslavia," the Serbian Government statement says.

Kosovo is an autonomous province in the Republic of Serbia.

Kosovo TU Assesses Albanians' 1-Day Strike

LD0509154990 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1248 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] Pristina, 5 Sep (TANJUG)—The coordination committee of "the Federation of the Kosovo Independent Unions" assessed at today's news conference that the one-day strike of Albanians was "successfully realized" in the province. Due to the measures undertaken by this union, its leadership stresses, all essential services were functioning normally on that day, 3 September.

The workers on duty during the strike at the recommendation of the coordination committee, carried out their tasks "faultlessly."

The general strike of Albanians in Kosovo, according to the leadership of the independent union, was not primarily political. Its main demand was the reinstatement of "more than 15,000 dismissed workers of the Albanian, Muslim, and Turkish nationalities." The secondary demands concerned the suspension of the Kosovo Assembly and its Executive Council, as well as other decisions and measures made and undertaken by the Socialist Republic of Serbia.

"The current chairman" of the Federation of the Kosovo Independent Union, Agim Hiseni, informed the journalists that the strike was political to the extent to which measures undertaken against workers in Kosovo are political. Hiseni said the union will not give up the demands for which the strike had been called.

Representatives of the independent unions in the Kosovo health institutions, the Kosovo Electricity Board, the Trepca mine, the leather and shoe plant in Pec—who together with many others attended the news conference—protested at the arrest of several independent union members and at "the suspension of numerous workers." The representative of the Independent Union of the Kosovo Electricity Board Workers, Medjit Sulja, added, "We will be forced to undertake countermeasures and to fight with all available trade union means."

The leaders of Independent Unions thanked Slobodan Lang from Zagreb on "his support manifested in hunger strike."

U.S. Senator's Rights Statements Deemed Devisive

AU0509083790 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 1-2 Sep 90 p 1

[Gordana Logar commentary: "Tear Gas and Confusion: When Senators Go Marching In"]

[Text] The unusually harsh and undiplomatic statement on human rights in Kosovo issued by a group of Republican senators led by Bob Dole after their three-day visit to Zagreb, Belgrade, and Pristina will hardly help "the unity of Yugoslavia" that the statement supports, among other things. By assessing—whether justified in doing so or not—the degrees of democracy in the three Yugoslav republics as different, the U.S. senators have in fact encouraged further quarrels, although it would be too much to claim that these quarrels would not go on at the same pace without them.

One could add one more reproach—that their approach was one-sided—and it is probably the most serious, only if one ignores the fact that they observed things from their own point of view (whose else should it be?). Moreover, their yardstick for human rights is in conformity with CSCE documents and therefore with all those European institutions that Yugoslavia and each of its individual republics are voluntarily seeking to join, which implies accepting certain conditions, rules of behavior, and social setup (multiparty system, for example). One of those human rights is the right of any group to ask a foreign delegation to hold talks away from the public eye. Therefore, one cannot blame the Americans for the fact that the talks between the senators and representatives of the Kosovo alternative movements were held behind closed doors.

Therefore, although the polemics about the seven people from the U.S. Senate could go on forever—they could include even the argument that "Croatia and Slovenia must be delighted" and that Serbia "must protect its rights unconditionally"—this would not do much to help the criticized side too much, particularly because the international documents that Yugoslavia has signed no longer treat human rights as a country's "internal affairs." Even less can one assess a visit by a foreign delegation in the traditional way as foreigners wandering uncontrolled over somebody else's territory.

Exactly by complying with these documents, the senators—irrespective of whether they were welcome guests or not—were following the procedure envisaged by the CSCE documents on human rights adopted in Vienna in 1989 and in Copenhagen in 1990. They paid an unofficial visit to Yugoslavia and they announced their visit to the Yugoslav side through diplomatic channels—the SFRY Embassy in Washington and the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade. Their visit did not take place under the auspices of official Washington (the White House or State Department), and, since they were a parliamentary delegation, their trip was financed by Congress. Although these formalities do not seem to be important at this inflammable moment in Yugoslavia, they are not without significance, at least inasmuch as one cannot ignore the reputation of the seven senators—especially Bob Dole from Kansas—and their influence on Serbia's image among U.S. congressmen.

Therefore, identifying them with official Washington—as was done in the official statements issued by Serbian ministries and ministers—is, to say the least, undiplomatic and is by no means to the credit of somebody defending himself.

There were enough signs and warnings given in advance to the effect that the visit was not going to be too gracious toward Serbian policy in Kosovo. After all, Dr. Prlja himself was aware of this too, because he had had talks with Senator Dole in Washington exactly a month ago when he invited the senator to visit. There was also a friendly warning from the United States last week. Congressman Jim Moody who, unlike Senator Dole, can be considered to belong to a kind of a Serbian lobby on Capitol Hill, arrived in Belgrade on his own initiative and said at a news conference that "today, the Albanian lobby has less influence on the disposition in Congress

than the fact that legal institutions and the only daily in Albanian has been abolished in Kosovo and that all opportunity for a dialogue with the other side had been refused."

Already these two facts, and the announcements in the press immediately before the senators' visit (Ljubljana DELO)—that the Albanians were preparing to welcome "American friends" by gathering en masse and carrying U.S. flags—gave the hosts an opportunity to prepare better for the visit. It was a particularly good sign for the security forces to organize themselves in the way that is common in Europe if that is where one is intending to go. The European (and U.S.) practice involves allocating an area for demonstrations which is fenced off by wooden police barriers and surrounded by a wide police cordon (in America, these can be mounted policemen), and any slogan, however unpleasant, must be received with complete calm. Proof that this is not unknown even here can be found—however cynical it may sound—in the official Yugoslav attitude for more than 40 years that "over there, they can shout, demonstrate, and attack, but it does not do them any good at all." During that long period of time, this was how bans on all demonstrations and arrests like the arrests of young men flying the Polish "Solidarity" flag in Belgrade's Marx and Engels Square at the beginning of the eighties were justified.

Instead of this, what happened in Kosovo was that the militia (taken by surprise?) began to disperse the demonstrators and was then attacked with broken bottles and even with bullets, as the official announcement put it. Logically enough, the other side was not spared injuries either.

While one does not dispute Serbia's official position that it was defending its rights and laws by all legal means, including the militia, and that it is not going to renounce these rights because of a group of foreign guests, one asks who profited more from the use of batons, tear gas, and personnel carriers, even if what was involved was Serbia's justifiable cause. Even more dilemma and doubt—if not even rejection of such a kind of thinking—could be caused by the sentence with which Serbia reproached the senators for closing their eyes to events in Croatia and Knin. It is not because it might resemble such a triviality as that they are "torturing blacks and Indians," but because the rights of Serbs in Croatia are here equated to those of the Albanians in Kosovo. According to recognized international legal definitions—particularly the ones of the CSCE according to which the senators had in fact come here—the Serbs in Croatia are a people, while the Albanians are a minority despite their numbers in the particular region.

It is therefore clear that the failure to comply with international norms and the lack of political feeling carries the danger that one will be criticized, does not respect existing rights, remains isolated, and considers all declarations on European dimension to be mere deceptions. If this is not the case, then it should be clear that Europe and the world have set their conditions: an equal opposition, access to all the media, separation of party and state, executive power answerable to the Assembly, free elections, and human rights which also include free demonstrations.

Regarding these demands, Yugoslavia, and everybody in it, lacks even those extenuating circumstances that Romania, and even President Iliescu as heir to the former regime, may have. It is registered in the diplomatic annals in Vienna that the Romanian representative (at that time, it was Ceausescu's representative) at the CSCE meeting in 1989 always said the following after documents had been adopted: We shall use those paragraphs that suit us.

Rugova Discusses 'Historic Rights' in Kosovo

AU0509093390 Skopje FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT in Albanian 29 Aug 90 pp 4-5

[Second and final part of interview with Ibrahim Rugova, president of the Kosovo Democratic Alliance, by Mehmet Emerllahu on 23 August; place not given: "Nobody Can Halt Democratic Processes"]

[Text] [Emerllahu] Where Kosovo and the Albanians are concerned, major historic injustices have taken place, and continue to take place. Conflicts are arising in Yugoslavia under the pressure of Serbia, which relies on its "historical rights" and stubbornly insists on "keeping its house in order" as "master of the house." It neither asks the other republics nor permits them to become involved. Where is Yugoslavia now as a state of "equal" peoples and nationalities?

[Rugova] If we wish, we could talk of "historic rights" from a scientific point of view. Since it was founded as an independent state, Serbia has always won with these "rights." However, if we want to discuss historical rights in Kosovo, it is well known who has historical rights here. We have been here since Illyrian times. Dardania [Illyrian province in classical times on the territory of modern Kosovo] is well known, and so on. If we really insist on discussing such matters, we can do so. It is well known that the Serbs, or rather the southern Slavs, came here in the 12th and 13th centuries. However, it would be ridiculous to deal with such matters today. It would be ridiculous for Europe, because Europe has changed its way of thinking. The old Europe of the 19th century, held up legitimacy and historical rights as a kind of title deed. However, Europe has changed its ideas regarding this subject, and now takes a different view of the injustices which occurred at the end of the last century and the beginning of this century, especially in 1918 (when European borders and especially those in the Balkans were defined) and in 1945 when social systems and borders were defined (although few borders were changed). People are thinking of overcoming all these injustices through a democratic order, not merely in the political sense, but through a democratization of the human spirit, the movement of people, greater freedoms, new relationships and contacts between individuals and peoples, and so forth. This is now the conception of a

future Europe, a European Community, which we must bear in mind. Meanwhile, as for the Albanians and the position we hold today, let me say once again: If they consider us a savage people, or savage as far as they are concerned, we must consider these matters differently. If you remember 1988, in which the 17th League of Communists of Yugoslavia Central Committee plenum was held at which it was decided to change the Constitutions of Serbia and Kosovo and which was a de facto suspension of Kosovo's autonomy, the other republics imagined that if Serbia obtained this portion (in other words, Kosovo) and Vojvodina, it would be satisfied. However, they made a serious strategic error, because they failed to predict Serbia's later, much greater appetites. Even the Slovenes and Croats thought that they would be left in peace and not provoked after their free elections, but look at what is happening in Croatia now. It is now a question of much greater appetites, plus an attempt to impede democracy and every democratic process. It is an attempt by current Serbian policymakers to eliminate democracy in Yugoslavia, because they are aware that they themselves will lose if democratic processes win and are introduced, and nobody likes to lose. Therefore, whenever any democratic center springs up in Yugoslavia, they hurry to do all they can to smother it and to obliterate democracy. However, these are ambitions with limited prospects. The statements of the SFRY Presidency, the Federal Executive Council, and the Yugoslav People's Army now seem to me very ironical when they say that we will solve problems in a democratic way, on a democratic path, and with democratic means. In fact, this is unprecedented hypocrisy, because one cannot close one's eyes to facts. When I see what is happening, I sometimes say how difficult or impossible it is for satraps to become democrats. One cannot face the world with shameless demagogy, because the world is well informed, and will not accept demagogy. The world is not deceived.

[Emerllahu] Yes, it has been in those very two republics which held free elections and which began to introduce democracy that disagreements have arisen, but not from within...!

[Rugova] That is exactly what has happened. They want to prevent democratic elections at all costs. Look, for instance, at Kosovo and the prevention of democratic processes, the attacks on the Alternative movement and on Albanian political parties and groups. They do all this out of fear, because Serbia knows that things will change tomorrow with free elections. They know that they will lose power, and not only in Kosovo.

[Emerllahu] The Albanians in Kosovo will remember the last 10 years for the massacres carried out by state and police violence, imprisonments, maltreatments, injuries, murders, poisonings, differentiation, sackings, and who knows what else! However, they will also remember them as a time of high national awareness, endurance, and patience constantly shown the face of the gravest provocations. It is said and firmly believed that the Kosovo Democratic Alliance [LDK] and you as its president have had a major influence in explaining everything that has happened, in avoiding provocations, and maintaining an attitude of what might be called collective cool-headedness and patience. How would you comment on these matters?

[Rugova] As a political party, we think that issues must be solved by political means. Our people, aware of the attitude of the Euro-American public, have gained the confidence that the problems will really be solved by political means. It is this confidence, and not just international support, which has kept alive the spirit of endurance and the hope that one day it will be clear even to Yugoslavia that the problem of Kosovo must be approached in a realistic and impartial way. Of course, they have also supported our viewpoints and positions, and have shown unprecedented patience and wisdom, as foreign agencies and diplomatic circles have especially emphasized in the last two months, during which violence has further escalated and when various authorities and institutions have been suspended. They are sometimes amazed by how this people can contain itself when faced with all the violence and their incessant maltreatment. The Suva Reka case occurred recently, in which a young man died from the maltreatment he received when he was returning with wood from his own forest, only to encounter the police and to suffer at their hands.

As a political party, we have said many times that we cannot guarantee that there will not be disturbances. Nevertheless, the people have understood that the problems must be solved by political means, not by confrontations for which the police are only waiting, nervous at the failure of such conflicts to occur. It must be clear that the peaceful political road is a longer route, but a measured and well-considered solution of this kind is more durable. The policies and programs of the LDK must also be understood in this sense because this Alliance does not want a single casualty. The reason why Serbian and Yugoslav officials refuse, or have not begun a sincere and unconditional dialogue with us is a different issue. Only when this is started will they realize that our activities are realistic, and, when better understanding is achieved, are also practical. However, we have not accepted and will not accept dialogue with preconditions. Let me say once again that every step must be carefully considered, because casualties are casualties and we cannot provoke people when they have lost patience. Look at the most recent situation: Although many things have happened, although everything has been taken from us if only as I think temporarily, and there have been cases of maltreatment, there have been fewer casualties. It is important for us to protect people from those who wish to provoke them, because we all know that in other, earlier situations, we suffered a lot and there were many casualties because of provocations. This time, they took all power from us, but there were no victims.

[Emerllahu] You always insist that the problem of Kosovo must be solved by political means, but an undemocratic state spares no means, and pays no heed to

democratic demands. It continues to use the policies and means of violence, and carries out provocations of all kinds. What is expected of the Albanians: Are they to be brought to heel by force, to be humiliated and brought to their knees, or are they to rise up?

[Rugova] This crazy and blind policy involves the same thinking as in old Serbia and prewar Yugoslavia—the idea of bringing the Albanians to heel by force. According to the theory of Cubrilovic and others, the Albanians must be subjugated and the most effective way of doing this is violence. Only force can teach the Albanians. Hence we have all this maltreatment, the imprisonments, and persecutions. Now they are using what I would call social terror, with dismissals from work and other forms of discrimination, the ruination of the economy, unemployment, and so forth. The aim is clear: They wish at all costs to reduce the Albanians to the unenviable situation of beggars, to exhaust and subjugate them so that political demands will never enter their heads. This is a familiar colonial ploy, a strategy which others have employed under certain circumstances, and which Serbia has tried against the Albanians throughout the last century. I think that even this situation will be overcome, although I am sure that it will be very difficult. However, I am also convinced that, apart from the LDK, from which even more can be expected, people have their own strong political beliefs and are clear about what is happening and what might happen if they are rational in their demands and behavior. People therefore trust themselves, their willpower, and also the LDK and the other Kosovo political parties. For instance, they realize that there are now tendencies for the Serbian state and police to compromise the LDK. An article in BORBA today struck me as ridiculous in claiming that the Kosovo Alternative has now begun to compromise because it has allegedly failed to meet the demands of its members. What you see is a simple, vulgar trick which I would say smacks of the police. It is also futile, because the people are firm in their convictions and know perfectly well under what kind of circumstances the LDK is operating. The people are therefore prepared to endure even longer in order to demand and achieve the solution for which they have declared themselves, and not one imposed by somebody else. I will say this too: The people now want a long-term solution. They do not want laments or sympathy, because we have now reached the stage where the international public understands clearly that the Albanians are an important element in Yugoslavia, both from a demographic and numerical point of view, and because of their human, intellectual, and economic potential. We therefore take a long-term view of things. As for the other side, they know their own business. They are sparing no means, because if it came to a confrontation under present circumstances, this would not be to our favor. Lives would be lost, and we do not want this. Even large states seek to achieve victory with as few casualties as possible. We must learn the same lesson, because we have lost many victims during our history, and have gained little. Any success would resemble a Pyrrhic victory. People have begun to think politically in a more mature way and this must give us courage. They have understood democratic processes, and have even understood the game of politics. If events had followed the course of a political game, and dialogue had been accepted, we would have settled everything. We are ready for such a dialogue. However, the policymakers of Serbia are not ready, because arguments are not on their side. They therefore do not dare to sit round a table and discuss problems with the Albanians. Later, we will see. Meanwhile, they avoid dialogue, use violence, and always try to find some kind of excuse for the international public.

[Emerllahu] For years, most of the media have served such policies, following down the years a line of speculative propaganda, which is now looking rather faded. Do you think that now the public really has a different view of Kosovo, or is their still room for lies and manipulation?

[Rugova] I would mention two groups of public opinion, the European and the American, to whom it is now clear what is happening in Kosovo, Serbia, and Yugoslavia. In principle, when they see that somebody is oppressing someone else, they are on the side of the oppressed. In this specific case, a state with 22 million inhabitants is behaving in a truly barbarous fashion toward 2-3 million Albanians. This public is therefore disposed to sympathize with and support the Albanians, for this is human. Even when a person is not fully aware of a situation, he responds and feels pain whenever he hears about violence against a people. Moreover, there has been fuller reporting about the Albanians in the last two years, because the Bolshevik system fell even here, and the Albanians have been freed from their own leaders, who kept many things under lock and key and concealed them from others, especially those who supported the cause of Kosovo. What is even more absurd, and a disgrace for these leaders, was that they were sometimes more severe than others over some issues.

Reporting changes after last year's events, when journalists and representatives of various international institutions began to visit Kosovo more often and reports were made direct from Pristina, the scene of the events. This year also, there has been increased interest on the part of diplomats, whom we contacted and with whom we discussed very frankly the problems preoccupying the Albanians and Kosovo. Moreover, the formation of parties and opposition branches has influenced the general political awareness of the Albanians in Kosovo and Yugoslavia in general. I think that the West has now examined the situation in Kosovo and possesses the facts. For two years, it has been studying everything that has happened in Kosovo, so that the issues are also familiar to responsible international institutions such as the Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, which has done a lot of work on Kosovo, Amnesty International, the International Federation for Human Rights in Paris, the American Human Rights Foundation, the U.S. Congress, and so forth. It is therefore no longer a question of the principle of great and small, but of the examination

of injustices and real demands. A field study of the problems of Kosovo has been carried out, and we of course now expect tangible steps. As you know, the wheels of diplomacy and interstate diplomacy turn more slowly than one imagines, and there are various complicated and interconnected interests.

[Emerllahu] According to you, is there enough interest in Kosovo to ensure a commitment to solving the issue of Kosovo, or must the Albanians do it themselves?

[Rugova] As I said, help does not come of its own accord. I mentioned the study of the situation and so forth, and contacts in order to make the issues more real. Now, if European integration is to take place, maintaining the individuality of every people and region in Europe, Europe will be interested in integrating the Balkans also, but not with its ancient quarrels and the hegemonist appetites of certain Balkan states, which have unfortunately revived in Serbia. Europe is interested in the stability of this region, as is Greece as a member of the EEC. Of course, it is evident that Europe also sees resources in Kosovo. If Kosovo is stable, Yugoslavia will also be stable, and the Balkans will be stable, and this is of importance for the future process of the integration of a united Europe. Europe therefore has realized that the Albanians must be included in democratic processes, both here in Kosovo and Yugoslavia, and of course, to speak frankly, in Albania, which means that Albania too will be integrated in European processes. Of course, one cannot set aside here various geopolitical and geostrategic interests and the question of the Mediterranean, because the logic of the superpowers is still operating, according to which anybody without a Mediterranean presence does not exist on the strategic map. There are many factors which make up the whole of the problem of the Balkans and Europe; one cannot, as some people think, trample on other people and not bear any responsibility or suffer no repercussions of any kind. The injustices against the Albanians in Kosovo and Yugoslavia affect others, and they cannot remain indifferent.

[Emerllahu] After all that has been said, and with the injustices against the Albanians at every level and other social and economic problems, do you think that Yugoslavia can open its doors to Europe and become a future fellow-traveler of Europe?

[Rugova] Yugoslavia has been given a signal to stop in certain matters, such as the violations of the rights and freedoms of its citizens! It is hard for Yugoslavia to enter Europe with this heavy burden and these unsolved problems. One cannot enter Europe burdened with elements of a Bolshevik system such as exists especially in Serbia, particularly when the countries of the East are shedding this system faster. Matters are clear. Yugoslavia has now been told "No," and much depends on the attitude to Yugoslavia of Europe, the United States of course, and I would also stress the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's attitude is still unknown; perhaps it has one, but not openly. I at least do not know. Its attitude should be known, even though the Soviet Union is said to be preoccupied with itself. It is nevertheless a superpower and cannot abandon its interests lightly. It is therefore a matter of three complex fields.

[Emerllahu] Let us return to the LDK. Regardless of the fact that it is working under extraordinary circumstances, it has its own program and, as you have said several times, it has a clear vision of Kosovo today and in the future. We know what Kosovo is today, but you might tell us what it will be tomorrow, and what its people must do under these circumstances to realize their demands.

[Rugova] Kosovo today belongs to its people, although at present it has neither autonomy nor power (!?); Kosovo belongs to its patient and strong-hearted people (if I may speak rather poetically). It has now come to a very difficult situation, especially with these dismissals from work, the suspension of all its institutions, and the imposed management of the economy. This imposed administration even enters hospitals and takes doctors and patients from the hospitals, and is beginning to enter the university, schools, and other institutions. We therefore think that real status within the framework of the Yugoslav federation would secure fundamental preconditions for the treatment of the majority Albanians, who would then be able to stand as guarantee for others who live in Kosovo. This is one political condition, which leads to the second: If this political condition were secured for Kosovo, there would remain the issues of economic development, culture, science, education, employment, the free market, and so forth. We have a clear vision of our future development. Of course, this will be realized by the most distinguished experts, who will draw up plans and projects in every field. We will consider investment opportunities, even foreign investments, and especially those of our businessmen who have been successful themselves abroad and who have expressed their readiness to work together with us and to invest in Kosovo. As a party, we also have a commitment to lifting the ban on Albanian political emigrants who left Kosovo after 1981 to escape maltreatment, persecution, and imprisonment.

The LDK will support the kind of status for which the people of Kosovo have declared and will declare themselves. We will not permit any kind of compromise in this. The independence of Kosovo within the Yugoslav federation is the only acceptable solution. Let us see how events will develop in the future. The best thing would be for the Albanians to formally declare themselves, and for their right to decide their own destiny to be recognized, not for others to write their constitution and prescribe for their autonomy, territory, and whatever else. If a not very strong ethnic group such as the Serbs in Croatia is allowed such a declaration, as they insist, it is a particular kind of absurdity that the Albanians are denied it, and the world will ask those within Yugoslavia who have grown deaf what they are doing to the Albanians and why their rights are being restricted. We think these are the basic conditions for Kosovo tomorrow and for its future. The whole issue centers on the fact that they there has

never been a willingness to recognize that the Albanians are the majority in Kosovo. We were always put in the position of captives and of a minority, even when the 1974 Constitution was in force. Something always hung over our heads, making us realize that we did not possess all our rights. It is therefore not surprising that people demanded and demand a solution to the question of Kosovo's real status, the status which belongs to it and which it deserves, like other parts of Yugoslavia.

[Emerllahu] Finally, the LDK is expected to register at a federal level soon. How will you act after registering and can you be prevented by Serbia?

[Rugova] Yes, if we register we will have a more legal status and we will be able to insist on certain things in a different way. Serbia, of course, will try to prevent us from registering, as it has done so far, and will do this through various channels. It will persist in hampering us, but it will find this very difficult. There is also another question: We, and perhaps we alone, have been accepted as a democratic party in the United States and Europe. This has happened without extensive contacts, but because of an awareness of our situation and on the merits of our program, which includes nothing harmful. Matters have therefore acquired their own impetus, and any measures taken to prevent us would be irrational even for those who undertake it. They would be ill-considered and would provoke a great reaction. Anyway, there is every probability that we will register, and matters will be different after our registration. We will work in a much more organized manner.

Alleged Kosovar Economic, Political 'Repression'

AU0409095890 Skopje FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT in Albanian 29 Aug 90 p 5

[Emin Azemi report: "Albanian Workers Chased by an Armored Vehicle!"]

[Excerpt] Pristina, 28 Aug— Economic and political repression is still continuing in Kosovo. The economic foundations of many collectives and institutions are being destroyed on the basis of illegal and unprofessional decisions which are above all aimed against Albanian working people and experts.

"Good news" awaited the workers of the "Balkan" industry of Suva Reka at the factory gate the day before yesterday: They were prohibited entry! This was the order of the "temporary management," which demonstrated its "efficiency" by barring the entry of skilled workers to this giant of Kosovo industry, famous for its profitability not only in Kosovo but beyond. When the workers tried to gain access to their workplaces, they were prevented by militia forces. When they tried to discover the reason why "Balkan" had been closed, they received a reply from the militia's truncheons and rifle-butts. The workers were then dispersed by force. An armored vehicle was also at the ready for this task, and chased the workers as far as the bus station. Some workers were injured in this incident.

Mass dismissal notices have also been served recently in the Stari Trg mine. According to the decisions of the imposed management, more than 400 miners, engineers, and workers may no longer work at Stari Trg because they "have obstructed the work process and persuaded other workers not to work." The Stari Trg workers reported for work on several successive days, but the imposed management with the help of the militia prevented them from entering the mine.

While on the subject of the economy, let us look at some other cases which illustrate corruption and a lack of proportion in development. The sum of 18,038,175 dinars was recently withdrawn from the Kosovo People's Bank and allocated to the needs of the Serbian militia and the Belgrade railroad. This was done following a decision of the Serbian Assembly.

The consequences of the measures imposed on Kosovo collectives are now becoming visible. A drastic fall in production in all sectors of the economy has been observed. Production was 24 percent lower in the January-July 1990 period compared with the same period last year. This rapid fall in production has been most pronounced in the key branches of the Kosovo economy (electricity production, coal, non-ferrous metals, non-metallic minerals, the metal- processing industry, textiles, etc.).

As a result of these depraved measures in the economy, more than 10,000 Albanian workers have been dismissed from their jobs, although the number of employed Albanians barely amounts to nine percent of the total population of Kosovo.

A further blight to the Kosovo economy has been bankruptcies, which have now overtaken 55 enterprises with 31,237 workers. These organizations have included the Kisnica and Novo Brdo mines with 3,300 workers, the Kosovo power stations with 2,600 workers, the Dobro Selo and Belacevac open-cast mines with 4,700 workers, the battery factory with 1,475 workers, the shock absorber factory in Pristina with 1,600 workers, and the magnesite mine in Goles with 1,200 workers.

Here are some other examples which contradict the megalomania of Serbian propaganda about the alleged economic aid of Serbia and Yugoslavia to Kosovo. With the resources of the federal fund, Serbia built a number of parallel textile plants in Kosovo, thus using the fund in an irrational way, worsening the position of existing factories and achieving the segregation of the Kosovo population. To make the situation even more absurd, the federal fund was "accidentally" used to build industrial plant in Serbian and Montenegrin localities such as Kosovo Polje, Leposavic, Strpca, Zubin Potok, Kamenica, etc., whose inhabitants were employed exclusively.

Another case shows how Kosovo has been "helped" economically. Even though specific and economically advantageous plans existed for the construction of a Peugeot factory, this program was blocked by Serbia, which at the same time insisted on the construction of a

dam at Gazivoda, a pompous and economically totally irrational project. It seems that this was done solely in order to provide work for enterprises in Serbia (at a time when the Ramiz Sadiku Construction Combine was being ruined) with resources from the federal fund which were allocated for Kosovo. [passage omitted]

Muslims Deny Coalition Plans With Tudjman Party

AU0509093490 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE in Serbo-Croatian 24 Aug 90 p 4

[E. Habul report: "Zulfikarpasic Denies Newspaper Reports"]

[Text] The newspaper reports that the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] has offered a coalition to the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] are not correct. This was stated by Adil Zulfikarpasic, vice president of the SDA, yesterday at a news conference which was also attended by other leading members of this party, Alija Izetbegovic, president of the party, and Muhamed Cengic, secretary of the party. The reason for the news conference was Zulfikarpasic's speech at the founding assembly of the HDZ in Sarajevo last Saturday [18 August], or to be more precise, his remarks about cooperation and alliance with the Croatian Democratic Party which were interpreted in the public as the announcement of a coalition between the two parties in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Such an interpretation, according to this leading official of the party which rallies Muslims, has considerable political consequences, especially because we plan to hold a commemorative session for the victims of Chetnik slaughter in World War II on Saturday [25 August], and because this could place a question mark over the earlier planned presence of the Serbian Democratic Party's [SDS] delegation at this commemorative session.

Proposing coalitions, Adil Zulfikarpasic said, is not the policy of the SDA.

One should distinguish between cooperation and political coalitions. We have never discussed coalition with the HDZ or and other political party. The question of coalition will only arise after elections, Adil Zulfikarpasic said. He also stressed that the SDA is profoundly interested in cooperation with the SDS and the HDZ. His view was that one must cooperate with the parties that conduct a Bosnia-Hercegovina kind of policy, that recognize the sovereignty and independence of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Zulfikarpasic then explained how the misunderstanding came about, admitting that his lack of preciseness contributed to it.

"Last Saturday, I spoke at the assembly of the HDZ about democratic processes in the republic and the need for all democratic parties to unite their forces. I was delighted by Mr. Perinovic when he said the policies of the Croatian Demoratic Community will be conducted from Sarajevo and that his party is in favor of the sovereignty and independence of Bosnia-Hercegovina. I also said: If you are for a sovereign Bosnia- Hercegovina, for the equality of Serbs and Croats, for sincere fraternal cooperation, then I believe you, and you are our greatest ally. The ovation that followed cut off the rest of my sentence: 'as are the Serbs.' I did not say this as an invitation to form a coalition," Adil Zulfikarpasic told journalists.

Our intention, said the vice president of the SDA, is to bring the HDZ and the SDS closer together. The policies of our party are not closer to those of the HDZ than to those of the SDS. We want to create such a political climate in Bosnia-Hercegovina as would bring all democratic forces to one table. Our major aim is to bring Serbs and Croats at the same table, Adil Zulfikarpasic said.

Alija Izetbegovic, leader of the SDA, said that the question of the togetherness of Serbs, Muslims, and Croats is the question of survival for Bosnia-Hercegovina. According to him, this is a "natural law" for the survival of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Explaining the policy of the SDA, Izetbegovic said that the members of the party differentiate other parties only according to whether they recognize the statehood of Bosnia- Hercegovina or not. Cooperating on this basis, we will not ask anybody whether he is a Serb or a Croat, Izetbegovic said reiterating that this is the law if this republic is to survive.

Serb in Croat Assembly Appeals for Understanding

AU0509093190 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 25 Aug 90 p 5

[Unattributed report from the extraordinary session of the Croatian Assembly in Zagreb on 24 August: "Thus Spake Simo Rajic"]

[Text] At the time when probably many deputies started to wonder how the knot entangling arms, genocide, uprising, and repression could be undone, Simo Rajic, representing the League of Communists of Croatia-Party of Democratic Changes, took the floor and appealed to the Assembly and the representatives of his party to conclude this session in a dignified manner. Let us do this, he said, so that people can go home and sleep in peace.

Moderate politicians are not popular today, Rajic said. For my people I am also a traitor who is asked to resign. The Serbian Democratic Party wants me to be physically liquidated. I must tell you that the Serbs in Croatia are not happy. They are beheaded. They were led by a party which brought them to their present situation. The League of Communists of Croatia has lost the trust of Serbs. This Assembly is obliged to fill this vacuum but must at the same time respect the mentality of that nation. With his efforts Mr. Tudjman has already achieved much in that repect.

Simo Rajic then addressed Mr. Tudjman personally: "What hurts me as a Serb—and nobody is a greater Serb than I, but what makes me different from the misanthropic Serbs is that I like people—what hurts me, therefore, is that Serbs have been unfortunate to always be immature people and to be led by people who happened to come to power by chance (from Khuen to Milosevic). The responsibility of the Croat people is to enable this nation to become equal in both the political and the economic sense. I do not think that they should be punished because of some troublemakers.

"In making decisions and statements bear in mind these specific characteristics. We should all be learning from Pribicevic and Radic. Let this resolution be a bridge of trust. Let us set up an Assembly commission which would visit those southern communes, and you Mr. President, you should go there, too, because people's trust in you is increasing." Simo Rajic then appealed to Croats and Serbs to offer a hand to one another, and to their leaders to correct their mistakes.

After he said this, applause rang through the Assembly hall. Franjo Tudjman got up and offered his hand to Simo Rajic. All the deputies replied to Rajic's message with a standing ovation.

Croatia's Mesic Discusses New Post in Presidency

LD0509204690 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1303 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Report on interview with Stipe Mesic, "new member of the SFRY Presidency from Croatia," by Zoran Medved, on Slovene Television "In Focus" program, on 4 September; place not given]

[Text] Ljubljana, 5 Sep (TANJUG)—"I have been sent to the Yugoslav top body because I have a good knowledge of the Yugoslav political situation and the people in top positions. They were elected differently than myself. Some of them represent a different type of policy. I am bringing the wind of democracy to the Yugoslav top body. I believe that I, together with others who will be democratically elected to the post, will be able to instigate change in the Yugoslav top body."

Asked whether he is leaving Zagreb under pressure from the HDZ (Croatian Democratic Community) right wing, Mesic said that there is no such thing, and went to add that "there are individuals who do not always understand the situation completely, and believe that things can be resolved swiftly".

Mesic then talked about a new Yugoslavia, which should be a confederation, that is, an alliance of autonomous, free, and independent states, states which will decide about this new model of their own free will. The existing model, according to Mesic, is not to anyone's liking, so a new one should be created.

Asked whether it is true that now Tudjman wants to win in Yugoslavia, Stipe Mesic replied: "Since the Eighth Serbian League of Communists Central Committee session and Milosevic's speech in Kosovo, Serbia has had a policy which, in effect, has been aimed at destroying the Yugoslav federation and establishing Serbian domination. It, however, accused everyone else of destroying Yugoslavia."

We hold that, Mesic said, we need Yugoslavia as a country of equal republics. Thus, this will not be a victory for Tudjman, nor a victory for anyone else, but a victory for equal republics within Yugoslavia. The clash between the current communist regime in Serbia and the democratically elected Croatian leadership, Mesic explained, as a clash between two options: "the one is in favor of domination by a Greater Serbian element, domination by one nation and one republic. The second wants equal relations within Yugoslavia. Irrespective of which party is in power in Serbia, if it wants to create a Greater Serbia, the clash would arise again", Mesic stressed.

Asked to comment on the thesis that Croatia and Serbia support autonomy drives in other parts of the country, but not on their own territory, Mesic said "the Serbian leadership is trying through repression to destroy, and is succeeding in destroying, the autonomy in Kosovo enshrined in the Yugoslav Constitution. At the same time, scriptwriters from Belgrade, with their subordinates in Knin, are trying to establish with arms an autonomy which does not exist. This means that Croatia does not use double standards, but that Serbia has a particular aim which it is achieving through the use of arms: on the one hand, to destroy an autonomy, and, on the other, to establish another autonomy." Mesic added that there are no regions but only a few municipalities where Serbs form majority in Croatia. This is no reason to have autonomy.

Asked what kind of autonomy Croatia would cede to the Serbs in Croatia, Mesic said "we can only grant cultural autonomy, to which Serbs certainly have the right. We stressed this in the Assembly's resolution. Serbs, however, cannot have any other kind of autonomy." Elaborating on this, Mesic mentioned that it is likely that all cultural institutions, institutions nurturing cultural traditions and classes in the language of a nation which seeks and gets cultural autonomy, would get permission for work. However, everything has to be within the bounds of possibility.

Asked about the possible break-up of the country, Mesic said "some governments in the West are aware of this possibility. The U.S. diplomatic circles have not been or do not want to be aware of this so far. It would be of help to us if democratic processes in Slovenia and Croatia, and now in Bosnia and other parts of Yugoslavia, are assisted. This would somehow put a brake on populism raging in Serbia and attempts to convince the world that everyone hates Serbs."

Continuing to talk about this, Mesic expressed the view that the first outburst of the aggressive Serbian policy, most strongly manifested in Kosovo, was not halted in time. "It is quite likely that a part of the military leadership was not completely aware of the consequences of Milosevic's policy and of its strength. I still believe that military leadership is sensible and capable of seeing that lending a hand to the repression and to processes leading to centralism in fact will end up in the break-up of Yugoslavia".

Talking about acceptability of the federal government's measures, Mesic stressed that Croatia urges the transformation of social ownership into share-holding ownership, the creation of mixed enterprises and new management structures. This would give a greater impetuous to speed up the development of the economy.

Mesic cited efforts to keep taxation system and policy at the federal level and to preserve federal taxes, as the weakest points in Markovic's program of reforms. "We are against this. We are in favour of each constituent member paying its contribution toward the cost of operations for which we agree that they are of mutual interest."

Mesic holds that Markovic's Alliance of Reformist Forces of Yugoslavia is a rash solution. It is unrealistic to hope that the Alliance is the force of integration. According to Mesic, parties in individual republics could form real forces of integration.

Talking about problems relating to the army, Mesic stressed that removing party and political issues from the Army has to be carried out. "The Army should carry out only tasks prescribed by the Constitution. It is the government body charged with the defense of the borders, and not resolving political problems. We received assurances that the army will not meddle with political solutions. We are convinced that the Army will be firm in this stand." Mesic expressed the view that the army will realize soon that its survival depends precisely on removing it from politics. This means that this confederation can survive only if the Army is subjected to this process.

SFRY Presidency Member Stipe Mesic then explained elements of the confederal contract which is being prepared by Croatia and Slovenia.

"We are offering a confederal model similar to the European Community model. If the European nations and states are satisfied with this model, there are no reasons for us not to adopt it and to join the European Community with it. This, in a way, is a short cut for entering the European Community."

Asked what federal units will gain from the confederal set-up Mesic said that this model offers protection for everyone and no one stands to lose from it. Joint affairs will be financed from individual contributions. Each will develop fields within their competence as best as they can. The flow of capital from developed to underdeveloped areas will be stimulated through lower taxation, better credit facilities, and by resolving the problems of besetting infrastructure through responsible ownership relations.

"Everything is possible, but above all we have to have political peace. We must agree that we can reach peace solely through talks and negotiations. Then the world and Europe will be interested in us." Mesic then went on to explain that the new model envisages that foreign policy, the army, and so on, will be in the domain of the future confederal government. A significantly larger number of Army recruits can do their national service in their republics. Thus, according to Mesic, we would have a mobile and resilient core of the confederal army. Its other parts could be organized on the basis of other principles. We can also reach an agreement about the foreign policy. Regarding foreign policy, Mesic said "why could our ambassadors not present their letters of credence on behalf of all confederal units and represent them all? Regarding consular missions, where interests are not congruous, then republics will open their consular missions. The confederal model envisages that some federal institutions will be moved from Belgrade," Stipe Mesic said in the interview with Slovene Television.

Tudjman on Army's Role After 'Democratic Changes'

LD0509082290 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1836 GMT 4 Sep 90

[Text] Zagreb, 4 Sep (TANJUG)—President of the Republic of Croatia Franjo Tudjman, as reported tonight, received a delegation of the Fifth Military District, headed by its commander, Colonel General Konrad Kolsek in the Banski Dvor Residence in Zagreb.

On this occasion Tudjman presented his view of the development of relations between the Army and society in the wake of the democratic changes that occurred in Croatia. He stressed that "some of the Army's moves such as, for example, disarming the territorial defense, flying party [communist] flags at the barracks and other things, create an atmosphere of mistrust of the Army among the people in Croatia. This mistrust should be overcome as soon as possible by sensible conduct on the part of civil and military authorities."

Tudjman emphasized that "the armed insurrection in the Knin area, the scenario of which had been drawn up outside Croatia, wanted to instigate bloodshed and lure the Army on to civil war as it aimed to topple the democratically elected authorities in Croatia and also later on in Slovenia."

The commander of the Fifth Military District, which covers most of Slovenia's and Croatia's territory, the statement underlines, stressed "that his headquarters is cooperating with the leader of Croatia and Slovenia and

that many projects are under way on which the military and civilian authorities are working together."

"Such cooperation contributes to a better understanding between the people and the Army, and should be developed further." Colonel General Konrad Kolsek underscored that "the Army has not approved and will never approve of meetings or the creation of autonomous regions not sanctioned by laws and Constitution, because that would only destroy the joint life and foment nationalistic passions and open dangerous abysses."

According to Kolsek, "the Army is not against the multiparty system stemming from the free will of the people, but is resolutely against authoritarian thinking and blind nationalism."

Finally, President Tudjman stressed that "the Croat Presidency will undertake all steps aimed at establishing the rule of law on the territory of the entire republic and will not tolerate a parallel government."

Both sides concluded that like meetings should be more frequent because they contribute to the democratization of relations between civilians and military authorities. In doing so, they ensure the sovereignty of the republic and strengthen its democratically elected government.

Top army officers from the Fifth Military District and top republican officials attended the talks.

VJESNIK on Military Role in Croatia

AU0109201790 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 17 Aug 90 p 12

[Branko Podgornik commentary: "The Responsibility of the Army"]

[Text] Everybody invokes the regulations that suit him. In a state which is at the same time coming apart and being reorganized, there are so many regulations that a legal cover can be found for every interest, if not today, then tomorrow.

Thus the new Defense Ministry of Slovenia recently announced that it will no longer send Slovene recruits outside the Fifth Military District, with the exception of those for whom no suitable military units are found in the region. It invoked the Assembly of Slovenia.

On Wednesday [15 August], however, the Federal Secretariat for National Defense again displayed its implacable position toward the demands to serve the Army "at home." It invoked the SFRY Constitution, federal laws, and other regulations which, as the Federal Secretariat stressed, must be implemented unconditionally.

Laws should indeed be respected, even if they were adopted at the time of a one-party monopoly when the assemblies were most frequently just a decoration of democracy, but they should be respected particularly now, when the assemblies in the western republics-states are becoming the unavoidable pillar of democracy.

If the laws contradict each other, one should talk, negotiate, harmonize the interests (which possess a democratic legitimacy), and then also the legislation. In the opposite case, all the moves and demands may have a legal cover but derive no benefit from it, and even crisis situations and clashes may arise. This applies particularly because there will undoubtedly be many more new laws in the republics, and a dialogue between the representatives of various interests is needed like our daily bread.

It seems that President Franjo Tudjman is a much more pragmatic and realistic politician than Janez Jansa. The secretariats for national defense of several communes in Croatia having demanded that one should imitate Slovenia, Franjo Tudjman said the following about the problem of recruits: "If they went to serve the Army according to one principle for 45 years...one can wait a certain time until the new constitution or the agreement on the structure of Yugoslavia is adopted, and then solve this problem on different principles." Tudjman thus indicated his readiness for talks which, by the way, he displays every day.

In this context, the question appears whether it is not logical that, considering its manifest implacability concerning the respect for the federal Constitution, laws, and regulations, the Army should also respect the republican constitutions, laws, and regulations adopted in a legitimate way, although republican regulations do not directly concern the Army (since it is not directly under the charge of the republics, although the reconstruction of Yugoslavia, during which the republics are obtaining all the attributes of statehood, will not be able to bypass it).

If, as the Army leaders frequently stress, the Yugoslav People's Army is one of the parts of this society which, because of its position so far, has a "right to be heard" during the negotiations on the new relations in Yugoslavia, the demand for the Army being responsible before each special interest within Yugoslavia is even more logical and understandable.

This (ir)responsible position of the Army is particularly manifested at present, after the demands for a referendum on the autonomy of the Serbs in Croatia. This referendum fails to conform not only to the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, but also to the rules under which referendums are conducted in the world, and it also defies political sense. Borisav Jovic, president of the SFRY Presidency, receives a delegation of the Serbs from Croatia and indicates, although in a concealed way, the possibility of the Army being used in case of interethnic clashes in Croatia. Jovan Raskovic openly calls for the Army to intervene, although at the same time he takes legally untenable steps—which are extremely dangerous politically—when he rejects a dialogue.

However, the Army again keeps silent about its renewed "use," illegal and politically dangerous, just as it kept silent during the intervention in Kosovo when, to the

almost general horror outside Serbia, it began to recognize accomplished political facts by those people who according to some assessments are probably the strongest in Yugoslavia, but who for the sake of their interests constantly pat the Army on its back.

Croat Ministers Meet Kucan During Slovene Trip

LD0409130290 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1018 GMT 4 Sep 90

[Text] Ljubljana, 4 Sep (TANJUG)—According to today's statement by the republican Secretariat for Information of Slovenia, Colonel-General Martin Spegelj, Croatian government minister for national defense, and Josip Boljkovak, Croatian Government minister for internal affairs, visited Slovenia yesterday.

They had talks with Janez Jansa, republican secretary for national defense of Slovenia, and with Igor Bavcar, republican secretary for Slovene internal affairs, on possible ways of resolving the military question in a confederation, and on internal aspects of the defense and security of Slovenia and Croatia.

Both Croatian government ministers were also received by Milan Kucan, president of the Presidency of the Republic of Slovenia.

Poll Conducted on Prospective Serbian Presidents

AU0509111190

[Editorial Report] Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian on 27 August on page 6 carries a 3,000-word report by Aleksandra Sajc and Boris Terzic on the results of BORBA's public opinion poll on prospective presidents of Serbia, entitled "For Milosevic, of Course."

Explaining how the poll was conducted, BORBA writes: "This poll, which BORBA published in four installments, was carried out between 20 and 25 July of 1990 in five Belgrade communes and four communes in Serbia proper (Loznica, Svetozarevo, Pozega, and Vranje). BORBA's team used the so-called 'quota sample' and interviewed 456 respondents. Their general age, sex, and education structure was chosen in such a way that it corresponds to the real structure in Serbia. As concerns the nationality composition, 83.3 percent of the respondents are Serbs, while the remaining 16.7 are of other nationality. The communes were randomly selected taking into account the degree of their economic development. Within every commune, we selected respondents according to the rural-town population ratio as established by the census. In this way we ensured that the sample is representative. Thanks to that, there is no reason for the results not to be representative for the population as a whole, although it would be methodologically incorrect to claim that this is necessary so."

The results of the poll are presented in four tables as follows:

Table 1.

"Who would you like to see as the president of Serbia after the multiparty elections?"

(bar chart depicting the views of the respondents from Serbia and Belgrade, in percentages)

	Serbia	Belgrade
1. S. Milosevic	51.3	38.7
2. V. Draskovic	9.65	7.26
3. J. Raskovic	1.5	2.4
4. D. Micunovic	1.3	4.03
5. Other leaders	4.17	4
6. Somebody else	14.9	16.9
7. Do not know	16.9	26.6

Table 2.

"To what extent are you satisfied with the way S. Milosevic is performing his duties as president of the Presidency of Serbia?"

(bar chart with figures expressed in percentages)

1. I am very satisfied	30.5
2. I am generally satisfied	37.7
3. I am neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	17.3
4. I am generally dissatisfied	6.14
5. I am very dissatisfied	2.85
6. Do not know/something else	5.48

Table 3.

"Who will in your opinion be the strongest opposing candidate at the presidential elections in Serbia?"

(bar chart with figures expressed in percentages)

1. V. Draskovic	14.5
2. S. Milosevic	5.26
3. J. Raskovic	3.73
4. R. Andjelkovic	1.32
5. D. Micunovic	1.1
6. Others	5.48
7. There is no such person	32.47
8. Do not know	36.2

Table 4.

"How should a candidate at the next elections declare himself if he is to get your vote?"

(bar chart with figures expressed in percentages)

1. As a Serb	29.24
2. As a citizen	17.36
3. As a citizen of Yugoslavia	11.79

Table 4. (Continued)

"How should a candidate at the next elections declare himself if he is to get your vote?"

(bar chart with figures expressed in percentages)

4. As a democrat	10.47
5. As a worker	9.14
6. As a socialist	7.14
7. As an anti-communist	3.49
8. As a communist	1.66
9. As something else	9.72

SDS Political Platform Presented in Mitrovica

AU0409080790 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 23 Aug 90 p 8

[M. Sasic report: "Separatist Ideas From Slovenia and Croatia Cannot Hinder the Idea of Yugoslavism"]

[Excerpts] Sremska Mitrovica, 22 Aug—The Socialist Party of Serbia [SDS] today presented its program at two big rallies in Sremska Mitrovica. Petar Skundric, general secretary of the party's Main Committee, spoke in front of the full hall of the local assembly building, while Nedeljko Sipovac, president of the Provincial Committee of the League of Communists of Vojvodina, addressed an exceptionally well-visited rally in the cellulose and paper factory, Matroz.

Having defined the basic principles of the SDS—humanism, social justice, equality, solidarity and protection for all, individual freedoms, the emancipation of peoples and nationalities—Skundric said:

We Are Creating a Political Center of the Struggle for New Democracy

"The aim of our political action is to preserve the integrity and unity of Serbia, something that was won together with the people during the time of dramatic political events. Our aim is therefore to build Serbia which will be a prosperous and democratic community of all of its citizens. What we are striving for and what we will be recognized by is the success of socialism in Serbia and Yugoslavia.

"The validity of this program and policy will be tested at the multiparty elections. In the SDS we will create a political center of the struggle for new democracy, without hasty and light elation and intolerable simplification. We will not repeat the old mistakes and will not have fateful illusions about automatic progress just because we have opted for a good program. [passage omitted]

"Our policy concerning the national question is the policy of national freedom as natural freedom. Nobody has the right to threaten this freedom. The law-governed state is obliged to protect the SFRY as a federal community of equal and free nations and citizens."

Our Community" Instead of Yugoslavia

"Our attitudes toward events in the Knin region are based on this platform. We demand that the rights and freedoms of the Serbian people in Croatia be respected. Proceeding from this basis, we condemn most energetically the actions of a group of extremists, the Serbian Chetnik Movement, and the Serbian Renewal Movement who abused the repression of the Serbian people in Croatia for the promotion of Chetnik ideas. We most energetically oppose the revival of the specters of the past and cannot allow marginal retrograde forces in Serbia to inflict damage to Serbia.

"Proceeding from the platform, we also oppose the impudent attacks launched from the pan-Muslim positions by the Party of Democratic Action (the Sandzak branch) on interethnic and personal relations in the republic. Their open support to the separatist movement in Kosovo and Metohija and the intention to turn it into an Islamic-fundamentalist movement will not sway us from our firm intention to persist in the struggle to find a solution to the crisis in Kosovo and Metohija as soon as possible. Solving the crisis in Kosovo and Metohija is the prime, national, ethic, historic, and state question of Serbia which cannot be, as we have clearly stated, negotiated or bargained over." [passage omitted]

Nedeljko Sipovac, president of the Provincial Committee of the League of Communists of Vojvodina, expressed doubt in the sincerity of the party promoted by the president of the Federal Executive Council. Speaking in the factory of cellulose and paper in Sremska Mitrovica, he said that members of the government are increasingly often using the phrase "our community" instead of Yugoslavia.

Sipovac stressed the readiness of the workers to bear the burden of the stabilization policy, but, as he said, this patience will not last forever. [passage omitted]

Raskovic Discusses Program With Press

LD0509173190 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1402 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 5 Sep (TANJUG)—The Serbs in Croatia are asking for nothing more than a cultural autonomy, like that enjoyed by the Albanians in Kosovo. However, should there by no confederation, the Serbian people in Croatia will demand territorial autonomy and—in case of the country's complete break-up—the right to decide which side to follow and what further steps to take.

In this way Academician Jovan Raskovic, chairman of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) main committee, formulated the key stands of the party's program. At a press conference in the International Press Center today, he made public for the first time that one of the possible options in the case of Yugoslavia's break-up would be "the creation of agglomeration" (aglomeracija) of Serbs in Croatia with Bosanska Krajina. [passage omitted]

Raskovic was quoted as saying that he personally did not believe that Serbs in Croatia would be a target of a direct and general attack. However, he forecasts aggressions on a smaller scale, and interrogations and harassment of Serbs from the bottom to the top. He does not expect direct aggression because, as he explained, "the Croatian leadership is not independent and must consult the FRG, the Vatican, and the United States whose democratic parties will not allow bloodshed."

The party leader of the Serbs in Croatia said that after two meetings with Croatian President Tudjman ("both went wrong") he no longer wishes to meet him, unless the latter comes to Knin. He denied rumors that he would resign ("I do not and will not think about it"), and spoke emotionally about an "outrageous hunt." I am not and I shall never be a politician, I am a talkative and civilized man, and I did not leave the party when the police minister (ministar policije) approached me, and I shall not do it even if they cheat and deceive me, he added.

Raskovic said that he did not know whether Miro Baresic is really the instructor of Croatia's "special units" (specijalci), but he is certain that Baresic should not be allowed to return to the country. Dr. Milan Babic, chairman of the Serbian National Council (Srpsko Nacionalno Vece), noted in this connection that he received the information about Baresic being the instructor from his brother.

Serbian Opposition Rally Scheduled in Belgrade

AU0509184190 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 4 Sep 90 p 4

["I.R"-signed report: "Opposition Meeting—12 September"]

[Text] Belgrade—Serbian opposition groups have recently begun preparations for a great protest rally scheduled for 12 September (from 1500 to 1800) on Republic Square in Belgrade by holding meetings of organizational centers and registering the meeting with the city Secretariat for Internal Affairs.

Members of the opposition have already printed 150,000 invitations to the meeting, organized a supervisory service of 350 people, provided a sound system, and made two five meter-long tricolors (without any symbols) which will hang above the main podium at the meeting.

This time, the opposition will not adhere to the rule respected at the 13 June demonstrations whereby there were no special party symbols on Republic Square. On Wednesday, 12 September, everyone will have the opportunity to bring what they want to the main opposition rally as regards party and demonstration banners.

Draft Serbian Constitution Drops Word 'Socialist'

LD0409131190 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1011 GMT 4 Sep 90

[Text] Belgrade, 4 Sep (TANJUG)—In the working text of the draft of the new Serbian Constitution, which will be considered on Friday [7 September] by the Serbian Assembly's Constitutional Commission, the ideological specification "socialist" is removed from the present name of the Republic. Serbia will be called only the Republic of Serbia, while the autonomous provinces will be called the Province of Vojvodina and the Province of Kosovo and Metohija.

Constitutional and legislative authority will reside in the National Assembly, the function of head of state will reside in the president of the republic, and executive power in the government.

MAAK Calls for Limited Party Ban in Macedonia

AU0509163290 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 28 Aug 90 p 10

[I. Kocan report: "Against Emissaries From Kosovo"]

[Text] Skopje—Events in Western Macedonia in the last few months which have been caused by the appearance of parties organized on a purely religious or nationalist basis, as well as the mechanical influx of citizens from Kosovo, led by emissaries with "rich" separatist biographies, are a crude attack on Macedonian statehood and sovereignty. This was stressed at a recent news conference given by the Movement for All-Macedonian Action (MAAK) in Skopje, at which it was announced that this party will demand that state organs establish the actual situation and, on the basis of the still valid constitutional principles and legal regulations, ban the further activity of the Party for Democratic Prosperity [Partija za Demokratski Prosperitet], the People's Party [Narodna Partija], the Community of Democratic Youth [Zajednica Demokratske Omladine], and the Party for Democratic Action [Party za Demokratsku Akciju] in Macedonia, as well as prevent the future activities of emissaries from Kosovo.

In the assessment of MAAK, these measures are unavoidable for the further continuation of democratic processes in the Socialist Republic of Macedonia and are in the interest of the Macedonian people and minorities which live in Macedonia. As stated at this meeting, MAAK thinks that Albanians, Turks, Romanies, and the rest should have all the rights and obligations guaranteed by international conventions and agreements.

At the same time, the MAAK Presidium has been following the recent events in Knin and other communes in Croatia with a mainly Serbian population with great concern and thinks that room always exists for reasonable dialogue and a solution with mutual respect of the Croatian and Serbian peoples. However, the referendum on cultural autonomy among Serbs should not mean a threat to the state and territorial integrity of Croatia.

The Party of Yugoslavs [Partija Jugoslovena] in this republic has also made a statement concerning the events in Western Macedonia, completely supporting the proposal of the Republican Community of Cultural-Scientific Manifestations of Muslim Macedonians [Republicka Zajednica Kulturno-Naucnih Manifestacija Makedonaca-Muslimana] that the Macedonian Assembly discuss the political security situation in Western Macedonia. The Party of Yugoslavs in Macedonia assesses that a unique drive by Albanian nationalists and separatists is under way in Western Macedonia for the Albanization and annexation of this part of Macedonian national and state territory to a "Greater Albania." This party points out to the republican authorities of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia that they are obliged to take all measures envisioned by the Constitution and the law to prevent this nationalist activity and accuses the authorities of doing nothing to stop the activities of the Albanian nationalist alternative movement from Kosovo and Metohija in towns and villages in Western Macedonia.

Macedonian 'Democratic Prosperity' Party Founded

AU3008190690 Skopje FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT in Albanian 26 Aug 90 p 2

[Enver Shala report: "A Democratic Race That Leads to Europe"]

[Excerpt] Tetovo, 25 Aug—The founding electoral conference of the Party of Democratic Prosperity in Macedonia [Partia e Prosperitetit Demokratik ne Maqedoni—PPDM] was held today in the "19 November" Cinema in Tetovo in the presence of 181 delegates and many guests. Genc Kuriu, president of the Tetovo Branch, formally opened the meeting in Albanian, Macedonian, and Turkish, and after greeting those present gave the floor to Nevzat Halili, PPDM president.

Reading his report in Albanian and Macedonian, Nevzat Halili dwelt primarily on the work and basic principles of the party's activities so far. Thanks to democratic processes in Macedonia, we are gathered here to speak freely and frankly about democracy in the language of democracy, without fear of anybody subjecting us to ideopolitical differentiation, even though there has been no lack of unprincipled attacks on the part of various individuals and parties which seek to turn back the wheel of history. Our main aim is a free and democratic Europe without borders, and we invite all democratic peoples to join the democratic and cultural race for a border-free Europe. Nevzat Halili then continued: The forthcoming free and secret elections will make it possible for we ourselves to nominate and elect the most capable and progressive people. The PPDM program nowhere mentions a single national community, and does not talk about a single culture, language, tradition, symbol, or national history, or the right to education in only one language or for adherents of a single religion. We are committed to the genuine rule of law, not the Milosevic-style rule of law which is enforced exclusively for the Albanians in Kosovo. The PPDM recognizes the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. It recognizes Macedonia as an equal unit in the Yugoslav federation or confederation and only as the state of all its citizens. It recognizes nobody's right to feel like a landlord or tenant in our common home. The PPDM will devote all its human and professional energies to improving the grave economic situation, and will invite workers abroad to invest their capital. The PPDM is ready for cooperation with all democratic parties in the republic and beyond, something which has been missing so far, if this cooperation is of mutual benefit.

Some Demands

He then repeated many demands of citizens and members of the party which were put forward during the party's earlier activity. The following demands were greeted with applause: for the freedom of all citizens of Macedonia to use their own languages at all levels; for the right to education in one's mother tongue at all levels; for the reopening of Albanian- and Turkish-language streams in all secondary schools; for the return to work of all differentiated workers, especially in education; for secondary education to be made compulsory by law; for equal consideration to be given to all national historical figures and literature; for place-names to be used according to the languages and traditions of all peoples; for the free use of national symbols; for the return of Albanian, Turkish, and Muslim Macedonian emigrants to Turkey and elsewhere, if they wish to return and have committed no crimes against the state and the people; for more radio and television programs in Albanian and Turkish; for the possibility of introducing schools and broadcasting in the Romany and Vlach languages to be considered; for daily newspapers in Albanian and Turkish and new theaters; for the revival of social and artistic associations; for justice in employment on the basis of social humanitarianism; for the right of parents to name their children, and for population policy to be defined in a civilized and democratic way; and for Amendments 43 and 56 of the Macedonian Constitution to be reconsidered, because their present content falls below the standards of the Republic of Krusevo in 1903 and the spirit of the first meeting of ASNOM [Antifascist Council for the National Liberation of Macedonia]. [passage omitted]

[The following passage appears boxed within the body of the item]

Nevzat Halili Elected President

The delegates to the Electoral Assembly of the PPDM elected by secret ballot Nevzat Halili as president. They also elected by secret ballot Mithat Emini from Tetovo as party secretary, and Sami Ibrahimi from Skopje and Arif Vinca from Struga as deputy secretaries.

Parties Propose United, Independent Macedonia

AU3108175290 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 17 Aug 90 p 5

[Nenad Batkoski article: The Victim of New and Alien Domination"]

[Text] Skopje—Until recently, advocating the confederal setup of Yugoslavia in Macedonia would be considered to be heresy and anybody who would present such an idea in public would be in an unpleasant position because of such "heretical thoughts."

It seems that the idea of a federal Yugoslavia based on the principles of AVNOJ [Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia] enjoyed firm support in Macedonia much longer than elsewhere in Yugoslavia. Today, however—if one is to judge by political parties' programs and the public speeches made by their leaders—it seems that the most vociferous support is given to the confederal status of Macedonia and the original sovereignty of the republics. According to this view, the federal state should be given "what the republics agree upon." Leaders of individual parties, primarily the VMRO [full name VMRO-DPMNE—Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity], MAAK [Movement for All-Macedonian Action], and the People's Party, are offering—as one of the possible and probable options—an autonomous and independent Macedonian state, that is, a united Macedonia.

The Radical VMRO

Ljupco Georgijevski is the leader of the VMRO-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity, which seems to have most radical demands and which has been polarizing the public lately and angering other Macedonian political parties because of its provocative views. At the latest protest rally in Ohrid which was organized on the occasion of the desecration of Macedonian memorial plaques in the Prohor Pcinjski Monastery and the militia intervention directed against Macedonian citizens, Georgijevski addressed the party's members and supporters who had gathered there and demanded that "Macedonian Assembly should adopt a political declaration on the independence and sovereignty of Macedonia."

"I want to awaken the Macedonian people and to tell them that Yugoslavia has been falling apart and that it no longer exists in the form in which we used to know it. We must know that in the near future we will be able to choose only one of the following two roads: to have an independent sovereign state in a confederal Yugoslavia or to accept a form of Serboslavia, that is, a return to the old Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes," Georgijevski said and pointed out that the idea of Yugoslavism presents danger to the Macedonian people, because it would be overwhelming and would smother the Macedonian national consciousness.

The other leader of this party, Dragan Bogdanovski, who had spent several years in Macedonian prisons because of his ideas about Macedonia and who was a political emigre during the past several years, is accusing Slobodan Milosevic and the Serbian leadership of being responsible for the breakup of Yugoslavia claiming that "they have aggravated national disputes with Croats, Slovenes, and Albanians to the extreme, and are trying to do the same with Macedonians."

"Through such a Byzantine policy, Milosevic wants to force the two economically stronger peoples, Croats and Slovenes, to leave the federation to be able to form a Great Serbia with the other republics," Bogdanovski says and calls on the Macedonian citizens to vote VMRO at the coming elections, the party which supports "confederalist status of Macedonia or the status of national sovereignty."

The Movement for All-Macedonian Action, MAAK, which is led by well-known Macedonian writers, Ante Popovski and Gane Todorovski, says in the manifest it deposited in the ASNOM [Anti-Fascist Assembly of People's Liberation of Macedonia] Memorial Museum in the Prohor Pcinjski Monastery on 2 August that "AVNOJ Yugoslavia has been using up its last chances to continue its existence as a federation and that Slovenia and Croatia have categorically decided in favor of confederal setup," that "advocating a truncated and asymmetrical Yugoslavia is nothing more than a political trick through which Macedonia is to become a victim of a new alien domination," that "with its four neighbors—Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia—Macedonia should build symmetrical relations based on equal conditions," and points out that "Macedonia's position at the moment is forced: If the Yugoslav federation cannot hold together, there is no other choice left to Macedonia but an independent and sovereign state of Macedonia."

Independent News Agency

At their latest news conference, the MAAK leaders said that they advocate a formation of an independent Macedonian news agency, that they want Macedonia to have its own diplomacy which will take the best care of the Macedonian people's interests in the Balkans, they want the Skopje Radio and Television to change its name into Macedonian Radio and Television, and both MAAK and VMRO want Macedonian militiamen to leave Kosovo.

Party of Yugoslavs Is an Exception

It seems that the only party to firmly support the federal setup of Yugoslavia is the Macedonian branch of the Party of Yugoslavs. For the first five months after its formation, the League for Democracy of Macedonia had also advocated a democratic federal Yugoslavia, but in the wake of the latest events in the country, even for this party, a federal Yugoslavia has become only one of the possible options. At its last session at which it discussed Yugoslavia's future, the Central Council of the Social Democratic Party of Macedonia did not touch upon the

dilemma between confederation and federation, but stressed that it advocates "Yugoslavia in which republics will possess original sovereignty, and foreign policy, defense, and macroeconomics along with a taxation policy which will be entrusted with the federal state." The Party of Democratic Prosperity, whose members and supporters are mostly Albanians says in its program, that it supports the sovereignty of the Macedonian state and the inviolability of the Yugoslav borders, but at the same time wants Albanians in Yugoslavia to be given the status of a people. The latest election program of Petar Gosev's "ruling" LCM [former initials of the League of Communists of Macedonia]-Party of Democratic Prosperity still gives its first and foremost support to AVNOJ Yugoslavia, but points out that unless an agreement is reached among the Yugoslav peoples about a federal community, it leaves open the possibility for Macedonia to be organized as a confederate state or a "fully independent state, if other Yugoslav peoples decide in favor of such a solution." Representatives of official state organs in the republic also point out their federal orientation, but even to them this seems to be the "optimum" solution in which one believes less and less. In his latest speech in Krusevo, Vladimir Mitkov, president of the Republican Presidency, said that "Macedonia is prepared for any option."

It would have been too pretentious to precisely list all the causes that made the stands of the Macedonian public completely turn from a firm and persistent support for an AVNOJ-based federation to the advocation of a confederate or an independent Macedonian state. It is on these orientations that Macedonian political parties place great hopes for the elections which are planned for November. One could say here that—apart from the process of changes on the Yugoslav political scene and constant confrontations in Yugoslavia, as well as the ever more opene confrontation with the Serbian neighbor—the change in mood has certainly been influenced by the changes in the Eastern European Balkan countries. The poor rating of Yugoslavia among Macedonian political parties can also be explained by the fact that Yugoslav diplomats have not been committed enough in solving the problem of the Macedonian national minorities in the neighboring countries.

There remains, however, the bitter feeling that Macedonian political parties have thereby joined the everyday debates leading to the so-called third or fourth Yugoslavia, particularly prior to the adoption of the new constitution. The attempt to present all this haggling about Yugoslavia as trying to take up a better negotiating position is unprecedented in its sarcasm. Of course, the question remains open as to whether—just as the case was in other republics—this haggling about Yugoslavia will bring election points to Macedonian political parties, or it will push them into destruction.

'Electoral Inequality' in Bosnia-Hercegovina

AU0109153790 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 18-19 Aug 90 p 6

[Zeljko Vukovic article: "When Anarchy Shapes Power: Electoral Inequality in Bosnia-Hercegovina"]

[Text] After the recent adoption of the election law and the constitutional amendments on which the future power after the elections is to be based, there is no doubt any more that the November change of the regime in this Yugoslav state will necessarily be a great fraud. Evidence is unfortunately inexorable.... Instead of promised democracy, which should be the key part of political and other power, the Bosnians and Hercegovinians have obtained a system in which their role in the political life is reduced to the "election machinery" which alone can and must give the legal legitimacy to the parties [stranke i partije] that vie for power. To be specific, the citizens of Bosnia-Hercegovina will be able to vote only for party lists and not for individuals, which is pernicious for a true democracy and insulting to citizens' awareness. This deprivation of the Bosnians and Hercegovinians on the one hand, and the "excessive power" of the party leaders and leaderships on the other, is further aggravated and made dangerous by the fact that no party has an economic program that would allow the voters to decide exclusively according to their national or ideological affiliation or inclination.

The future deputies in the bicameral parliament will be practically elected by the party leaderships, which means that they will above all be responsible to these leaderships and not to the Bosnians and Hercegovinians whom they formally represent. More precisely, their political careers, and thus also their social and financial status will depend on how much they, as deputies, decide according to the will of their respective party leaderships. If the party leaders are satisfied with them, a possible dissatisfaction of the voters can have the effect merely of generalized public criticism.

This means that the Bosnians and Hercegovinians now grant their future power (whoever may "exercise" it) everything that they have denounced and continue to denounce concerning the communist power. Specifically, they have legalized a machinery of power that has made them unhappy once before. If the communist power had to resort to various demagogic procedures to cover up the fact that it had an absolute hold on the cadre policy, those who come into power after November will not have to do so.

However, all the trouble is not just that the citizens of Bosnia- Hercegovina have agreed to have the insulting status of somebody providing legitimacy to an a priori alienated power even under a multiparty system. While they were "voluntarily" forced to elect one and the same power for decades, the Bosnians and Hercegovinians were all equally deprived of their rights, above all as citizens, as well as members of peoples, nations, and so forth. In a multiparty system—such as they agreed

to—the essential change will be the fact that they will not all be equally deprived of their rights and unequal. This can be fatal for the existence of Bosnia-Hercegovina and beyond.

Voters To Suit Authorities

The facts are incorruptible. The electoral system is such that the national structure of the bicameral parliament (a Chamber of Citizens and a Chamber of Communes) will have to agree with the national structure of the population of this republic, with a permitted deviation of 15 percent. In places where greater deviations occur, the elections will be annulled. The will of the voters must suit the authorities, and not the other way round as democracy demands.

Necessarily one will no longer be able to talk about the equality or the equal inequality of the Bosnia-Hercegovina people at all. For instance, the Croatian people are handicapped from the start. They constitute only 17 percent of the total population of the republic, and they are entitled to the same percentage of the seats in the parliament and in state organs. They will have only one representative in the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina (the Muslims will have three, the Serbs two, and "others" one). In practical terms this means that they are a priori deprived of their rights as one of the three state-building peoples. If Bosnia-Hercegovina is constitutionally defined as a community of equal members of the three sovereign peoples, their Presidency should be obligatorily composed on a parity principle, which means two Muslims, two Croats, two Serbs, and one "other." Until Bosnia- Hercegovina becomes above all a state of the citizens living in it, any other combination means depriving one people of their sovereignty or granting the privilege of the majority to another.

The equality of the three state-building peoples in Bosnia-Hercegovina will necessarily be endangered in the assembly itself. The Chamber of Communes is merely an imitation of the Chamber of Citizens and is virtually superfluous. Instead of this chamber, a Chamber of Peoples should have been introduced for the sake of equality in which every people would have an equal number of deputies regardless of their proportion of the total population. In democratic society, a Chamber of Citizens is composed of freely elected people's deputies and its task is above all to take care of the economic situation of the citizens of the republic. In this chamber, citizens' interests and not national interests are protected. In this case, the Chamber of Peoples, composed on a parity principle, would take care of national equality. However, the creators of the future power have decided otherwise.

Concealing Facts

Undoubtedly, the new structure of power will lead the Bosnians and Hercegovinians to new divisions and quarrels, and even clashes. At the time of the communist regime, their only identity was patriotic self-managing, but after November, they will only have their national identity. If it happens that the national parties share power in Bosnia-Hercegovina—which is probable at the moment—the chances that the citizens of Bosnia-Hercegovina will be additionally manipulated by party leaderships in their struggle for power grow like a geometric progression.

To cover up the fact that the new order necessarily produces inequality of the three state-building peoples (not to even mention the denial of the rights of citizens), the authors of the proposal invoke a parliamentary body which is to be called the Council for the Equality of Bosnia-Hercegovina Peoples. This will be a commission on a parity basis which would intervene in cases of violations of this equality. Realism indicates that this commission, objectively speaking, will not be able to fulfill its task. The final decisions are adopted by the parliament, and since the deputies are elected strictly by the will of the party leaderships, it is to be expected that they will cast "bloc" votes. This means that if a party can and wants to violate equality, it will be able to do this quite lawfully, despite the said commission.

It is also false to say that no national party will possess an absolute majority and thus hold power. In order to form a government, the elections laws say, no one needs a majority of over 50 percent. For instance, hypothetically it may be as follows: If the Muslim party wins 30 percent of votes and this is the best result, it has the right to form a (coalition) government. Of course, it pays attention to the said proportional provisions. In this case, the influence of the Croats in the government will be merely symbolic.

Underground Present Power

When all is added up, it appears that the future regime in Bosnia-Hercegovina best suits the most numerous people in Bosnia- Hercegovina, the Muslims. More precisely, it best suits the leadership of the party that represents their interests. Equality and peace among the Bosnia-Hercegovina peoples will in fact depend most on the policy the leadership of this party will conduct. It depends on their goodwill to chose either to be the "cement" of future Bosnia-Hercegovina as a community of three state-building peoples and the others, or to reshape the republic according to their own political and other views.

A state in which the elementary civil and human rights depend on the will of the ruling party or the party with the greatest influence in a coalition, is far from being democratic, particularly when citizens do not even possess the right to vote for the individuals who will rule them in the coming four years.

The installation of the future regime in Bosnia-Hercegovina, which will certainly be undemocratic, has passed quite unnoticed, virtually as if were an underground act. Who are its actual authors? Logically, they are the present authorities. However, no one in Bosnia-Hercegovina admits this. More precisely, the communists have formally renounced power and produced an illusion of "anarchy." Actually, if it is true that the communists are not the creators of the future regime,

who has decided on the future power? The delegates of the Bosnia-Hercegovina Assembly merely approved this political project according to the standard procedure. As usual, the creators are not on the stage.

Whoever the author of the election system and the structure of the future power in Bosnia-Hercegovina may be, he acted against democracy and the true interests of Bosnia-Hercegovina citizens. The fact that the Bosnians and Hercegovinians will be able to go to the polls again in four years' time is no consolation. Since the cadre policy, as the "policy above all policies," has been given over to party leaderships, the control of the public over the authorities will not be any stronger than the control it had over the communist power.

The fear of what is in store for the Bosnia-Hercegovina citizens after the inauguration of the new government is intensified by the fact that no political regime gets established by accident. The picture of "anarchy" created in the public has above all the purpose of concealing the true authors and creators of the future regime. The fact that the future regime in Bosnia-Hercegovina is just a superstructure of the communist regime can signify only that these authors are experienced. It does not matter whether they gained their experience as "executors" in the communist regime or as analysts.

Markovic Reaffirms Policy in Tuzla Address

LD0509060890 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1617 GMT 4 Sep 90

[Text] Tuzla, 4 Sep (TANJUG)—The Federal Executive Council [FEC] will persist in its program of reform measures and their implementation, especially in the convertibility and exchange rate of the dinar, regardless of the new processes in our economy.

This was stated this afternoon by FEC President Ante Markovic in talks with leadership of the municipal assembly of Tuzla.

Above all, Markovic said, this refers to the huge economic consequences caused by the Gulf crisis, which have a bad influence on the Yugoslav economy, particularly in Bosnia-Hercegovina. A drought will also cause further damage to our economy.

In spite of the fact that in election campaign in certain republics, almost everything is being politicized, including the economic measures, we will not give up the reform already underway, Markovic stressed during the talks.

As long as the initiated measures and laws are in force, he went on to say, they must be observed and consistently implemented, especially the law on personal income. Even more so, because the mass of personal income increased 50 percent in the month of August alone, for which there are no funds.

Before the meeting with representatives of Tuzla and talks in which Tuzla Municipal Assembly President Mirza Muratbegovic and President of its Executive Committee Silva Zaninovic took part, the FEC president was cordially greeted by hundreds of citizens in front of the Assembly in the town center.

Montenegrin Meetings With U.S. Envoy 'No Secret'

LD0509110190 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0950 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] Titograd, 5 Sep (TANJUG)—Mr. Warren Zimmermann, the U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia, met Dr. Ljubisa Stankovic, member of the Presidency of the Soviet Republic of Montenegro, in March and June of this year. They met within the framework of the former's working visits to Montenegro. On these occasions Zimmermann also held talks with other representatives of Montenegro's state leadership, including the president of the Presidium of the Montenegro League of Communists Central Committee. There exist official documents on Warren Zimmermann's visits to the republic's Foreign Relations Committee and on the republic's protocol.

This is being stressed in a statement issued by the Montenegro Information Secretariat, which leads to the conclusion that there have been no secret meetings between Stankovic and Zimmermann as claimed by some media sections. The statement says their meeting took place according to the republic's protocol.

The "claims" concerning an alleged secret meeting between Zimmermann and Stankovic provoked a strong reaction from the Central Committee of the Socialist Party, of which Stankovic is president. The Central Committee has called for an official report on the meeting.

Appeal Made for Citizens To Join Reform Alliance

AU0209203190 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 22 Aug 90 p 4

["Appeal" from the Initiative Committee for Founding the Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia; place and date not given: "Join Us"]

[Text] The Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia represents the core of a growing pan-Yugoslav pro-reform movement. It rallies all citizens who accept and support the Program of Economic and Political Reforms, irrespective of their national affiliation, religion, ideological views, or membership in some of the existing parties. This is a movement of the citizens of Yugoslavia, of all those who are fed up with quarrels, threats, confrontations, and various kinds of divisions, of all those who see and demand their right to the future and cohabitation in peace, economic prosperity, nonviolence, tolerance, dignity, and freedom.

By accepting the Program of Economic and Political Reforms, the citizens rallied in the Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia express the resoluteness to contribute with their political action to the elimination of the causes of the long-lasting crisis, the creation of the conditions for the future development of the country, and the normalization of every citizen's life. This development must be founded on democracy, a parliamentary

multiparty system, the rule-of-law, economic efficiency and entrepreneurialship, social justice, the preservation of cultural and natural heritage, a peaceful and free life in the Yugoslav community, and Yugoslavia's fastest and fullest possible inclusion in European and the world civilization, economy, and integration.

The Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia is a logical answer to the situation in the country and the opposition to the Program of Reforms. It is also an expression of the efficiency and success of the changes that have been carried out to this point. The results are obvious. Inflation has been eliminated. Let us not allow others to bring it back. The dinar has become a world currency for the first time ever. Let us not allow others make it worthless again. We have never had such foreign currency reserves, nor have our borders been more open to market competition. Almost all prices have been liberalized and subjected to the logic of the market. All forms of ownership have been made equal and the problem of everybody's and nobody's social property is being tackled. Our debts to other countries have been reduced. Foreign capital, which is endorsed and assured by our program of reforms, is finding its way to our country. We have the support of all friends of Yugoslavia in Europe and the world. Thanks to a number of adopted and proposed laws, we are becoming a democratic country founded on the rule of law and citizens' freedoms.

At the present time and under present conditions, the Program of Economic and Political Reforms of the Federal Executive Council—which is taking over as its political platform and represents the Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia—is the only real alternative to political confrontations and national frictions which are exhausting and destroying our social being and affecting people's normal life. This program is a guarantee that our country will not disintegrate and that attempts to resolve the crisis with the nondemocratic means, with which one cannot achieve anything, will be prevented. This program is a broad basis for all citizens and democratic forces to participate in the rearrangement of our community on the new bases and in a peaceful way by preserving what is sound and firm in its foundations. The realization of the Program of Reforms will fundamentally change the picture of Yugoslavia and the life of all of its citizens. The rule of dogmas, ideological myths, and everything that is outdated and obsolete is over. Obstacle to a new, modern, rich, democratic, and just society things are crumbling.

We want elections! We want elections, and only elections, to decide on the fate of Yugoslavia and of all of us. The Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia is launching a political action with the intention of rallying all citizens and reform political forces around its program of changes which will steer Yugoslavia out of the deep economic and political crisis and at the same time enable it to become a modern, efficient, and parliamentary country founded on the rule of law, a community of equal citizens—who would be voluntarily united through new agreements—and their sovereign states.

Therefore, we appeal to all citizens and all political forces and parties which accept the Program of Reforms to join the Alliance of Reform forces of Yugoslavia.

Our fate and our future are in our own hands! Let us rally around the program whose realization will ensure a peaceful, dignified, free, and richer life to all citizens of Yugoslavia.

Join us! Initiative Committee of the Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia

Nationals Leave Iraq in Kuwaiti-Registered Cars

AU0509103890 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] Yugoslavs in cars with Kuwaiti license plates are not having any problems in crossing the Turkish border with Iraq. However, the Iraqi authorities are not allowing thousands of other travelers to cross into Turkey precisely because their cars have Kuwaiti license plates. This is being claimed by Pakistani refugees who are stating that Iraqi authorities have been implementing this ban for the last two days.

Pakistani diplomats in Ankara state that refugees at the border must go back 1,800 kilometers in order to get Iraqi license plates, so many people either abandon or sell their cars.

Romania's Iliescu Departs Belgrade, Visits Zagreb

Democratization 'Irrevocable'

LD0509115490 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatiand 1034 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] Belgrade, 5 Sep (TANJUG)—Romanian President Ion Iliescu was today given a send-off with highest military honors at the end of his two-day official talks in Belgrade with top federal and Serbian officials. At Belgrade airport President Iliescu was seen off by the president of the SFRY Presidency, Borisav Jovic, and other top federal functionaries.

Before leaving Yugoslavia President Iliescu will later this afternoon pay a short visit to Zagreb for talks with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman.

Before leaving Belgrade the Romanian president gave a press conference in the Dvor at Dedinje—his official residence during the visit to Yugoslavia's capital. On this occasion he described his talks as wide-ranging and useful and expressed satisfaction with his visits and meetings in Yugoslavia.

President Iliescu stressed that during the talks with his Yugoslav counterpart an identity and high level of proximity of views was displayed especially regarding the further directions of developing bilateral cooperation, relations in the Balkans, the crisis in the Gulf, and current developments in Europe and the world.

The Romanian president also made a brief reference to the current situation in Romania, stressing that the course of democratization in his country is irrevocable and that it is being carried out not in order to curry favors with anybody but as the result of the people's needs and the commitment of the entire society.

Points Out 'New Style' of Talks

AU0509162290 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Dragan Petrovic report]

[Text] Concluding his three-day official visit to Yugoslavia, Romanian President Ion Iliescu has left for Zagreb where he had talks with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. Prior to his departure from Belgrade the prominent guest from Romania held a news conference for Yugoslav and foreign journalists. Here is a report by Dragan Petrovic:

[Petrovic] Summing up the numerous talks he had had with Yugoslav officials, Ion Iliescu said among other things:

[Begin Iliescu recording in Romanian fading into Serbo-Croation translation] We were pleased to notice a new style in the talks. Their basic characteristic was that they included no formalism and that they were frank and open [iskren i otvoren]. We briefed each other on the most current issues in Yugoslavia and Romania. We talked about the political and economic situation and the commitment of our countries in deepening democratic processes, as well as switching over to market economy. [end recording]

[Petrovic] Speaking about bilateral relations, Iliescu particularly pointed out the mutual desire to further economic cooperation. He said that new ideas on specific ways to further cooperation were presented both at the talks at the highest level as well as at the talks between ministers.

In the talks about the current international situation, we found great similarity and identicalness of views, the Romanian president said.

Speaking about the need to further multilateral cooperation in the Balkans, Iliescu stressed that under new conditions, when great changes have occurred both in the Balkans and in the processes in Europe in general, Yugoslavia and Romania are of the opinion that all Balkan countries must make their contribution to the security of Europe.

In this respect, Iliescu presented several new ideas to his interlocutors concerning, for example, the way to institutionalize further contacts between Balkan countries in many spheres, particularly in the sphere of ethnic relations and the position of national minorities in the Balkans. He stressed that this is a very important issue for this region.

The Romanian president then spoke about the internal situation in his country, stressing that, regarding the political sphere life is becoming calmer, although one cannot say so about the economic situation. In that sphere one is still beginning to correct the grave consequences and mistakes of the extreme centralization and extreme bureaucratization of the Ceausescu regime.

Notes Romanian Croats With Tudjman

LD0509205590 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1820 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] Zagreb, 5 Sep (TANJUG)—Process and problems in transition from a socialist to a democratic multi-party system were similar in Romania and Croatia, Romanian President Ion Iliescu and Croatian Republican President Franjo Tudjman said in talks in Zagreb today.

Iliescu is on a three-day visit to Yugoslavia.

Iliescu and Tudjman held hour-long talks on questions of cooperation and developing political, social and economic relations.

Tudjman said the transition to a multi-party democratic system in Yugoslavia's Slovenia and Croatia republics were less painful and easier than in Romania because Yugoslavia had a more democratic, self-management socialist system.

Tudjman expressed Croatia's interest in promoting the position of the Croatian national minority in Romania.

President Iliescu described measures implemented by Romania to secure conditions for the equal development of political, social and spiritual life of its citizens, including members of all peoples living in Romania.

'Plan' To Resettle Romanian Croats Criticized

AU0509144290 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 28 Aug 90 p 5

[Zvonko Tarle report: "A Change in the Ethnic Balance"]

[Excerpts] Istria is worried: A plan known as operation "Croats from Romania" has been discovered, unmasked but not disabled. The authors of this plan are ideologists of the Croatian Democratic Community, those same ones who settled Janjevo people from Kosovo in Zagreb on the eve of the first postwar elections. To a man, they all voted at that time for the Croatian Democratic Community and in the town of Dubrave, where they were staying, the first post-election ox was roasted. [passage omitted]

Operation "Croats from Romania" is the third attempt to essentially influence the demographic picture of Istria. It is necessary to inject Istria with the fresh, loyal, and nobly excited Croatian blood of around 20,000-30,000 Croatian souls and there is no doubt that the plan will succeed. Dr. Franjo Tudjman spoke about this in NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA. He said that the Romanian

Croats need to be helped and that they should be moved to Croatia where their abandoned homes are. Istria will be directly mentioned and even warned. Abandoned homes can nowadays only be found in Pazintina, Bujstina, and the villages around Buzet. Croats from Romania would find homes in these villages.

Numerous hindrances obviously exist. But also, what is more important, definite problems which would complicate the already fairly complicated position of Croatia and Yugoslavia in the international context. One should also cite the fact that European countries are signatories of a declaration which says that the structure of a region in which national minorities exist cannot be changed. This is particularly important because Italians also live in Istria and the reaffirmation of this national minority is under way. There are also some other ethnic groups—Montenegrins in Peroj and Romanians (Vlachs) in Mali, Veli Mlun, and Zeljano. There are significant groups of Slovenes. Istria is a region in three states (Croatia, Slovenia, and Italy) but the problem of borders has never been definitely resolved—there are those who think that the borders were created after the war at Croatia's expense but a not inconsiderable number of thinking people also point out the specific rights that Slovenia lost.

Croats from Romania, future firm voters for the Croatian Democratic Community, are not welcome in Istria. They would destroy the harmony of interethnic relations because they would unnecessarily politicize these relations. There is also a large group of inhabitants of Istria who call themselves Istrians. They are from mixed Roman-Slav marriages, often with a strong Croatian or Italian accent, and it is not unusual for one family to have three sons with three different surnames (Pauletta, Pauletich...).

It is good that the plan for settling Croats from Romania in Istria has been discovered. It is good that this has happened at the very beginning and that both the Croats and Italians of Istria and all political parties, apart from the Croatian Peasants Party (Istrian Peoples Party) and the Croatian Democratic Community, are resolutely against it being implemented. Even though Dr. Tudjman said that something must be done for Croats in the diaspora and particularly in Romania, it would not be good for anything to be done on our country's territory, at least not in a region with a sensitive national composition and harmonious relations. This would permanently upset relations and one pragmatic political act (for the sake of several thousand votes at the elections) could have far-reaching consequences—even in the elimination from the historical scene of some national minorities, either through assimilation or through their migration.